Την ίδια ώρα, στην Κίνα...

[Costas]

Μου θυμίζει τη διαφορά ελληνικής και χριστιανικής θρησκείας:

The late Dr. Hu Shih, eminent historian of Chinese thought and culture, used to say with sly delight that centuries of Christian missionaries had been frustrated and chagrined by the apparent inability of Chinese to take sin seriously. Were we to work out fully all the consequences for Chinese society of the model offered by an organismic cosmos functioning through the dynamism of harmony, we might well be able to relate the absence of a sense of sin to it. For in such a cosmos there can be no parts wrongfully present; everything that exists belongs, even if no more appropriately than as the consequence of a temporary imbalance, a disharmony. Evil as a positive or active force cannot exist; much less can it be frighteningly personified. No devils can struggle with good forces for mastery of humans and the universe, and people’s errors, unlike sin in other worlds, can neither offend personal gods nor threaten a person’s individual existence.

Frederick Mote, Intellectual Foundations of China, the Problem of Evil and Consequences of A World without Sin

Η μεγάλη κατάφαση:

The Chinese [narrative] tradition has tended to place nearly equal emphasis on the overlapping of events, the interstitial spaces between events, in effect on non-events alongside of events in conceiving of human experience in time. In fact, the reader of the major Chinese narrative works soon becomes conscious of the fact that those clearly defined events which do stand out in the texts are nearly always set into a thick matrix of non-events: static description, set speeches, discursive digressions, and a host of other non-narrative elements. … The ubiquitous potential presence of a balanced, totalized dimension of meaning may partially explain why a fully realized sense of the tragic does not materialize in Chinese narrative. Such characters as Prince Shen-sheng, Hsiang Yu, Yueh Fei, and even Chia Pao-yu clearly possess the qualities of the tragic figure to one extent or another. But in each case the implicit understanding of the logical interrelation between their particular situation and the overall structure of existential intelligibility serves to blunt the pity and fear the reader experiences as he witnesses their individual destinies. In other words, Chinese narrative is replete with individuals in tragic situations, but the secure inviolability of the underlying affirmation of existence in its totality precludes the possibility of the individual’s tragic fate taking on the proportions of a cosmic tragedy. Instead, the bitterness of the particular case of mortality ultimately settles back into the ceaseless alternation of patterns of joy and sorrow, exhilaration and despair that go to make up an essentially affirmative view of the universe of experience.

Andrew Plaks, Chinese Narrative

 

[Costas]

mainland China’s ‘red classics’: a term that has recently come to refer to the major works of literature, film, and other cultural products that were first produced and rose to national prominence during the early period of communist rule.

“Red Classics” in post-Mao Chinese cultural discourse refers to the major literary and visual texts produced in the seventeen years from 1949, the year of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), to 1966, the year Mao launched the Cultural Revolution; hence they are also called literature/film of “the Seventeen Years,” or “socialist literature/culture.” This body of literary and visual texts as a whole reflects the results of a nationwide, state-sanctioned literary practice of constructing revolutionary myth in order to legitimize and secure the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in mainland China. At the same time the works created models of the socialist new person offering a vision of how the individual and collective should function in a more egalitarian, socially considerate and selfless manner. While the thematic and stylistic potential initially demonstrated in the original sources of many such texts were rich and diverse, as the political climate in China changed, works were progressively made to fit into the CCP’s increasingly homogenized and extremist ideological system through a complex process of appropriations and revisions. This process reached its extreme in the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) during which the nation’s cultural landscape shrank into a single narrow ideological mold dominated by class struggle and typified by the famous Revolutionary Model Operas (Yangbanxi) whose ranks included remakes of red classics including Tracks in the Snowy Forest and The Red Lantern. It is no surprise that after the end of the Cultural Revolution, this body of ‘socialist realist’ literature was quickly abandoned, together with Maoist ideology, as the Chinese people embraced the new era of reforms. The ensuing 1980s saw a rapid economic expansion, a surge of new modes of literary and artistic experiments, and quickly shifting literary trends from modernism to postmodernism. In the 1990s and continuing into the new millennium, however, as the country’s economic reforms continued to expand, new problems emerged including the ever- greater disparity between rich and poor, and rampant official corruption. Paralleling this, a significant change occurred in China’s cultural landscape— a change ironically marked by the return of the literary and cultural products of “the Seventeen Years,” now elevated to the status of “Red Classics.” The novels and short stories first published in “the Seventeen Years” were put back onto the shelves of the now privately owned bookstores; old films about revolutionary heroes and heroines were remade into better images and sound-tracks, with Blue Ray definition, playing in showrooms right next to those playing Batman. Old revolutionary stories were adapted into household television dramas, played by stars of kung fu films; and Red songs could be heard from the government’s conference halls to restaurants to Karaoke houses, and even in public parks. The reappearance of the Red Classics at multiple points in China’s recent history attests to their importance as a cultural phenomenon.

 

[Costas]

What Does Chinese Say allows you to search among Chinese news and social media (weibo). It uses Baidu translation API, so you can search in English and view results (machine-translated) in English.

