Την ίδια ώρα, στην Κίνα...

[Costas]

1.
(New York Review of Books Blog)
Στιγμιότυπα από την Έκθεση Βιβλίου του Λονδίνου, με γουστόζικες στιχομυθίες τού (αντικυβερνητικού) αρθρογράφου με Κινέζους υπαλλήλους και Κινέζους παράγοντες της Έκθεσης: -You're a shit. –Bici, bici.

2.
(New York Review of Books Blog)
Πολιτική νεκρολογία για τον εξόριστο "Κινέζο Ζάχαροφ" Fang Lizhi (1936-2012), και ένα σύγχρονο δείγμα damnatio memoriae:

News of his passing spread quickly on the Chinese Internet. Students whom he had taught in the 1980s and admirers of his eloquent championing of human rights wrote their accolades. State Security officials noticed, and within hours ordered Internet police to delete all messages that mentioned the words “Fang Lizhi.” After that, tweets about Fang on Weibo (the Chinese version of Twitter) disappeared about a minute after posting.

 

[Costas]

Στην Τσοχατζοπουλειάδα του 'μαοΐζοντος' Μπο Ξ(Σ)ιλάι φιγουράρουν αδερφοί, αδερφές, γυναίκα και γιος που κατέχουν και επενδύουν εκατομμύρια δολάρια. Ένα άρθρο κι ένας γενεαλογικός χάρτης. (ΝΥΤ)

 

[Costas]

Dear all,

It is my pleasure to announce to you today the Leiden Weibo Corpus (LWC), an annotated linguistic 100-million word corpus containing 5.1 million messages from Sina Weibo, China¹s premier Twitter-like microblogging service.

The LWC is freely available online at http://lwc.daanvanesch.nl/. Data for the LWC was collected in January 2012. As such, it contains many linguistic phenomena that may not be found in older corpora, such as suffixation with '-ing', an aspectual marker borrowed from English.

Furthermore, Sina Weibo messages come with valuable meta data, such as the gender of the user and his location. This information allows the LWC to calculate how often words are used in different provinces and cities across China, which is useful for research into lexical variation across China.

Naturally, the LWC also supports searching for single words or grammar patterns, such as 'any verb followed by an aspectual particle and then a noun'. This feature may also be of interest to students and teachers of Mandarin who are looking for example sentences.

Please feel free to forward this announcement to anyone who might be interested. Any feedback regarding the LWC would be greatly appreciated; please send it to daanvanesch@gmail.com.

Best wishes,

Daan van Esch
graduate student in Chinese linguistics
Leiden University, the Netherlands

 

[nickel]

Αν ξέρεις, κάνε τον κόπο να μου λύσεις μια απορία: αυτό το «suffixation with '-ing'» γίνεται ελεύθερα και δυναμικά; Δηλαδή, για να δούμε το αντίστοιχο στα ελληνικά, θα ήταν όχι το να παίρνουμε από τα αγγλικά έτοιμες λέξεις σε —ινγκ (κάμπινγκ, μπόουλινγκ) αλλά το να φτιάχνουμε και δικές μας προσθέτοντας το —ινγκ σε ελληνικές ρίζες: το ψωνίζινγκ, το λακωνίζινγκ εστί φιλοσοφίνγκ. Αυτό περιγράφει ή κάτι άλλο;

 

[daeman]

Το γόπινγκ, το τσάπινγκ, το φύλλινγκ, το απαρεμφάτινγκ (γερουνδίζειν, ελληνιστί). ;)

 

[Costas]

το να φτιάχνουμε και δικές μας προσθέτοντας το —ινγκ σε ελληνικές ρίζες: το ψωνίζινγκ, το λακωνίζινγκ εστί φιλοσοφίνγκ.

Αυτό. Ρήμα κινέζικο + ing, με υπονοούμενο ένα οριστικό άρθρο. Π.χ. τα 1, 2, 5, 6, 10 εδώ.

 

[nickel]

Α, ακόμα χειρότερα! Το λακωνίζing εστί φιλοσοφing.

 

[Costas]

Κανονικά, υπάρχει αντίστοιχο του ing, και είναι το 着 (zhe), π.χ. [1][2] κλπ., αλλά ίσως αυτό να μην είναι αρκετά ονοματικοποιημένο, ίσως δηλ. να είναι περισσότερο "-οντας" και λιγότερο "το+απαρέμφατο".

