Costas
¥
3η στον κόσμο σε κρατούμενους δημοσιογράφους η Λαϊκή Κίνα, μετά την Τουρκία και το Ιράν, με 32 (ή μήπως 31;) άτομα, σύμφωνα με την ανεξάρτητη, εδρεύουσα στη Νέα Υόρκη Committee to Protect Journalists.
Την ίδια ώρα, στην Κίνα...
- Thread starter Costas
- Start date
Costas
¥
Παραπομπή σε δίκη του Xu Zhiyong [#790, #854] και άλλων του Νέου Κινήματος Πολιτών από τις εισαγγελίες. Το ποινικά κολάσιμο έγκλημα; Συγκέντρωση πλήθους με σκοπό τη διατάραξη της δημόσιας τάξης. Κοινώς, κρατούσαν πλακάτ κι έβγαζαν φωτογραφίες της εκδήλωσής τους με αίτημα τη δημοσίευση των περιουσιακών στοιχείων των κρατικών αξιωματούχων και την ισότητα πρόσβασης στην εκπαίδευση (μεγάλο πρόβλημα με τα δικαιώματα των εσωτερικών μεταναστών).
Costas
¥
Why the World Needs to Roar around the New Citizens Movement Trials
By Xiao Shu, published: December 22, 2013
(China Change)
As this stands to be the largest-scale series of political cases in China this century, comparable to Taiwan’s Kaohsiung Incident of yore, it’s worth the world’s time to stand around and bear witness.
The New Citizens Movement is a rights-based movement initiated by a group of Chinese grassroots activists, the main purpose of which is to see the implementation of the human and civil rights provided for in China’s constitution and laws.
Dr. Xu Zhiyong, who initiated this movement, is a prominent public intellectual in China who rose to prominence in 2003 as one of the three young legal scholars who brought an end to use of custody and repatriation detention.
Since then, Xu has dedicated his time to the rights defense movement (weiquan), through which he established the grassroots rights defense group Open Constitution Initiative (公盟，Gongmeng). When Gongmeng was forced to dissolve in 2009, Xu himself was detained for more than a month.
After regaining his freedom, rather than withdraw Xu Zhiyong chose to pitch himself back into battle. In 2010 he initiated the well-received “Citizens’ Commitment” online campaign, an invitation to the like-minded to sign on and hold each other to a personal commitment both to the fulfillment of civic duty and the pursuit of civil rights.
This in fact was a turning point for social movements in China, an upgrade from the traditional weiquan movement to a citizens’ movement. Where weiquan focused traditionally on specific incidents and individual interests on a case-by-case basis, this civic movement differed in its approach to quality of life issues from the perspective of universal rights.
(…)
Rather than a bottom-up attempt at violent revolution, this was a bottom-up growth process for civil society. It was an attempt, through the power of growth, to change China and push for peaceful transition, and provide China a soft landing for the crisis in which it is now deeply stuck.
Thus the mould was cast for this civic movement: forward-looking, rational and moderate. And it was these qualities that drew participation from every sector and ethnic group in society, growing like a rolling snowball.
(…)
The New Citizens Movement was evidently able to break free of this and—similar to the way Antaeus was only able to gain real power with feet firmly on the ground—begin to engage mainstream society. For social movements in China, this was an historical breakthrough.
And it was precisely this that led to a backlash by authorities, for whom the biggest taboo is citizens organizing among themselves.
The New Citizens Movement took great pains to avoid this high-voltage tripwire, keeping things both deinstitutionalized and decentralized: voluntary cooperation based solely on consensus and tacit agreement.
In spite of such restraint, to authorities it was still unacceptable.
Since the days of Jiang Zemin, the philosophy of governance has been to nip all forms of grassroots organization in the bud, to deliver a crushing blow at the earliest sign of existence rather than let anything grow to infancy, keeping civil society scattered in the wind rather than allowing any space for it to grow.