AAUP Rebukes Colleges for Chinese Institutes and Censures Northeastern Ill.
The American Association of University Professors on Saturday urged colleges that operate Chinese language and culture centers financed by the People’s Republic of China to either scrap the partnerships or renegotiate them to promote transparency and protect academic freedom.

In a statement approved last week by the AAUP’s Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure and released here on Saturday at the association’s annual conference, the AAUP argues that many colleges in the United States and Canada have sacrificed their integrity and jeopardized academic freedom by giving the Chinese government considerable say over the centers, which are known as Confucius Institutes.

As things now stand, the statement said, the Confucius Institutes in place at about 90 North American colleges "function as an arm of the Chinese state and are allowed to ignore academic freedom." It said the agreements that establish them feature "nondisclosure clauses and unacceptable concessions to the political aims and practices of the government of China".

 

[Costas]

Watch The Dying Art Of Neon Sign-Making In Hong Kong
The Huffington Post | By Mallika Rao

But it was in China that they reached their pinnacle. A neon arms race between Shanghai and Hong Kong meant both cities became major producers of the stuff, so that by the 1980s, when American shop owners swayed by changing public taste were opting instead for internally-lit shadow boxes, you couldn’t find an alley in Hong Kong undazzled by a rainbow of meticulously bent, glowing characters. So drenched was the city, Ridley Scott famously used it as inspiration for his vision of a glamorously seamy future in "Blade Runner," eschewing the dark streets of New York as too “medieval.”

 

[Costas]

As Chinese Leader Takes On Graft, Relatives Are Said to Shed Investments (NYT)
As President Xi Jinping of China prepares to tackle what may be the biggest cases of official corruption in more than six decades of Communist Party rule, new evidence suggests that he has been pushing his own family to sell hundreds of millions of dollars in investments, reducing his own political vulnerability.

Chinese rights lawyers have warned that they are under mounting pressure, with the formal arrest of one of China's best-known advocates, Pu Zhiqiang, and multiple detentions. One bleak joke doing the rounds is that even lawyers' lawyers need lawyers" these days.
(Guardian)

 

[Costas]

Ενθύμησις επισκέψεως πρωθυπουργού Λι Κετσιάνγκ:

China bans unauthorised critical coverage by journalists | Reuters
Reporters in China are forbidden from publishing critical reports without the approval of their employer, one of China's top media regulators said on Wednesday. The rule comes as the government intensifies a crackdown on freedom of expression, both online and in traditional media. The State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television published the rule in a circular announcing a crackdown on false news and journalists who take bribes or extort money from their sources. Στη συνέχεια οι αρχές διαβεβαίωσαν ότι ο μόνος λόγος που πάρθηκε αυτό το μέτρο είναι οι κιτρινιάρηδες και εκβιαστές δημοσιογράφοι...

Mainland China code seeks to muzzle lawyers who publicise cases through social media | South China Morning Post
Mainland lawyers are angry about a new code being drafted by the national bar association that restricts what they can say online. The code urges lawyers to exercise extreme caution when commenting about cases on the internet and bans them from revealing case information before court rulings. An association spokesman confirmed yesterday that such a draft was being considered but would not give details.

 

[Costas]

China Jails Anti-Graft Activists Linked to New Citizens’ Group (Bloomberg)

Pay High Attention to Online Ideological Security | China Copyright and Media
This article by Lieutenant-General Li Dianren of the National Defence University was published first in the Chinese Journal of Social Science, and republished on Seeking Truth online, on 15 June.
Equally important as safeguarding information technology security is safeguarding ideological cybersecurity. The former aims for hard power, the latter fights in soft disputes. Together, these two constitute two indispensible sides of cybersecurity. At present, some Western countries rely on their “network information superiority”, to change the network into a main channel to penetrate and destroy other countries, export Western ideology on a large scale, preach Western political systems and models, slander and attack other countries’ political systems and value views, vigorously conduct “peaceful evolution” and carry out “colour revolutions”, and direct one “smokeless war” after another. To some extent, ideological penetration has become one of the main forms of Western “netwar”, it is the same as “hard destruction” based on information technology, and it constitutes a grave challenge to target countries’ cybersecurity and national security.

'Tell me where my husband is' – wife’s plea to China's Communist Party - Telegraph
Nearly six months after her husband disappeared into the custody of China’s security services, the wife of respected Uighur academic Ilham Tohti issues an emotional plea for information on his whereabouts.

 

[Costas]

China Says Hong Kong Online Referendum Illegal as Website Hacked - Bloomberg
The voting website, which opened yesterday, suffered “severe” distributed denial-of-service attacks, in which hackers flooded systems with information to shut them down, the organizers of the poll said in a statement dated June 19. More than 265,000 votes had been submitted as of 7 p.m. yesterday, the website showed. The election procedure is not in line with Hong Kong’s constitutional Basic Law, Xinhua said, citing the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office of the State Council. The public nomination of candidates runs counter to the Basic Law, Xinhua said.

