Την ίδια ώρα, στην Κίνα...

Σ' ένα άλλο άρθρο του ίδιου Evan Osnos βρήκα ένα λινκ προς μια συνέντευξη του ειδικού στην κινεζική κρεμλινολογία Cheng Li, του πανεπιστημίου του Πρίνστον, με τίτλο The Bo Xilai Crisis: Confidence Gained or Risk Increased?, που συνοψίζει ωραία τα διακυβεύματα της δίκης του Bo Xilai και της επερχόμενης αλλαγής ηγεσίας στη Λαϊκή Κίνα, η οποία αλλαγή δεν είναι, παρά τα φαινόμενα, λιγότερο κρίσιμη για το παγκόσμιο γίγνεσθαι από την εκλογή του επόμενου Αμερικανού προέδρου:

(...)
A review of the recent intellectual discourse in China reveals a heated discussion about the current risk of revolution in the country. One of the most popular books in intellectual circles today is the Chinese translation of Alexis de Tocqueville's classic study, The Old Regime and the Revolution. One frequently quoted passage is Tocqueville's argument that revolution usually takes place not when the old regime resists change but, rather, when it begins to reform itself. Conservative hardliners in the CCP leadership may ultimately decide to resist political reform at all costs, rendering the current consensus on reform either wishful thinking or a temporary condition. Some policy differences in the leadership, especially concerning political reform and personnel appointments, could become contentious and even result in factional infighting spiraling out of control. The new leadership may find it increasingly difficult to build the kind of consensus necessary to govern effectively. Thus, the upcoming Bo Xilai trial may polarize Chinese society and enhance the risk of sociopolitical unrest.
(...)
Thus, although we still do not know for sure whether the crisis is a blessing or a curse, the party's handling of the Bo Xilai case gives some hope that things are moving in the right direction. Time will tell whether this landmark trial can provide the CCP leadership with the confidence to pursue bold and genuine political reforms and provide the Chinese public with renewed confidence in a reborn ruling party. If not, China is headed toward even greater trouble, not only because demagogic figures in the mold of Bo Xilai may be even more brazen and despicable in the future, but also because the regime will lose all of the credibility and legitimacy that it so desperately needs to restore.
 
Διαβάζοντας μια παλιότερη συνέντευξη του ίδιου Cheng Li, του Απριλίου, έπεσα στην εξής εκτίμησή του για την υπόθεση Wang Lijun (ο αρχιμπάτσος του Bo Xilai):

I do have doubts about the way Wang Lijun is being portrayed as having approached Bo regarding an investigation into Bo’s and Gu’s involvement in the death of Neil Heywood. This does not make sense to me. Wang’s entire career had been based on his patron-client ties with Bo. He was considered Bo’s close confidant, knew many if not all of Bo’s dirty secrets, and had done many highly questionable things during his three years as Bo’s police chief in Chongqing. Therefore, given their close ties, it puzzles me that Wang would have challenged Bo on Gu’s potential role in Heywood’s death. Wang may have felt that he simply could not cover up this case. Still, I think there are probably some missing pieces to this story.


Χτες λοιπόν μια Κινέζα ιατροδικαστής της εισαγγελίας αμφισβήτησε την αιτία θανάτου του Βρετανού Neil Heywood (βίντεο, WSJ), συγκεκριμένα το ότι πέθανε από τη συγκεκριμένη ουσία που ειπώθηκε στη δίκη.

Ακόμα, ο Cheng Li έκανε σ' εκείνη τη συνέντευξη κάποιες σκέψεις και παραλληλισμούς:

The Cultural Revolution and the 1989 Tiananmen incident are two of the great disasters in the history of the CCP, but in the aftermath of these events you see opening and reform after the Cultural Revolution and the acceleration of China’s market transition and integration with the outside world after Tiananmen, respectively. Positive political developments came out of these terrible events. There is hope that something similar may yet happen following the Bo crisis. Lessons will be learned, a consensus will be reached, and bold decisions will be pursued. Wen Jiabao, in recent comments at the National People’s Congress, said very clearly that the party-state leadership system needs to be changed and that the rule of law should be emphasized in the handling of Wang Lijun’s case in order for the CCP to endure the test of history.

Learning from this crisis is not a choice for the CCP as much as it is a necessity. If nothing changes, the party will continue to lose its credibility. I believe the characterization of the Chinese political system as “resilient authoritarianism” is incorrect. While the prevailing view had been that this year’s leadership procession would go smoothly, two years ago I argued that the upcoming succession would be highly problematic and feature some sort of major crisis. Now the general sentiment is that China is in a terrible situation due to a vicious power struggle, but I am more optimistic. China has removed a major danger and avoided the worst scenario, which would have been taking the country down a Maoist, ultranationalist path. Of course, Bo’s chances of accomplishing this were always slim, but now they are close to zero. This is solid progress, and a reason to be more optimistic about China’s future.