(…)
Authorities initiated targeted crackdowns in March this year. One-by-one, New Citizens Movement participants were taken down: Zhao Changqing (赵常青) and Ding Jiaxi (丁家喜) in Beijing, Li Huaping (李化平) in Shanghai, Liu Jiacai (刘家财) in Hubei, and Liu Ping (刘萍), Wei Zhongping (魏忠平) and Li Sihua (李思华) in Xinyu, Jiangxi province.
The repression reached its peak in July this year with the arrests of New Citizens Movement advocates Xu Zhiyong and Guo Feixiong. Prominent entrepreneur Wang Gongquan was also detained for his support of Xu, and remains held by authorities today.
In just half a year, more than 20 New Citizens Movement participants were arrested, well in excess of the scale of repression seen following the release of Charter 08. Among the victims are the economically disadvantaged such as Liu Ping, intellectuals like Xu Zhiyong, and professionals like Ding Jiaxi, not to mention entrepreneurs such as Wang Gongquan, in all comprising nearly every layer of intermediate society.
(…)
Talking domestic politics over dinner? Against the law. Dissatisfaction with the political system? Against the law. Uploading photos taken in open empty spaces? Against the law. Demanding officials publicly disclose personal assets? Against the law. Demanding equal access to education? Against the law. Demanding the National People’s Congress ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights it signed years ago? Against the law.
In a word, fulfillment of civic duties and the pursuit of civil rights has essentially been criminalized. The absurdity of these and other trial details that leaked out left people in disbelief.
(…)
No matter which way they scramble, authorities won’t be able to free themselves from their predicament: the hole they dug for themselves through repression of the New Citizens’ Movement.
They proclaim full adherence to the constitution, then cast the strictly constitutionalist New Citizens Movement as an enemy of the state; they want the comfort of a dictatorship, but also the legitimacy derived from upholding rule of law; they want to persecute, but they also want to maintain appearances; they want it all, which is impossible. Civilization or barbarism? You can’t have both, so authorities need to make a decision.
Let Wang Gongquan go home. Let Xu Zhiyong go home. Let Guo Feixiong and all citizens who lost their freedom simply for striving for their civil rights go back to their homes.
These aren’t pleas, these are decrees based in natural law. What’s needed now are the voices of civil society from around the world, rising together in one loud roar.
Xiao Shu (笑蜀), the pen name of Chen Min, is a former columnist for the Chinese newspaper Southern Weekly and the Chinese magazine Yanhuang Chunqiu, and an active participant in the New Citizens Movement. He is currently a visiting scholar at National Chengchi University in Taiwan.
(Translated by John Kennedy.)
By Xiao Shu, published: December 22, 2013
(China Change)
As this stands to be the largest-scale series of political cases in China this century, comparable to Taiwan’s Kaohsiung Incident of yore, it’s worth the world’s time to stand around and bear witness.
The New Citizens Movement is a rights-based movement initiated by a group of Chinese grassroots activists, the main purpose of which is to see the implementation of the human and civil rights provided for in China’s constitution and laws.
Dr. Xu Zhiyong, who initiated this movement, is a prominent public intellectual in China who rose to prominence in 2003 as one of the three young legal scholars who brought an end to use of custody and repatriation detention.
Since then, Xu has dedicated his time to the rights defense movement (weiquan), through which he established the grassroots rights defense group Open Constitution Initiative (公盟，Gongmeng). When Gongmeng was forced to dissolve in 2009, Xu himself was detained for more than a month.
After regaining his freedom, rather than withdraw Xu Zhiyong chose to pitch himself back into battle. In 2010 he initiated the well-received “Citizens’ Commitment” online campaign, an invitation to the like-minded to sign on and hold each other to a personal commitment both to the fulfillment of civic duty and the pursuit of civil rights.
This in fact was a turning point for social movements in China, an upgrade from the traditional weiquan movement to a citizens’ movement. Where weiquan focused traditionally on specific incidents and individual interests on a case-by-case basis, this civic movement differed in its approach to quality of life issues from the perspective of universal rights.