Yunlin Dog Sellers Openly Taunt Dog Lovers: “Buy The Dog Or It Dies!” | Nanfang Insider
We first heard rumors that the Yulin dog eating festival was to be cancelled, and then heard reports that it had already taken place last week. With tensions running high between animal rights activists and Yulin’s traditional dog-eaters, it now appears Yulin’s dog sellers are taunting activists and exploiting their love of dogs. Reports in the Morning Report suggest that dog sellers in Yulin are selling their live dogs to animal activists at inflated prices while threatening harm to the dogs in their possession.

Το Πεκίνο από ψηλά

 

[Costas]

Αμερικανική, ουσιαστικά, είδηση, αλλά με κινεζικό ενδιαφέρον:

Chinese tycoon Chen Guangbiao sparks fury among New York's homeless after 'publicity stunt'
Organiser says the event could have been 'planned better'
By Andrea Chen and Agence France-Presse in New York City (SCMP)

Chinese philanthropist Chen Guangbiao’s New York charity lunch ended bitterly as hundreds of homeless people, who were promised US$300 in cash, left empty-handed -- and furious.

The eccentric Chen, who made his fortunes in the recycling business, last week bought a full-page advert in The New York Times – a paper he once attempted to buy – promising 1,000 underprivileged residents a swish meal at the Boathouse in Central Park, along with the cash.

At yesterday’s event, the first batch of beneficiaries – 250 shelter residents of the New York City Rescue Mission, which helped organise the luncheon – sat down for a three-course meal as promised.

Guests were bused in and treated to a sit-down meal of seared tuna, filet mignon and seasonal berries, waited on by staff in suits and bow ties.

Chen serenaded the guests with his signature rendition of We Are the World and a magic show. Volunteers, dressed up in green military uniforms, sang a Chinese patriotic song. Then a cart filled with cash was wheeled onstage.

But the giddy atmosphere fell apart when it was announced that the tycoon would not be handing out the cash, at the behest of the Mission, which was concerned the money would be used on drugs and alcohol.

After the announcement, several people tried to rush at Chen, who was shielded by guards, while others shouted insults at him, media reports said.

Speaking to the South China Morning Post, a member of the event’s organising team described the scene as “weird and troublesome”.

“Chen could have organised the luncheon in a better way,” the organiser said, requesting anonymity.

“At least he did not have to bring all those military uniforms – [viewed as] Halloween costumes [by] the Americans – and asked his volunteers to put on the uniforms and sing a patriotic song,” she said.

After the Mission intervened, an anxious Chen at first told his guests there was a change of plan and that he would distribute the US$300 at the shelter after the lunch.

Chen announced through a translator that he was heading to the New York City Rescue Mission -- which helped organise the lunch -- and invited guests to join him there.

Several homeless people were asked to pose with Chen in front of the cart of cash while holding dollar bills.

“He took photos with some of the guests holding US$300 on the stage,” the organiser told the Post. But at the end of the event, none of the guests received any donation in cash.”

“Don’t lie to the people!” Ernest St Pierre told AFP. “We came here for $300 but now he’s changed his tune.”

“This individual who’s filthy rich put it in the paper,” St Pierre, a former US Navy medic, told reporters.

Retired Vietnam War veteran Harry Brooks told reporters he would be “highly upset” if he didn’t get the cash, despite enjoying the food “very much.”

“I could use $300,” he said. “Clothing for one thing,” he said gesturing at his shabby attire when asked how he would spend it.

Not all guests were unhappy. Many said they enjoyed the food and called the experience “beautiful,” saying they were touched that someone had flown all the way from China wanting to help.

But as they were herded outside to queue up to get the bus back, complaints multiplied.

Quin Shabazz, 34, said he felt the homeless had been exploited and branded the lunch -- covered by a mob of TV cameras and reporters -- “a big publicity stunt.”

Al Johnson, 42, said he had been banking on the money to get his life together and go home to his family in Texas.

“This was going to change my life,” he said. “Fraud. This is fraud with a capital F,” he added. “I feel used for a photo op.”

Craig Mayes, executive director of the New York City Rescue Mission, was left to deny there had been any injustice.

“I’m really sorry. It was misrepresented in the paper,” he said.

Michelle Tolson, director of public relations at the Mission, said Tuesday that no cash would be handed out to individuals and that it had taken 1.5 months of negotiations to convince Chen to instead donate $90,000 to the group.

The money would be ploughed straight into the Mission’s $5 million yearly expenses to feed and house people, she said.

The shelter provides people with a hot meal, a clean shower and a safe bed, clothing and assistance in addressing their problems.

Chen, known for publicity stunts and reportedly worth an estimated $825 million, serenaded his guests with a rendition of the 1985 charity single “We Are the World.”

The smiling, bespectacled businessman said he wanted to give back after wealthy Americans had contributed to relief efforts after disasters in China.

“Hopefully, I will really lead the way to encourage other people who are in a position to help to follow through,” he said.

However, the rocky start to his philanthropy campaign in New York has not dented Chen’s confidence, saying he planned to hold more charity luncheons and keep his promise of treating 1,000 homeless people to fine meals. “My homeless friends, please trust me, and trust the Mission,” Chen had said before leaving the restaurant, according to The New York Times.

Chen grabbed headlines in the US months ago for his effort to buy the Times and hosting a news junket where he distributed business cards proclaiming he was the “most influential Chinese”.