 

[Costas]

Σκανδάλου Μπο Ξ(Σ)ιλάι συνέχεια. Ο Μπο παρακολουθούσε τα τηλεφωνήματα του προέδρου της Κίνας Χου Τζιν-τάο που (θεωρούσε ότι) τον αφορούσαν. Η δοσολογία της παρακολούθησης ξεπερνάει τα συνήθη επίπεδα της 'δημοκρατικής' Δύσης [Ουοτεργκέιτ κττ.]. (ΝΥΤ)

When Hu Jintao, China’s top leader, picked up the telephone last August to talk to a senior anticorruption official visiting Chongqing, special devices detected that he was being wiretapped — by local officials in that southwestern metropolis.
(...)
The story of how China’s president was monitored also shows the level of mistrust among leaders in the one-party state. To maintain control over society, leaders have embraced enhanced surveillance technology. But some have turned it on one another — repeating patterns of intrigue that go back to the beginnings of Communist rule. [Α ρε, Φέλιξ Εντμούντοβιτς, πού 'σαι να καμαρώσεις τους επιγόνους σου!]
(...)
The [Neil Heywood] murder account is pivotal to the scandal, providing Mr. Bo’s opponents with an unassailable reason to have him removed. But party insiders say the wiretapping was seen as a direct challenge to central authorities.
(...)
“Everyone across China is improving their systems for the purposes of maintaining stability,” said one official with a central government media outlet, referring to surveillance tactics. “But not everyone dares to monitor party central leaders.” ["Maintaining stability" είναι η επίσημη κωδική ονομασία του παλιού δικού μας "Ησυχία τάξις και ασφάλεια".]
(...)
One of several noted cybersecurity experts they [ο Μπο και το δεξί του χέρι, ο μπάτσος Ουάνγκ] enlisted was Fang Binxing, president of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, who is often called the father of China’s “Great Firewall,” the nation’s vast Internet censorship system. Most recently, Mr. Fang advised the city on a new police information center using cloud-based computing, according to state news media reports. Late last year, Mr. Wang was named a visiting professor at Mr. Fang’s university.
(...)
Li Zhuang, a lawyer from a powerfully connected Beijing law firm, recalled how some cousins of one client had presented him with a full stack of unregistered mobile phone SIM cards, warning him of local wiretapping. Despite these precautions, the Chongqing police ended up arresting Mr. Li on the outskirts of Beijing, about 900 miles away, after he called his client’s wife and arranged to visit her later that day at a hospital.
(...)
Mr. Bo had tried to tap the phones of virtually all high-ranking leaders who visited Chongqing in recent years, including Zhou Yongkang, the law-and-order czar [1][2 (σάιτ του Αμερικ. Κογκρέσου)] who was said to have backed Mr. Bo as his potential successor.
(...)
Beyond making a routine inspection, it is not clear why the disciplinary official who telephoned Mr. Hu — Ma Wen, the minister of supervision — was in Chongqing. Her high-security land link to Mr. Hu from the state guesthouse in Chongqing was monitored on Mr. Bo’s orders. The topic of the call is unknown but was probably not vital. Most phones are so unsafe that important information is often conveyed only in person or in writing.
But Beijing was galled that Mr. Bo would wiretap Mr. Hu, whether intentionally or not, and turned central security and disciplinary investigators loose on his police chief, who bore the brunt of the scrutiny over the next couple of months.
(...)
...tensions between the two men crested, sources said, when Mr. Bo found that Mr. Wang had also wiretapped him and his wife. After Mr. Wang was arrested in February, Mr. Bo detained Mr. Wang’s wiretapping specialist from Liaoning, a district police chief named Wang Pengfei.
Internal party accounts suggest that the party views the wiretapping as one of Mr. Bo’s most serious crimes. One preliminary indictment in mid-March accused Bo of damaging party unity by collecting evidence on other leaders.
Party officials, however, say it would be far too damaging to make the wiretapping public. When Mr. Bo is finally charged, wiretapping is not expected to be mentioned. “The things that can be publicized are the economic problems and the killing,” according to the senior official at the government media outlet. “That’s enough to decide the matter in public.”