(…)
Rather than a bottom-up attempt at violent revolution, this was a bottom-up growth process for civil society. It was an attempt, through the power of growth, to change China and push for peaceful transition, and provide China a soft landing for the crisis in which it is now deeply stuck.
Thus the mould was cast for this civic movement: forward-looking, rational and moderate. And it was these qualities that drew participation from every sector and ethnic group in society, growing like a rolling snowball.
(…)
The New Citizens Movement was evidently able to break free of this and—similar to the way Antaeus was only able to gain real power with feet firmly on the ground—begin to engage mainstream society. For social movements in China, this was an historical breakthrough.
And it was precisely this that led to a backlash by authorities, for whom the biggest taboo is citizens organizing among themselves.
The New Citizens Movement took great pains to avoid this high-voltage tripwire, keeping things both deinstitutionalized and decentralized: voluntary cooperation based solely on consensus and tacit agreement.
In spite of such restraint, to authorities it was still unacceptable.
Since the days of Jiang Zemin, the philosophy of governance has been to nip all forms of grassroots organization in the bud, to deliver a crushing blow at the earliest sign of existence rather than let anything grow to infancy, keeping civil society scattered in the wind rather than allowing any space for it to grow.
(…)
Authorities initiated targeted crackdowns in March this year. One-by-one, New Citizens Movement participants were taken down: Zhao Changqing (赵常青) and Ding Jiaxi (丁家喜) in Beijing, Li Huaping (李化平) in Shanghai, Liu Jiacai (刘家财) in Hubei, and Liu Ping (刘萍), Wei Zhongping (魏忠平) and Li Sihua (李思华) in Xinyu, Jiangxi province.
The repression reached its peak in July this year with the arrests of New Citizens Movement advocates Xu Zhiyong and Guo Feixiong. Prominent entrepreneur Wang Gongquan was also detained for his support of Xu, and remains held by authorities today.
In just half a year, more than 20 New Citizens Movement participants were arrested, well in excess of the scale of repression seen following the release of Charter 08. Among the victims are the economically disadvantaged such as Liu Ping, intellectuals like Xu Zhiyong, and professionals like Ding Jiaxi, not to mention entrepreneurs such as Wang Gongquan, in all comprising nearly every layer of intermediate society.
(…)
Talking domestic politics over dinner? Against the law. Dissatisfaction with the political system? Against the law. Uploading photos taken in open empty spaces? Against the law. Demanding officials publicly disclose personal assets? Against the law. Demanding equal access to education? Against the law. Demanding the National People’s Congress ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights it signed years ago? Against the law.
In a word, fulfillment of civic duties and the pursuit of civil rights has essentially been criminalized. The absurdity of these and other trial details that leaked out left people in disbelief.
(…)
No matter which way they scramble, authorities won’t be able to free themselves from their predicament: the hole they dug for themselves through repression of the New Citizens’ Movement.
They proclaim full adherence to the constitution, then cast the strictly constitutionalist New Citizens Movement as an enemy of the state; they want the comfort of a dictatorship, but also the legitimacy derived from upholding rule of law; they want to persecute, but they also want to maintain appearances; they want it all, which is impossible. Civilization or barbarism? You can’t have both, so authorities need to make a decision.
Let Wang Gongquan go home. Let Xu Zhiyong go home. Let Guo Feixiong and all citizens who lost their freedom simply for striving for their civil rights go back to their homes.
These aren’t pleas, these are decrees based in natural law. What’s needed now are the voices of civil society from around the world, rising together in one loud roar.
Xiao Shu (笑蜀), the pen name of Chen Min, is a former columnist for the Chinese newspaper Southern Weekly and the Chinese magazine Yanhuang Chunqiu, and an active participant in the New Citizens Movement. He is currently a visiting scholar at National Chengchi University in Taiwan.
(Translated by John Kennedy.)