He is listed at number 227 on Forbes’ list of the 400 richest Chinese, with an estimated wealth of US$825 million.

Coalition for the Homeless says around 60,000 homeless men, women and children bed down in New York’s shelters and thousands more who sleep rough on the streets or elsewhere.

The number of homeless New Yorkers has risen by 75 percent since 2002 and in recent years has reached the highest levels since the Great Depression of the 1930s, according to the advocacy group.

 

[Costas]

Ιαπωνία (τα παχιά δικά μου):
Publishers fighting back against bestsellers highly critical of China, South Korea (Asahi Shimbun)

A growing group of publishing companies are banding together to battle the recent popularity of books and magazines that are disparaging of China and South Korea and even appearing on a top-10 bestseller list.
(...)
......because most of the anti-China and anti-South Korea books contain contents that raise doubts about reporting on those two nations by the mass media, the popularity of such books is likely due to media literacy education.

"In school classrooms, the emphasis has been on taking a critical view of information," Sato said. "On the other hand, schools have not taught their students that simply being critical of everything is not really being intellectual. Readers of the anti-China and anti-South Korea works will likely continue to seriously read such books because they are under the impression that they possess a critical way of thinking."
By MAYUMI MORI/ Staff Writer

 

[Costas]

Μέσω Sinocism:

ICANN 50 in London: Lu Wei, Minister of Cyberspace Affairs Administration of China (βίντεο) Προσφώνηση. Το ζουμί (διατυπωμένο μέσα από γενικές αρχές) είναι στο 6.00-9.00

China's 'Sovereign Internet' (By Shannon Tiezzi / The Diplomat)

A new report in People’s Daily interviewed five Chinese experts on Internet security and political thought, including Fang Binxing (credited with creating China’s “Great Firewall”). The report focuses on the idea of “Internet sovereignty” — the idea that each country has the right to control its domestic internet space. Yet by moving from a discussion of China’s rights to talk of international law, the report moves beyond a defense of China’s internet censorship to outlining China’s vision for global internet governance.

The idea of China’s “Internet sovereignty” is a high-profile resurrection of a concept first rolled out in a 2010 white paper called “The Internet in China.” The white paper explained the “Internet sovereignty of China” as meaning that “within Chinese territory the Internet is under the jurisdiction of Chinese sovereignty.” All persons and organizations operating within Chinese territory are expected to follow China’s Internet laws and regulations, the white paper said.

In an interview with New Yorker’s Evan Osnos at the time, Columbia University professor Tim Wu noted that China’s idea of “Internet sovereignty” was simply “a statement of private international law as typically practiced.” Most countries, Wu noted, have decided that the Internet is subject to national laws. The difference between China and the rest of the world, according to Wu, was simply one of scale: “Other countries, if they don’t consider the Internet sovereign, have a certain respect for the network as a platform for free speech … Again this varies from place to place, but China is unique in its lack of respect for the idea of an open Internet.”

Thus, among China’s rules and regulations for the Internet are typical prohibitions against “divulging state secrets” and “subverting state power” as well as more unique bans on “damaging state honor,” “propagating heretical or superstitious ideas,” “spreading rumors [and] disrupting social order and stability.” These rules were lumped into the category of “internet security,” equating these actions to hacking and other forms of cyber crime.

The People’s Daily article seeks to argue not only that China has the right to set up its own rules and regulations for the Internet, but that an international consensus should be reached to recognize this right. The article begins by noting that, in the Internet age, China now has “information borders” in addition to traditional sovereignty over land, air, and sea. The report argues that each country has a right to strengthen control over its own domestic Internet, and that such actions will help safeguard order and stability on the global Internet system.

In the interview with People’s Daily, Fang Binxing pointed to a 2013 report from a UN-commissioned group of experts on information security. That report noted that “state sovereignty and international norms and principles that flow from sovereignty apply to State conduct of ICT [information and communication technologies]-related activities, and to their jurisdiction over ICT infrastructure within their territory.” Fang argued that this statement proves the UN has already accepted China’s idea of “Internet sovereignty.”

Fang made no mention of the next item in the UN report, which requires that “state efforts to address the security of ICTs must go hand-in-hand with respect for human rights and fundamental freedom set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” The juxtaposition of these two points in the UN report outlines the basic difference between China’s concept of the Internet and the Western concept: is cyberspace entirely made up of domestic spheres, each under a different country’s sovereign rule, or is the Internet as a whole subject to international rule in the name of “universal values”? People’s Daily argues for the former approach.

The next expert interviewed, Wang Jun of Minzu University’s Marxism school, acknowledges the difficulty of defining boundaries for cyberspace, but offers some suggestions. “Although cyberspace has no national boundaries, network infrastructure has borders. Internet users have home countries. Internet companies and organizations always belong to a specific country.” Thus Wang suggests that each country can control these physical aspects of cyber space and “other countries have no right to interfere.”

Yet even while holding that “Internet sovereignty” is immune to external interference, the People’s Daily article acknowledged the importance of international consensus on defining cyberspace boundaries and rules of conduct. Currently, disagreements between countries are a major barrier to defining boundaries and implementing control of cyberspace, Wang Xiaofeng of Fudan University’s Center for America Studies said. Lang Ping of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences noted that no country can independently face the challenges posed by cyberspace.

