Την ίδια ώρα, στην Κίνα...
- Thread starter Costas
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Με την αναμενόμενη καθυστέρηση διάβασα το παραπάνω και είναι το καλύτερο κείμενο που έχω διαβάσει για τη λογοκρισία, έστω κι αν είναι μια ψηφίδα μονάχα, μια σχεδόν όμορφη ψηφίδα, σε ένα μωσαϊκό που, όπως γράφει, περιλαμβάνει ξυλοφόρτωμα και φυλάκιση. Η Έβελιν χτίζει το κείμενο υποδειγματικά, ξεκινώντας από τα γραφικά και τα ανώδυνα, και φτάνοντας στην απόγνωση του ελεύθερου πολιορκημένου. Highly recommended reading.
SBE
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Ορισμένες ψυχώσεις των Κινέζων (της λογοκρισίας) θυμίζουν κάποιες ψυχώσεις των Ελλήνων, αν και με διαφορετικό τρόπο. Για παράδειγμα το άρθρο, Νίκελ, αναφέρει πως οι χάρτες έπρεπε να δείχνουν και τα νησιά που κανονικά σε τέτοιες κλίμακες είναι αόρατα. Στην Ελλάδα τις μισές φορές που ένας ξένος χάρτης δεν δείχνει μια βραχονησίδα γίνεται ζήτημα από το κοινό.
Costas
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Η πολιτική οικονομία της διατήρησης της σταθερότητας (npr):
(...)
Beijing this year is spending $111 billion on its domestic security budget, which covers the police, state security, militia, courts and jails. This is now higher than its publicly disclosed military expenditure.
(...)
"I think money spent on stability maintenance is a big burden to society, including the government," she says. "Once interest groups coalesce around that funding, they need to feed themselves via the stability maintenance machine. Then more instability is needed, right?"
(...)
He is brutally honest about how corrupt the system has become. He describes how his rural town spends roughly $25,000 per year on one particular petitioner, sometimes resorting to paying him not to cause trouble. (...) He also admits that he pays bribes to erase complaints that petitioners have already lodged, which could block the chances of promotion for himself and his superiors. "We have to beg related departments to cancel records," he admits. "We have to bribe them and the police. They profit from their power, and so gain more power to sell off."
(...)
Even the train conductors profit from the security apparatus, by spotting the petitioners and tipping off officials so they can be detained on arrival in Beijing. "They sold them to the Beijing liaison office," he says, "for $64 a head."
(...)
(...)
Beijing this year is spending $111 billion on its domestic security budget, which covers the police, state security, militia, courts and jails. This is now higher than its publicly disclosed military expenditure.
(...)
"I think money spent on stability maintenance is a big burden to society, including the government," she says. "Once interest groups coalesce around that funding, they need to feed themselves via the stability maintenance machine. Then more instability is needed, right?"
(...)
He is brutally honest about how corrupt the system has become. He describes how his rural town spends roughly $25,000 per year on one particular petitioner, sometimes resorting to paying him not to cause trouble. (...) He also admits that he pays bribes to erase complaints that petitioners have already lodged, which could block the chances of promotion for himself and his superiors. "We have to beg related departments to cancel records," he admits. "We have to bribe them and the police. They profit from their power, and so gain more power to sell off."
(...)
Even the train conductors profit from the security apparatus, by spotting the petitioners and tipping off officials so they can be detained on arrival in Beijing. "They sold them to the Beijing liaison office," he says, "for $64 a head."
(...)
Costas
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Οχτώ χρόνια φυλακή στον Cao Haibo (Τσάο Χαϊμπό) γιατί έφτιαξε φόρουμ στο διαδίκτυο με τίτλο "Ένωση για την αναζωογόνηση του έθνους". Το έγκλημα: "ανατροπή της κρατικής εξουσίας" (όχι "προτροπή σε ανατροπή της κρατικής εξουσίας"). Στον κομουνισμό ένας μόνο συνεταιρισμός είναι νοητό να υπάρχει, το Κομουνιστικό Κόμμα και τα πιόνια του. Στον μεταολοκληρωτικό κομουνισμό μπορείς να διαμαρτυρηθείς, αλλά μόνο σαν άτομο (πάλι ρισκάρεις, βέβαια). Ουαί και αλίμονο όμως εάν αμφισβητήσεις το δικαίωμα του ΚΚ να είναι ο μόνος πολιτικός συνεταιρισμός, είτε το κάνεις μόνος σου είτε συνεταιριστείς για να το κάνεις· αποτελεί αυτομάτως εσχάτη προδοσία, le`se majeste', ανατροπή της κρατικής εξουσίας, βεβήλωση του ιερού σώματος, του τοτέμ. Το είδαμε και με την Αλληλεγγύη στην Πολωνία. Γι' αυτό και παθαίνουν παράνοια με την Εκκλησία: μην τυχόν και ο υπαρκτός αυτός θεσμός πάρει πολιτική χροιά.