Costas
¥
Ειδικά στην εποχή μας, οι άνθρωποι πρέπει να έχουν πρόσωπα. Το παραπάνω άρθρο έχει φωτογραφίες επτά μελών του Κινήματος:
Xu Zhiyong (许志永)
Liu Ping (刘萍)
Wang Gongquan (王功权)
Li Huaping (李化平)
.............
............ 
Guo Feixiong (郭飞雄 )...... Ding Jiaxi (丁家喜)...........Zhao Changqing (赵常青)
Xu Zhiyong (许志永)
Liu Ping (刘萍)
Wang Gongquan (王功权)
Li Huaping (李化平)
......................... Guo Feixiong (郭飞雄 )...... Ding Jiaxi (丁家喜)...........Zhao Changqing (赵常青)
Κώστα, έβαλες στο αρμόδιο νήμα σημείωση για τον Xu Zhiyong της νέας αβατάρας σου;
Costas
¥
Από ένα άρθρο του Murong Xuecun στη New York Times περί του νέου στιλ λεκτικής και εικαστικής προπαγάνδας στην ΛΔΚ, μια ιστορία που θυμίζει τη θυσία του Αβραάμ και μια άλλη που θυμίζει...Μακαβέγιεφ!
Some of these legends of filial sacrifice verge on the extreme. One tells of a poor man who was prepared to kill his young son so that his starving mother would have more to eat. (The man starts to dig a grave in which to bury his son, and instead finds a pot of gold, the reward for his virtue.) Another relates the story of a man so worried about his father’s health that he secretly tastes the old man’s feces. (The sweet taste confirms that the father was gravely ill. The son prays that his life be taken instead of his father’s, and both men live.)
Μου άρεσε και το τέλος του άρθρου (se non è vero, è ben trovato):
But my old schoolmate, the party member Mr. Lin, sees it differently. “Of course it’s stupid!” he told me. “But who cares? We can stick that stupid stuff on all those walls. Can you?”
Some of these legends of filial sacrifice verge on the extreme. One tells of a poor man who was prepared to kill his young son so that his starving mother would have more to eat. (The man starts to dig a grave in which to bury his son, and instead finds a pot of gold, the reward for his virtue.) Another relates the story of a man so worried about his father’s health that he secretly tastes the old man’s feces. (The sweet taste confirms that the father was gravely ill. The son prays that his life be taken instead of his father’s, and both men live.)
Μου άρεσε και το τέλος του άρθρου (se non è vero, è ben trovato):
But my old schoolmate, the party member Mr. Lin, sees it differently. “Of course it’s stupid!” he told me. “But who cares? We can stick that stupid stuff on all those walls. Can you?”
Costas
¥
The Gong Fu Tie Calligraphy, a hanging scroll with just nine characters, was sold for US$8.229 million at Sotheby’s in the Fine Classical Chinese Paintings and Calligraphy auction on September 19 after 70 rounds of heated bidding. It has been described as one of the finest examples of calligraphy ever produced. (...) However, three researchers with Shanghai Museum, Zhong Yinlan, Shan Guolin and Ling Lizhong, said the Gong Fu Tie bought by Liu was a forgery, the Xinmin Evening News reported yesterday. (xinhua)
Costas
¥
The survey was conducted by the French market research company Ipsos in September and polled more than 16,000 adults in 20 countries. Chinese respondents topped the list in measuring success by their possessions, coming in more than double the global average, according to the results published last week. Seventy-one percent of Chinese respondents agreed with the statement “I measure my success by the things I own,” far higher than respondents from its East Asian neighbors South Korea, at 45 percent, and Japan, 22 percent. (NYT)
Costas
¥
Αποσπάσματα συνέντευξης του προέδρου και διευθύνοντος συμβούλου της Monsanto Hugh Grant στο οικονομικό περιοδικό Caixin.