Lang and Wang also see a competition among major powers for influence in cyberspace. Wang said that “some countries” (almost certainly a reference to the U.S.) are “abusing” their technological advantages to conduct cyber-espionage and cyber-attacks. Later, both Fang and Lang explicitly complained that the United States has an outsized role in controlling cyberspace due to its technological prowess. The experts generally agreed on a need for international dialogue and consensus on clear boundaries and rules for Internet control.

China’s goal for this dialogue would be to codify its own interpretation of “Internet sovereignty” into international law, much as Western countries have been able to codify their idea of “universal values.” The People’s Daily article sees cyberspace as a contested zone where the U.S. wields too much influence; it seeks to combat this by pushing for international consensus modeled on its own vision for the Internet.

Ai Weiwei, art without compromise (By William Wan / The Washington Post)
(...)
But he remains as confrontational as ever in his life and art. Of late he has gone from fighting the government to warring with others in China’s art community, criticizing some for surrending too readily to government pressure and censorship. Recently, after his name was left off a press release about an exhibition at Beijing’s influential Ullens Center for Contemporary Art, Ai pulled his work from the exhibition and posted transcripts on Instagram of embarrassing conversations with the director about government pressure to omit his name. [ΣΣ: [1][2] ]

Then, he went a step further and began taping interviews with other artists about what they thought of the omission, demanding that they choose a side: to stand with him or against him.

The fight has kicked up controversy and debate among Chinese artists. Some have dismissed Ai as an egotistical diva warped by newfound fame, while others praised him for exposing the compromises many now quietly make in China’s art world. [ΣΣ. πολύ ενδιαφέρον το τελευταίο αυτό λινκ]
(...)
Και ακολουθεί συνέντευξη όπου οι απαντήσεις και τα σχόλιά του δεν μπορούν ν' αφήσουν κανέναν αδιάφορο.

 

[Costas]

Μέσω Sinocism, συνέχεια:

Nightmares uncovered after girl dies at Chinese web addiction rehab school (Games in Asia)
(...) Apparently, during a lengthy training session meant as punishment, teachers pulled Ling Ling up by her arms and legs and then dropped her—repeatedly—to the ground. When she began to vomit blood and became unable to stand, her classmate Xin Xin said, the teachers said that she was faking and continued to beat her. Both girls ended up in the hospital, but Ling Ling’s bed was in the morgue, where her mother was called the following morning to identify her body. (...) Web addiction—which often means addiction to MMORPGs—is a serious problem in China. In fact, China was the first country to officially name internet addiction a clinical disorder, and for years, the government has considered it a major health threat. Experts estimate that China has about 4 million people that are seriously addicted to the web and/or online gaming. (...) In one instance, a 15-year-old child named Deng Senshan was sent by his parents to a Nanning training camp, and then died within eight hours of his arrival. And shockingly, eight hours isn’t the fastest that staff at these schools have managed to do serious harm. A 13-year-old student had his clavicle fractured by staff at a school in Liaoning within just two hours of his arrival when he attempted to run away. The schools’ promotional materials are full of phrases like “guidance” and “training”, but the contracts parents sign when enrolling their kids often states that the school does employ ‘suffering’ and ‘disciplinary’ teaching methods and that the parents agree to permit this so long as the students are not injured. (...) ...the school’s ‘treatments’ hadn’t worked, and in fact the addiction had become more severe. (...) Four schools of the twelve were shut down (including the Zhengzhou school that killed Ling Ling) and others were investigated, but several got away with simply paying compensation to the family or, in one case earlier this year, simply refunding tuition.

 

[Costas]

Μέσω Sinocism, τέλος:

Ο νέος χάρτης της ΛΔΚ, όπου οι διεκδικήσεις της στη Νότια Κινεζική Θάλασσα (με την 9 φορές διακεκομμένη γραμμή) δεν είναι πια σε γωνιακό κουτάκι αλλά κανονικό μέρος του χάρτη, που έτσι μεγάλωσε κατά πολύ. [Την ίδια ώρα οι χάρτες της Ελλάδας έχουν όχι μόνο το Καστελόριζο πάντοτε σε κουτάκι αλλά συχνά και τη Ρόδο-Κω, την Κέρκυρα κλπ.]

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Vietnam needs brotherly correction (By Wang Qiang / Global Times)
"Comrades and brothers" is used to describe the friendship between the Communist parties of China and Vietnam and the friendship between the two countries and their people during liberation and national building. However, due to the wrong attitude, provocative wording and dangerous actions of Vietnam in the South China Sea issue in recent days, some people have raised doubt over the "comrades and brothers" friendship, and the bilateral relationship has faced some challenges.

The key to solving the deadlock of China-Vietnam relations is whether Vietnam can give up its wrong stance.
(...)
If the Communist Party of Vietnam cannot acknowledge the conspiracy behind some international hostile forces or leaves the country's nationalist and anti-Communist forces unchecked, domestic security and social order will face more threats and chaos.