Costas
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Sabina Knight, Chinese Literature. A Very Short Introduction, μόλις 137 σελίδες για 3000 χρόνια! Βιβλιοκριτική (mclc)
Costas
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Σύμφωνα με έκθεση της Κινεζικής Ακαδημίας Επιστημών, το 2011 η αστυφιλία στην ΛΔΚ ξεπέρασε για πρώτη φορά το 50% κι έφτασε το 51,3%. (discovery, κινέζικα)
Costas
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Words without Borders, November 2012: Banned Chinese Writers
Costas
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Κινεζική Κρεμλινολογία, αρ. 2. Ενδιαφέρουσα η φωτογραφία που θα δείτε στο άρθρο, όπου ο νυν και ο πρώην πρόεδρος φιγουράρουν στα μεγάλα φωτοπορτρέτα τους ντυμένοι στο παλιό στιλ κουστουμιού Σουν Γιατ-Σεν, αντί για τα κλασικά Δυτικά κουστούμια. (ΝΥΤ)
Costas
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Fury at torn Mao pics (People's Daily online). Fury από ορισμένους (πολλούς, βέβαια). Άλλοι δεν αγανάχτησαν.
Costas
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Άρθρο του Geremie R. Barmé σχετικά μ' ένα άρθρο του αναλυτή Yuan Peng. Κάνει ωραίες ιστορικές καταδύσεις. (The China Story)
Nonetheless, of the ‘New Five Black Categories’ in Yuan’s analysis, four are not new. Nor indeed is the discussion of social anomie or unruly elements, given the fact that the Chinese party-state is presently much taken with the theory and practice of ‘social management’ 社会管理. What caused particular offence (apart from Yuan’s clear identification of perceived ‘threats’) was that ‘vulnerable groups’ 弱势群体 were included in the list. Critics were appalled that in a booming modern China that boasts of its aspirations to achieve global status the groups most deserving of support, protection and care were being identified as an incipient danger. That such a suggestion came from an analyst working for a government think tank that was itself created to protect the Chinese revolution, and its own elevation of the formerly dispossessed and oppressed classes of the country seemed nothing less than confronting. To offer the state policy advice that overtly targets the marginalised and disempowered appeared, to many, as inhumane and in blatant contradiction of the Communist Party’s founding principles and avowed value system.
Edit: Κάτσε να βάλω και το σχετικό εδάφιο του Yuan Peng εδώ, για όσους δεν έχουν χρόνο (τα παχιά δικά μου):
During this period, the US will avail itself of various non-military means to delay or hinder China’s progressive rise. In so doing it will hope to gain strategic advantage, revitalise itself and consolidate its hegemonic position. The main ways in which the US is doing this are:
Using the exchange rate of the Renminbi as an entré, and a short-term strategy of opening up China’s fiscal markets so as to comprehensively infiltrate China’s ‘third industry’. The overall aim is to control the pulse rate of China’s development and, in the process, to gain massive financial advantage;
In the name of ‘Internet freedom’ transforming the traditional mode of pursuing top-down democracy and freedom. Utilising rights lawyers, underground religious activities, dissidents, Internet leaders and vulnerable groups as core constituencies with the aim of infiltrating China’s grass roots so as to carry out a bottom-up process to create thereby conditions to ‘transform’ China.
Strengthening alliances and enhancing partnerships while undermining China’s relationship with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Pakistan and Myanmar, while kick-starting the US-Russian relationship to put China on the back foot diplomatically and undermine a rising China’s external environment and to limit our strategic space.