Costas
¥
Το 2014 ξεκινά με το κατέβασμα ρολών άλλου ενός από τους διάσημους μπλόγκερ, δια τον φόβον των Ιουδαίων (το λινκ μέσα στο κείμενο, δικό μου):
(South China Morning Post)
Prominent scholar He Weifang says 'goodbye' to online debate
By Patrick Boehler and Laura Zhou
He Weifang, one of the mainland’s best known "public intellectuals", said farewell to his Sina Weibo account on Tuesday, reducing further the number of prominent political thinkers debating on Chinese social media.
“In the past year, I’ve seen one familiar blogger after the other disappear, it could not avoid feeling disappointed,” he wrote in post on Tuesday afternoon. “It’s time to close this microblog. Goodbye,” he concluded.
He, a law professor at Peking University, told the South China Morning Post on the phone that he felt “uncomfortable” with insults and abusive words leftists left in his microblog.
He has more than 1.1 million followers on his Sina Weibo microblog. His decision to end his microblogging follows a trend of prominent opinion-leaders, known as “public intellectuals”, going silent amid a government crackdown against dissent.
After a series of detentions in August, the Supreme People’s Court said in September that any online post deemed libellous that is reposted more than 500 times or viewed more than 5,000 times can land its author in jail.
Some prominent commentators, like venture capitalists Charles Xue Biqun and Wang Gongquan, have been detained on seperate charges. Others, like historian Zhang Lifan, have seen their weibo accounts closed.
Scholar He attached a painting of the Tao Yuanming, an ancient poet who retired from government service in disgust of corruption, to his post. A signatory to Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo’s Charter ’08, he has in the past frequently called for constitutional rule and political reforms.
“The doctrine of communism inevitably leads to slavery, because it takes away people’s right to think and to express - and these problems have not been properly resolved," he told the Post in an interview in October.
Hundreds of internet users have expressed regret over his decision to leave social media. “If He is gone, how many wumao will lose their jobs?”, quipped one, referring to government-paid leftist attackers of “public intellectuals” like He.
(South China Morning Post)
Prominent scholar He Weifang says 'goodbye' to online debate
By Patrick Boehler and Laura Zhou
He Weifang, one of the mainland’s best known "public intellectuals", said farewell to his Sina Weibo account on Tuesday, reducing further the number of prominent political thinkers debating on Chinese social media.
“In the past year, I’ve seen one familiar blogger after the other disappear, it could not avoid feeling disappointed,” he wrote in post on Tuesday afternoon. “It’s time to close this microblog. Goodbye,” he concluded.
He, a law professor at Peking University, told the South China Morning Post on the phone that he felt “uncomfortable” with insults and abusive words leftists left in his microblog.
He has more than 1.1 million followers on his Sina Weibo microblog. His decision to end his microblogging follows a trend of prominent opinion-leaders, known as “public intellectuals”, going silent amid a government crackdown against dissent.
After a series of detentions in August, the Supreme People’s Court said in September that any online post deemed libellous that is reposted more than 500 times or viewed more than 5,000 times can land its author in jail.
Some prominent commentators, like venture capitalists Charles Xue Biqun and Wang Gongquan, have been detained on seperate charges. Others, like historian Zhang Lifan, have seen their weibo accounts closed.
Scholar He attached a painting of the Tao Yuanming, an ancient poet who retired from government service in disgust of corruption, to his post. A signatory to Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo’s Charter ’08, he has in the past frequently called for constitutional rule and political reforms.
“The doctrine of communism inevitably leads to slavery, because it takes away people’s right to think and to express - and these problems have not been properly resolved," he told the Post in an interview in October.
Hundreds of internet users have expressed regret over his decision to leave social media. “If He is gone, how many wumao will lose their jobs?”, quipped one, referring to government-paid leftist attackers of “public intellectuals” like He.