It is necessary for the parties of both countries to strengthen cooperation. When conditions are ripe, we can communicate on theories like "depoliticization of the armed forces," "multi-party mechanisms" and "separation of the three powers" to unite thoughts within the party.
(...)
China would set a good example by firmly cracking down on Vietnam's fuss-making.
(...)
Besides, it is necessary to take some measures to make our brother correct its own mistakes. That is what we call "brotherly affection."
The author is a research fellow with Non-war Military Operations Research Center at National Defense University PLA China.

Άμα έχεις τέτοιον big brother να σε στέργει...

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Στο πλαίσιο της καμπάνιας για την περιστολή της διαφθοράς στις τάξεις του Κόμματος και του κράτους, για τις συνεδρίες κριτικής και αυτοκριτικής Officials can buy scripts for their democratic life meetings for 100 rmb online...

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Όλος ο κόσμος μέσα σ' ένα καρυδότσουφλο: η Τόνγκα, τα παγκόσμια μπλοκ, η υπερχρέωση, οι εθνοτικές ταραχές... (AP)

 

[Costas]

The Debate Over Confucius Institutes (China File)

Last week, the American Association of University Professors joined a growing chorus of voices calling on North American universities to rethink their relationship with Confucius Institutes, the state-sponsored Chinese-language programs whose policies critics say are anathema to academic freedom. We asked contributors to discuss the debate. Specifically: the costs and benefits of having a Confucius Institute on a university campus; the economic forces at play; and the role of China in university life more broadly. —The Editors

Update: Several readers have noted with dismay that this Conversation does not include an entry by someone who works for or with a Confucius Institute. We share this concern. We have solicited responses to our original question—and to the discussion as it has developed—from numerous employees of universities that have Confucius Institutes as well as from people who teach at Confucius Institutes, and people who work with and for Hanban. So far, none of the people in the above categories whom we have approached has been willing or able to contribute. We welcome such contributions. —The Editors

Μια παράγραφος από την ανακοίνωση του AAUP, στο πιο πάνω λινκ "joined":
Confucius Institutes appear designed to emulate the cultural ambassadorship and programming associated with, for example, the British Council, the Goethe Institut, and L’Alliance Franςaise. These latter three entities are clearly connected to imperial pasts, ongoing geopolitical agendas, and the objectives of “soft power,” but none of them is located on a university or college campus. Instead, their connections to national political agendas and interests require that they be established in sites where they can fulfill their mandates openly without threatening the independence and integrity of academic institutions in host countries.

 

[Costas]

People’s Daily Takes Firm Stance Against Urine Consumption
By CHRIS BUCKLEY / NYT

If imbibing urine is not your cup of tea, People’s Daily — the solemn voice of the Chinese Communist Party — is with you on that one. On Friday, the newspaper took time off from its usual encomiums to party leaders to warn people against drinking their own pee.

“There is no clinical or medical basis for using urine over a long period of time as a product for preventing and curing illness, or as a health supplement,” an investigative report in the paper said, citing squadrons of medical experts.
(...)
People’s Daily may have been prompted to move against urine drinkers by a recent burst of publicity for their cause. In news reports that spread on the Internet in China, elderly Chinese men have boasted of the benefits of the habit and demonstrated its pleasures in pictures that may cause some readers to wince.

One man in his late 70s told a newspaper in the southwestern city of Chongqing that the therapy took some getting used to, but gulping down the liquid was not as unpleasant as many assumed. “At least, it’s a lot better tasting than many bitter Chinese medicines,” he said.

But he recommended using a glass, not plastic cup, to preserve “the authentic taste” of the liquid. For reasons that the report did not explain, he insisted on using a false name.

 

[Costas]

Ξάφρισμα από Sinocism:

Η είδηση απασχόλησε και τα ελληνικά ΜΜΕ. Εδώ, μια ανάλυσή της:
Xi Bags High-Level Military “Tiger” Amid Deepening Corruption Crackdown
Instead of highlighting the usual litany of “personal failings” typically associated with such graft cases, the official announcement noted that Xu “took advantage of his post to assist the promotion of other people and accepted bribes personally and through his family members.” Such a direct—and public—assertion about the buying of military office suggests Xi and his civilian peers are keen to send a message concerning the party’s control of the military. The accusation goes right to the heart of the PLA's loyalty to the CCP and its role as the ultimate guarantor of party rule. The Egyptian military’s summary abandonment of then President Mubarak in 2011 presumably has prompted some soul searching among the senior civilian leadership in China, and, unlike his predecessor, Hu Jintao, Xi appears to have the wherewithal to bring the PLA fully to heel.

(Reuters)
In a visit certain to be watched carefully in Pyongyang, President Xi Jinping will be holding talks with South Korean President Park Geun-hye for the fifth time in a year, without yet meeting the North's leader, Kim Jong Un.
(...) South Korea is also one of the few major economies that runs a surplus with China, to the tune of $63 billion last year, thanks to exports of cars, smartphones, flatscreen TVs, semiconductors and petrochemicals.
(...) "My belief is that North Korea wants to be left alone, with some modest economic opening that they control," [Deputy US Secretary of State Richard] Armitage said at a recent forum in Beijing. "They don't like China much more than they like the United States."