In this way the US is using a ‘global [or 360-degree] environment’ encompassing ‘sea, air, space and the Internet’ to pursue its goals of undertaking dialogue and determining relevant protocols in the hope of actually weakening China’s strategic challenges to the US in all of the above arenas.
Nonetheless, of the ‘New Five Black Categories’ in Yuan’s analysis, four are not new. Nor indeed is the discussion of social anomie or unruly elements, given the fact that the Chinese party-state is presently much taken with the theory and practice of ‘social management’ 社会管理. What caused particular offence (apart from Yuan’s clear identification of perceived ‘threats’) was that ‘vulnerable groups’ 弱势群体 were included in the list. Critics were appalled that in a booming modern China that boasts of its aspirations to achieve global status the groups most deserving of support, protection and care were being identified as an incipient danger. That such a suggestion came from an analyst working for a government think tank that was itself created to protect the Chinese revolution, and its own elevation of the formerly dispossessed and oppressed classes of the country seemed nothing less than confronting. To offer the state policy advice that overtly targets the marginalised and disempowered appeared, to many, as inhumane and in blatant contradiction of the Communist Party’s founding principles and avowed value system.
Edit: Κάτσε να βάλω και το σχετικό εδάφιο του Yuan Peng εδώ, για όσους δεν έχουν χρόνο (τα παχιά δικά μου):
During this period, the US will avail itself of various non-military means to delay or hinder China’s progressive rise. In so doing it will hope to gain strategic advantage, revitalise itself and consolidate its hegemonic position. The main ways in which the US is doing this are:
Using the exchange rate of the Renminbi as an entré, and a short-term strategy of opening up China’s fiscal markets so as to comprehensively infiltrate China’s ‘third industry’. The overall aim is to control the pulse rate of China’s development and, in the process, to gain massive financial advantage;
In the name of ‘Internet freedom’ transforming the traditional mode of pursuing top-down democracy and freedom. Utilising rights lawyers, underground religious activities, dissidents, Internet leaders and vulnerable groups as core constituencies with the aim of infiltrating China’s grass roots so as to carry out a bottom-up process to create thereby conditions to ‘transform’ China.
Strengthening alliances and enhancing partnerships while undermining China’s relationship with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Pakistan and Myanmar, while kick-starting the US-Russian relationship to put China on the back foot diplomatically and undermine a rising China’s external environment and to limit our strategic space.
In this way the US is using a ‘global [or 360-degree] environment’ encompassing ‘sea, air, space and the Internet’ to pursue its goals of undertaking dialogue and determining relevant protocols in the hope of actually weakening China’s strategic challenges to the US in all of the above arenas.
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Costas
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Θα υπάρξουν μεταρρυθμίσεις με την αλλαγή ηγεσίας; Δεν θα υπάρξουν; Θα είναι σημαντικές ή διακοσμητικές; Ριζικές ή ανεπαρκείς; Θα προέλθουν από πάνω ή από κάτω; Τι θα σημαίνουν για τη σταθερότητα της χώρας και τη διεθνή της θέση; Άρθρο της Guardian.
Να και πώς περιγράφει ο Jeremy Paltiel, an expert on the Communist party at Carleton University in Canada, την άλυτη αντίφαση της εφαρμογής του λενινικού μοντέλου του δημοκρατικού συγκεντρωτισμού στη διοίκηση του κράτους:
The party cannot be an organisation of executives who are subject to a single discipline and at the same time a deliberative assembly of people free to present their opinions and pursue their interests. If the discipline were to be relaxed, the party would cease to function as the backbone of the state and lower levels could no longer be relied upon to follow the will of the centre.
Να και πώς περιγράφει ο Jeremy Paltiel, an expert on the Communist party at Carleton University in Canada, την άλυτη αντίφαση της εφαρμογής του λενινικού μοντέλου του δημοκρατικού συγκεντρωτισμού στη διοίκηση του κράτους:
The party cannot be an organisation of executives who are subject to a single discipline and at the same time a deliberative assembly of people free to present their opinions and pursue their interests. If the discipline were to be relaxed, the party would cease to function as the backbone of the state and lower levels could no longer be relied upon to follow the will of the centre.