 

[Costas]

http://wiki.rockinchina.com/w/Main_Page

 

[Costas]

Ο Τσεν Γκουανγκτσένγκ το 'σκασε, τυφλός καθώς είναι, μέσα στη νύχτα. [1][2][3]. Φοβάται τώρα για εφιαλτικά αντίποινα εναντίον των δικών του (δείγμα).

 

[Costas]

Άρθρο της ΝΥΤ για την απόδραση του Chen Guangcheng και τα ζητήματα που θέτει για τις βραχυπρόθεσμες αμερικανοκινεζικές σχέσεις (Συρία, Ιράν κλπ.), καθώς εικάζεται ότι βρίσκεται στην Αμερικανική Πρεσβεία του Πεκίνου, προσπαθώντας να διαπραγματευτεί το να ζήσει στο εξής ως "νορμάλ Κινέζος πολίτης" (και όχι φυλακισμένος επ' αόριστον χωρίς κατηγορία στο σπίτι του, με τη γυναίκα του να ξυλοφορτώνεται και τα παιδιά του να πηγαίνουν στο σχολείο παρακολουθούμενα).

 

[Costas]

Με τη Βόρεια Κορέα δεν ασχολούμαι, ωστόσο ένα άρθρο της ΝΥΤ για έναν Νοτιοκορεάτη Βουδιστή μοναχό που έχει ένα δίκτυο πληροφόρησης και ανθρωπιστικής βοήθειας για τη χώρα με οδήγησε στο μπλογκ του, που δημοσιεύει ένα σχετικό εβδομαδιαίο ενημερωτικό δελτίο, το North Korea Today, για κάθε ενδιαφερόμενο/η.

Προσθήκη: διαβάζοντας το Δελτίο, έπεσα δις και τρις στον όρο Arduous March, οπότε βάζω τον σχετικό σύνδεσμο προς τη Wikipedia.

 

[Costas]

Στο #331, οι σύνδεσμοι 2 και 3 έχουν ένα βίντεο του Τσεν Γκουανγκτσένγκ που, μετά την απόδρασή του από το σπίτι του, απευθύνεται στον πρωθυπουργό Ουέν Τζιαμπάο (ο οποίος το παίζει φιλελεύθερος και φίλος του λαού σε σχέση με τους υπόλοιπους). Ιδού μια αγγλική του μετάφραση (Enter the News Dragon):

Dear Premier Wen Jiabo,

I finally escaped. All the stories online about the brutal treatment I received from the Linyi authorities, I can personally testify they are true. The reality is even harsher than the stories that have been circulating.

Premier Wen, I hereby formally make the following three requests.

First, I would like you to personally intervene in this matter by sending an investigation team to find out the truth. Those who ordered county-level police and officials to break into my house, beat and hurt me, refused me medical attention -- without any legal foundation or officers wearing uniforms -- whoever made the decision has to be investigated and punished according to law. Their actions are so cruel it has greatly harmed the image of the Communist Party.

They broke into my house and more than a dozen men assaulted my wife. They pinned her down and wrapped her in a blanket, beating and kicking her for hours.
(...)
Second, although I'm free, my worries are only deepening. My wife, mother and children are still in their evil hands. They have been persecuting my family for a long time and my escape would only prompt them into a mode of revenge. Such retribution would only become worse.

They once broke my wife's left orbital bone. She suffers lumbar disc protrusion from all the beating and there are still lumps on her ribs due to physical assaults. She has been cruelly denied medical treatment.

My elderly mother, on her birthday, was pushed to the ground with her head hitting the door. She was crying and accused them of attacking an old woman. They scoffed: "It's true we're young and that's why you can't beat us." How shameless, how cruel and how unjust.

My child goes to school accompanied by three guards. They search her bag every day and stop her from leaving school ground or home.

From July 29 to December 14 last year, they cut off power to my house. From last February onward, they have barred my mother from going out to buy groceries, making our lives extremely difficult.

I am very worried. I implore netizens to pay more attention to my family to ensure their safety. I also implore the Chinese government to ensure the safety of my family based on the principles of upholding the rule of law and protecting the interest of the people. If anything is to happen to my family, I will pursue this issue to no end.
(...)
Third, many people wonder why my situation has dragged on for so long without a resolution. I can say this: It's because the local authorities -- the decision-makers and the enforcers -- have no intention of resolving this. For the decision-makers, they are afraid of their crimes being exposed. For the enforcers, there is a lot of corruption involved.