Special Report: The battle for Hong Kong's soul (Reuters)
"Xi Jinping has rectified (China's) policy for governing Hong Kong," a source close to the Chinese leader told Reuters in Beijing, requesting anonymity. "In the past, the mainland compromised toward Hong Kong too much and was perceived to be weak."

This tightening grip has fueled resentment and sparked a civil disobedience movement called "Occupy Central", which threatens to blockade part of Hong Kong's main business district.

Mass protests can paralyze this high-density city. Business leaders have warned that Occupy could damage businesses: Four of the largest multinational accounting firms placed advertisements in local newspapers warning against the movement, which has been branded illegal by Chinese authorities.

Occupy's primary aim is to pressure China into allowing a truly democratic election in 2017.

Beijing says Hong Kong can go ahead with a vote in 2017 for the city's top leader. But mainland officials stress that Hong Kong's mini-constitution, the Basic Law, specifies that only a nominating committee can pick leadership candidates. Pro-democracy activists demand changes that would allow the public to directly nominate candidates.

Nearly 800,000 people voted in an unofficial referendum that ended on Sunday, which called for Beijing to allow open nominations of candidates for the 2017 poll – a vote China's State Council, or cabinet, called "illegal and invalid", said the state Xinhua news agency.

Fears that the screws are tightening were heightened when Beijing published an unprecedented cabinet-level White Paper in June on Hong Kong. It bluntly reminded Hong Kong that China holds supreme authority over the city.

"The high degree of autonomy of (Hong Kong) is not an inherent power, but one that comes solely from the authorization by the central leadership," it says.

Mass Hong Kong protest looms as democracy push gathers steam (Reuters)
Hong Kong is bracing for its largest protest in more than a decade after nearly 800,000 voted for full democracy in an unofficial referendum, a move likely to stoke anti-China sentiment in the former British colony.

The annual July 1 rally, marking the day the territory returned to China in 1997, will focus on pressuring Beijing's Communist Party leaders for full electoral freedom, organizers said, and could draw the largest turnout since 2003, when half a million people demonstrated against proposed anti-subversion laws which were later scrapped.

 

[Costas]

China to let Indian experts monitor Brahmaputra in Tibet (The Hindu)
China has for the first time formally agreed to allow Indian hydrological experts to conduct study tours in Tibet to monitor the flows on the upper reaches of the Brahmaputra, according to a new agreement signed here on Monday during the visit of Vice-President Hamid Ansari.

In a move to assuage India’s concerns about the ongoing dam projects on the upper reaches of the river — known as the Yarlung Zangbo in Tibet — Beijing has formally agreed to allow India to “despatch hydrological experts” to conduct study tours “according to the principle of reciprocity”.

 

[Costas]

Uphill Fight Ahead for Hong Kong’s Democracy Movement
By KEITH BRADSHER (NYT)

HONG KONG — A pro-democracy march held Tuesday by a huge crowd of mostly young demonstrators underlined the determination of many of this autonomous Chinese city’s residents to preserve and expand the freedoms that they inherited from British rule. But it also brought to light more challenges that may lie ahead.

The protesters remained peaceful and did not resort to violence, which would have given the local government a pretext to respond much more firmly and probably would have hurt broader public support for the demonstration. But at an overnight sit-in that followed the march, the police also showed that they could efficiently remove and arrest 511 protesters in less than four hours — a brisk pace suggesting that they may be ready to respond to larger sit-ins that some democracy advocates are contemplating for later this year.

The calm and poise of the demonstrators Tuesday seemed to help reassure the business community that future protests would not severely disrupt commerce, resulting in a 1.55 percent rise in the Hong Kong stock market on Wednesday. But while the protesters disproved government warnings that their activities would lead to chaos, their civil behavior could also lead to an impression that they are manageable, which could limit the pressure they are able to bring to bear on the government for changes.

The preponderance of young people among the demonstrators may also make it much harder, rather than easier, to reach any compromise with the local government and its backers in Beijing. The key question is who may run to become the territory’s chief executive in the next elections, in 2017. That issue was front and center for Tuesday’s march, as well as the subject of an informal vote last month in which nearly 800,000 Hong Kong residents participated, and which Beijing dismissed as illegal.

Students and people in their 20s have overwhelmingly supported a plan calling for the general public to be allowed to nominate candidates for chief executive — so-called civil nomination, an idea completely dismissed by Beijing and its allies.

By contrast, older Hong Kong residents have tended to support a compromise that would retain the nominating committee mandated by the Basic Law, the territory’s mini-constitution, but make that nominating committee more diverse and open to a wider range of candidates than Beijing wants.

Asked after a speech on Wednesday afternoon whether the political center was eroding in Hong Kong, Anson Chan, the second-highest official in the Hong Kong government in the years immediately before and after the British returned the territory to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, bluntly replied, “I have to say that I agree.”

Mrs. Chan, one of the most influential advocates of democracy here, noted that a key pro-democracy member of the city’s legislature, Ronny Tong, had even withdrawn his own plan for reconstituting the nomination committee, after concluding that support in the democratic camp for civil nomination was overwhelming. She said that she still favored a nominating committee with broad rules that would make it possible for a full array of candidates to appear on the ballot, not just those approved by Beijing.