I am not arguing that Bo’s downfall will only have positive ramifications and that nothing will go wrong. However, there are always opportunities to learn lessons and make improvements, and I think the potential for China to do so is not insignificant. It is worth remembering that the assassination of a Taiwanese writer by agents of Taiwan’s Nationalist Party was a trigger that helped spur the island’s transition from authoritarianism to democracy in the mid-1980s. Similarly, China must now either make changes to be on the right side of history or be left behind. The Bo Xilai crisis can be either a curse or blessing for the CCP—a curse if the party pretends that its rule can remain as before, but a blessing if the party decides to transform itself.
 
Ένα άλλο από τα ωραία λινκ του Evan Osnos παραπάνω είναι προς το βιβλίο του Andrew Wedeman, Double Paradox: Rapid Growth and Rising Corruption in China. Τσιτάρω από την "Περιγραφή του βιβλίου" στο Amazon:

According to conventional wisdom, rising corruption reduces economic growth. And yet, between 1978 and 2010, even as officials were looting state coffers, extorting bribes, raking in kickbacks, and scraping off rents at unprecedented rates, the Chinese economy grew at an average annual rate of 9 percent. In Double Paradox, Andrew Wedeman seeks to explain why the Chinese economy performed so well despite widespread corruption at almost kleptocratic levels.

Wedeman finds that the Chinese economy was able to survive predatory corruption because corruption did not explode until after economic reforms had unleashed dynamic growth. To a considerable extent corruption was also a by-product of the transfer of undervalued assets from the state to the emerging private and corporate sectors and a scramble to capture the windfall profits created by their transfer. Perhaps most critically, an anticorruption campaign, however flawed, has proved sufficient to prevent corruption from spiraling out of control. Drawing on more than three decades of data from China -as well as examples of the interplay between corruption and growth in South Korea, Taiwan, Equatorial Guinea, and other nations in Africa and the Caribbean- Wedeman cautions that rapid growth requires not only ongoing and improved anticorruption efforts but also consolidated and strengthened property rights.
 
Ο Cheng Li στη συνέντευξή του στο #481 πιο πάνω υποστήριξε πως το γεγονός ότι η ηγεσία του ΚΚΚ αποφάσισε να περάσει τον Μπο Ξ(Σ)ιλάι από δίκη και όχι από το παράλληλο πειθαρχικό σύστημα που υπάρχει για τα στελέχη του κόμματος, απόφαση που κατ' αυτόν υπαγορεύτηκε από το ότι τα εγκλήματα που τον αφορούν παραήταν χοντρά, ότι το γεγονός λοιπόν αυτό είναι θετικό σημάδι για την πορεία που θέλει να χαράξει γενικότερα η ηγεσία για τη χώρα. Πάντως, και για να μη δημιουργούνται παρανοήσεις, αυτό δεν σημαίνει ότι ειδήσεις σαν και την παρακάτω (από το κινεζόφωνο BBC) θα είναι στο εξής αδιανόητες:

Lawyer Hired to Represent Bo Xilai Knows Not Whether He'll Be Allowed to Speak in Bo's Defense
 
Me and My Censor. Εμπειρίες μιας Κινεζοαμερικανίδας αρχισυντάκτριας σ' ένα επιχειρηματικό περιοδικό στη Κίνα τα χρόνια πριν από τους Ολυμπιακούς του Πεκίνου. Ενδιαφέρον και νόστιμο. (Foreign Policy)
 
Ρεπορτάζ από τις κινητοποιήσεις ενάντια στο χημικό εργοστάσιο στο Νίνγκμπο (#486), με αφήγηση του ρεπόρτερ από τη σύλληψη (χωρίς τραυματισμό, και κατοπινή απόλυσή του) στην κλούβα και με βιντεοκλίπ από τις μαζικές εκδηλώσεις. (itv news)
 
Για τους ενδιαφερόμενους για μεταφρασμένη στα αγγλικά κινεζική λογοτεχνία και τους βιβλιοθηκάριους αγγλόφωνων βιβλιοθηκών, CLT (Chinese Literature Today).
 

nickel

Administrator
Staff member
Το Κιντλ μου αγκομαχεί, να το ξέρετε, και μαζί του κι εγώ. Έμεινα πίσω μια βδομάδα λόγω ξενυχτιών (όπου η κλινανάγνωση ήταν ίσα-ίσα για να μου κλείνει τα βλέφαρα) και τώρα το χρέος δείχνει «μη βιώσιμο». Να οργανώσουμε έξοδο ανάγνωσης, όπου δεν θα μιλάμε μεταξύ μας, μόνο θα φέρουμε βιβλία που χρωστάμε να διαβάσουμε και θα εμπνεόμαστε ο ένας από το βύθισμα του άλλου.
 

SBE

¥
Aκόμα καλύτερα, αντί για ομάδες αυτο-ανάγνωσης, οργάνωσε ομάδες που θα διαβάζει ο καθένας από ένα άρθρο και θα γράφει περίληψη δέκα σειρών για τους υπόλοιπους.
 

bernardina

Moderator
Κατά τη παραμονή τους στην Κίνα , τα άτομα που αποκαλυφθούν να παθαίνουν από ένα από τα παραπάνω νοσήματα θα απελαθούν.
Παθαίνω! :lol:
 
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