I remember when they humiliated me last August in the Cultural Revolutionary style, they told me, you said in your video that 30 million yuan was spent on (your house arrest), that was the 2008 figure -- now the amount is more than double that and that's not even including bribery money for officials in Beijing. Some of the hired guards have complained that they make so little since most of the money has gone to others.

It's been a great opportunity for all of them to make money. As I understand, the township gives team leaders money to hire guards and each guard is supposed to get 100 yuan per day. Those team leaders tell potential hires that they get only 90 of the 100 yuan. Since most farmers get 50 to 60 yuan working in the field, and the guard job is considered safe and comfortable with meals included, of course people are willing to take it. In just one team, with more than 20 guards, the team leader gets 200 yuan extra per day. How corrupt is that?

The leader of the guards watching my wife sells vegetables he grows to the teams for a profit. These things are well known but there's nothing ordinary people can do about them.

As for the "stability maintenance" budget, they told us the county would give the township several million yuan at a time and local officials would still complain how little they get. You can see the serious corruption involved in this process and how they abuse money and power.
(...)

 

[Costas]

Η Beijing Daily Online (κομματικό έντυπο) ξεσπαθώνει εναντίον του αρνητισμού των ΜΜΕ και εξηγεί ποιος πρέπει να είναι ο ρόλος τους στο πλαίσιο του κινεζικού συστήματος. Μετάφραση αποσπασμάτων (όχι από μένα):

Lately, among the so-called news reports that have attracted people’s eyes, many have been negative reports — food safety issues, conflicts between doctors and patients, construction quality issues, official corruption. Issues like these have appeared in an endless stream. With the build up made by the media, it has seemed that all food in China is “poisonous”, all construction projects are “tofu architecture”, all public officials are corrupt, all social tensions are unusually severe, and our development path ahead is dark and troubled.
. . .
For some time, these sorts of reports have been a trend among certain domestic media, particularly prevalent among certain commercial newspapers and magazines (小报小刊). They enthusiastically disseminate negative, extreme
and provocative speech, full of rampant speculation and scandal. They pursue low-brow novelty, and push inciting information, all in order to attract eyeballs. The emergence of this phenomenon has happened partly because of the influence of the so-called “freedom of speech” (新闻自由) of the West, and partly out of the pursuit of profit, with a mind to earning vulgar applause — forsaking the ethical bottom line of the media.

For some time, those Western concepts of journalism and news have been savored sweetly by some. Some media workers (媒体工作者) even suggest that the Western ideas like “freedom of speech” and the “fourth estate” are golden rules and precious precepts. In their eyes, publicizing the development achievements of the nation is “false,” and exposing darkness and misery is an expression of “social responsibility”. In fact, they don’t even understand views of the news in the West. In the two-party and multi-party political environments of the West, different media have different political standpoints, and for the sake of obtaining leadership opportunities, they blow with negative news, raking up bad things about their opponents . . .

Our national situation is different from that of the West, and imitating these “squid-like tactics” (乌贼战术) will only break up and divide social consensus, to the disadvantage of creating a harmonious social environment.

What Chinese society needs is not these media who indiscreetly criticize under the banner of “objective reporting.” Rather, we need media that are responsible and reliable, that truly protect the fundamental interests of the nation, the public and the Chinese peoples.

. . . Chinese media must sing the main theme. This is determined by China’s political system, and accords with the realities of China as a nation of 1.3 billion people. The fact is that for China to develop it must maintain social stability, and it must create a public opinion environment conducive to stability. This is where the responsibility of Chinese media lies, and it is also where the fundamental interests of the people of our country lies.

Το ενδιαφέρον είναι ότι τελευταία η αναζήτηση για Beijing Daily στο Weibo (κινεζ. Twitter) έχει μπλοκαριστεί, έχει επαναφερθεί κι έχει ξαναμπλοκαριστεί. Ενδοκομματική διαμάχη;

 

[Costas]

Ο Τσεν Γκουανγκ-τσένγκ αναχώρησε με την οικογένειά του για τις ΗΠΑ.(ΝΥΤ) Εκείνος που την έχει πιο άσχημα τώρα είναι ο ανιψιός του, Τσεν Κε-γκούι (βλ. παραπάνω στο παρόν νήμα #331, λινκ πάνω στη λέξη 'δείγμα'), όπως λέει και το παρακάτω κομμάτι του άρθρου της ΝΥΤ που δεν εμφανίζεται στο κείμενο του βασικού λινκ:

In the two weeks since he left the embassy, Mr. Chen has expressed concern for relatives still at the mercy of local officials in Shandong. American diplomats said Chinese officials rejected a list of 13 people, many of them family members, that Mr. Chen had said he wanted protected from harassment.