She contended that such a procedural compromise would still make it possible to achieve full democratic goals.

“Hong Kong people have demonstrated that we want the whole loaf, not half a loaf, and we certainly don’t want a loaf rotten through and through,” she said at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club.

Mrs. Chan noted that foreign countries and their citizens and companies in Hong Kong had a large stake in the issue as well. If the many individual and political liberties that define Hong Kong are eroded, then the city could eventually lose its separate, preferential status from mainland China for the purpose of many international agreements, covering everything from airline routes and international trade to taxes, cross-border investments and visa requirements, she said.

Michael DeGolyer, the director of the Hong Kong Transition Project, a 26-year-old coalition of academics who have been studying the territory’s political evolution from a British colony to a Chinese territory, expressed caution about whether Tuesday’s march had been large enough to change political calculations in Hong Kong’s government and in Beijing.

“It wasn’t this enormous, overwhelming turnout that everyone would be stunned by — it was big,” Mr. DeGolyer said.

Organizers estimated that 510,000 people joined the march, while the police calculated that the largest number of people simultaneously participating at any one time during the eight-hour march was 98,600. The police did not attempt to estimate the total number of participants.

The Hong Kong University Public Opinion Program estimated that 154,000 to 172,000 people had taken part in the march. Since 2003, a sizable pro-democracy march has been held every year in Hong Kong on July 1, the anniversary of its return to Chinese sovereignty; the turnout Tuesday came closest to rivaling that of the enormous 2003 march.

One lingering question Wednesday, after the police had removed and arrested participants in the sit-in, was whether future sit-ins would be as peaceful. A small but noticeable number of elderly residents and people in wheelchairs chose to participate; one of the many subthemes of the march had been a call for better social benefits for the elderly and the disabled.

The young protesters treated the elderly and wheelchair-bound protesters among them with respect and even deference, resulting in a calmer tone to the sit-in than most had expected. The police also treated those protesters with great caution, and reluctantly arrested them while showing a clear awareness that every move was being followed by numerous television cameras and cellphone cameras.

“Nobody wants to be a granny beater,” Mr. DeGolyer said later.

But the participation of elderly and disabled protesters at future protests is uncertain. At the same time, the police showed Wednesday morning a new willingness to formally arrest large numbers of people, not just carry them out of the downtown road they were blocking.

“This was not an illegal assembly; it was a peaceful and legitimate protest under international law,” said Mabel Au, the director of Amnesty International Hong Kong. “The police action was hasty and unnecessary andsets a disturbing precedent.”

The backdrop for the protest was an increasingly repressive political environment in mainland China, where detentions of human rights advocates and others have increased as President Xi Jinping has rapidly consolidated power. Some demonstrators in Hong Kong, particularly the limited number of older demonstrators, voiced an awareness that they were seeking a greater political voice at a time when the political climate, if anything, may be darkening.

“I just try my best by marching even though it may not be of much use,” Gary Fong, a 45-year-old metalworker, said during the march on Tuesday. “Who knows, this may be the last year that we will be allowed to march.”

 

[Costas]

No regrets, say the Chinese women who chose independence over marriage
The girls who took a lifelong vow of chastity are now in their 80s, the last survivors of a unique custom
(Tania Branigan in Shatou village, Guangdong / The Guardian)

Her mother carefully undid Liang Jieyun's plaits, combed out the strands and pinned them into a bun. When her friends put up their hair, they wore the red clothing of brides. But as Liang left her girlhood behind and stepped across the family threshold, she was embarking on a lifelong commitment to remain single.

At 85, Liang is a rare survivor of a custom stretching back to the early 19th century in parts of southern Guangdong. Women here could vow to remain a "self-combed woman", or zishunü (自梳女), leaving their parents' home to work without marrying. "If I hadn't become a 'self-combed woman', the landlord would have forced me into marriage," she said.

Pretty girls were often forcibly taken as wives or concubines. It happened to two of her friends, and they killed themselves.
(...)

 

[Costas]

Μέσω Sinocism:

China bans Ramadan fast in Muslim northwest (yahoo)
BEIJING (AP) — Students and civil servants in China's Muslim northwest, where Beijing is enforcing a security crackdown following deadly unrest, have been ordered to avoid taking part in traditional fasting during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan.

Ramadan, Beijing style (The Economist)
In China Ramadan this year comes against the backdrop of increased violence perpetrated by Uighurs and a government line which more strongly than ever attributes it to radical Islam and international jihadism. In Xinjiang, authorities have reportedly taken steps, as they have in years past, to discourage Ramadan fasting among ordinary people and ban it outright for many party members, government workers and school children.

At the Madian mosque, however, the scene was more relaxed. Bitter tensions may be roiling in Xinjiang, but in the cool shade of craggy pine trees and the sweeping eaves of the central courtyard of the Qing-dynasty mosque, diversity and tolerance were on display.

Nightclubbing, we're nightclubbing...
Clubbing with China's Cocky Young 1 Percenters (Jamie Fullerton / Vice)