A nephew, Chen Kegui, is in police custody accused of slashing and injuring men who broke into his family’s rural home last month in their search for Mr. Chen. The nephew faces a possible death sentence and has been denied access to his lawyers. His father, Chen Guangfu, has said he was tied to a chair and beaten for three days by interrogators seeking information on his brother’s whereabouts.

On Saturday, however, many Chinese dissidents and rights advocates were celebrating, among them Teng Biao, a prominent rights lawyer and friend who had advised Mr. Chen to go abroad.

“I am very happy Mr. Chen will finally have a chance at a normal life,” he said

(Τώρα, αν μπορούσαν να κάνουν κατιτίς οι Γιάνκηδες και για τους κρατουμένους του Γκουαντάναμο, ώστε να έχουν κι αυτοί a chance at a normal life, ή για τους Παλαιστίνιους κρατουμένους της απομόνωσης και της κράτησης χωρίς δίκη, καλά θα ήταν...)

Υστερόγραφο
Η φράση του άρθρου της ΝΥΤ "Mr. Chen, one of China's best-known dissidents", χρειάζεται ωστόσο απάντηση: "Chen Guangcheng would never call himself a dissident; he might hesitate to even describe himself as an activist. The incredible thing that we should keep in mind as representatives from the US and China decide Chen’s fate, is that he is a man who simply thought that the laws on paper should be enforced."

 

[Costas]

Στο μεταξύ, αποφυλακίστηκε μετά από 23 χρόνια ο Li Yujun (Λι Υ-τζύν, 李玉君), που είχε αρχικά καταδικαστεί σε θάνατο και μετά μετατράπηκε η ποινή του, γιατί, μικροπωλητής 22 χρονών τότε, στις 3 Ιουνίου 1989, είχε βάλει φωτιά σ' ένα βυτιοφόρο με πινακίδες του Στρατού για να εμποδίσει την είσοδο των δυνάμεων του στρατού σε μια διασταύρωση του Πεκίνου. "Ελεύθερος" τώρα, στα 45 του, θα είναι υπό εποπτεία και χωρίς πολιτικά δικαιώματα για 8 χρόνια, στη διάρκεια των οποίων υποχρεούται να μην εκφράζει πολιτικές απόψεις στο ίντερνετ, να μη δίνει συνεντεύξεις στον Τύπο, να δηλώνει κάθε αριθμό κινητού τηλεφώνου που έχει, να δίνει το παρόν στην αστυνομία μια φορά το μήνα και να μην εγκαταλείψει το Πεκίνο. Η οικογένειά του τον είχε εγκαταλείψει και δεν τον επισκεπτόταν ποτέ. (sina.com.hk)

 

[Costas]

Perry Link (NPR)
...until now, the so-called dissidents in China have been overwhelmingly elite intellectuals - writers and professors and the like. And they have come out with sophisticated statements about what political reform ought to be, and what universal principles of human rights are and how they should apply to China.
But at another level in China, you've got very widespread discontent that bubbles up from the bottom. So the importance of a man like Chen Guangcheng is that he is one of those from-below people. He's self-taught in the law and he came from the bottom up helping women to resist forced abortions and so on. And then his reputation spread, especially because of the Internet.

 

[Costas]

Κουτσομπολιά για το περιβάλλον του Μπο Ξ(Σ)ιλάι. Ενδιαφέρον για όσους αγαπούν τις ταινίες δράσης με επιχειρηματίες, αστυνομικούς, κατασκόπους και σκυλιά-δολοφόνους. (ΝΥΤ)

 

[Costas]

Πηγές αναφέρουν ότι ο αστυνομικός Ουάνγκ Λιτζύν της υπόθεσης Μπο Ξ(Σ)ιλάι θα δικαστεί τον επόμενο μήνα για προδοσία (South Morning Post).