Costas
¥
Ο Bill Bishop του Sinocism κοιτάζει στη γυάλα και προλέγει για το 2014:
1. 2014 is the Year of the Horse but it will also likely become known as the Year of the Grind as Beijing works through its many political, economic, environmental and social challenges;
2. Xi Jinping will continue to consolidate power. The apparent ongoing purge of Zhou Yongkang and his allies will result in Xi having more control over both the security services and the military than any leader in decades;
3. Xi's appointment to head the leading group for comprehensively deepening reform is positive for reform prospects. Some had expected Premier Li Keqiang to lead the group and now see this move as a diminution of Li, but given that the scope of the group is much broader than just the economy it makes more sense for the General Secretary to lead it. Only Xi may have the authority and the bureaucratic power to push through reforms that affect so many entrenched interests (though of course reform will also bring new opportunities to some). If Xi is successful in rebuilding Party discipline through the Mass Line Campaign and the corruption crackdown then there is a decent chance the reforms will succeed. But there is a reason some in Beijing say that Xi is the Party's last chance to make the changes needed to keep it in power;
4. The corruption crackdown will intensify and while it will not solve the root issues it will be more successful than most have predicted. Zhou Yongkang may be the first tiger to fall in 2014 but there will be others. There will be increasing pockets of resistance as cadres are squeezed but Xi appears to have the power base to continue the crackdown. And business prospects will not improve for luxury goods merchants;
5. The economy will continue to struggle, in large part due to the excessive buildup of corporate and government debt. The recent audit and the listing of "resolving risk associated with local government debt" as a key task in 2014 by the Central Economic Work Conference are signs of both how worried Beijing is and how serious it is taking the debt mess. There are no quick fixes though, moral hazard is a huge issue and while a debt crisis is unlikely (but never say never) Beijing's options are increasingly constrained and any overly aggressive efforts to rein in credit growth could dramatically slow the economy. GDP growth should come in around 7% (and there will be plenty of debate about how "healthy" or real" that growth is), the Shanghai Composite will end 2014 15% higher, the RMB will appreciate to between 5.8-5.9 to the US Dollar and first-tier and maybe second-tier city real estate markets will continue to see price appreciation, though at least one high profile real estate developer will be taken down as a scapegoat for the high housing prices;
6. The Party has made much progress towards its goal of seizing the commanding heights of the Internet and those efforts will continue, as will a continued shift in social media usage from Weibo to Wechat. The stepped up control of the Internet will continue part of the broader, ongoing ideological tightening;
7. Alibaba and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange will both make concessions by the second quarter that will allow the company to list on the HKSE. The IPO will be bigger than Facebook's even though Tencent's Wechat will increasingly be seen as serious threat and Laiwang, Alibaba's Wechat clone, will have little traction;
8. There will be more China pain for US technology companies in the wake of the Snowden revelations. Do not be surprised if Beijing bans military and security personnel and cadres above a certain rank from using Apple products;
9. There will be progress on cleaning up the environment though the problems are so huge that not much will change substantively in a year. But there will be more bureaucratic will and policy support as Beijing has come to realize that the environmental disaster is one of the core threats to the country. One of my predictions for 2013 was that the environmental issues would lead to "more protests as citizens become more aware of their rights and are emboldened to protect them." In fact there were fewer large scale ones than in 2012 as Beijing narrowed the public sphere.
10. Verbatim from last year's predictions: "China’s external environment is increasingly complex. Mr. Xi is likely to work hard on maintaining stable relations with the United States, while at the same time expanding China’s military capabilities and asserting its regional interests. China has unsettled its neighbors with its approach to the disputes over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea and the various islands in the South China Sea. Both issues look intractable, so a solution is unlikely in 2013. Expect a quickening arms race in Asia, increasingly nationalist rhetoric, continued tensions with Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines and growing risks of misunderstandings — and possible mishaps — as the various countries send more vessels into the disputed areas."
What I will add for 2014 is that there will be increasing recognition that Beijing has a well-crafted strategy, not ad-hoc and uncoordinated actions, that it believes it will demonize and isolate Japan in the region and force the US to choose between supporting an increasingly unpopular regional partner or applying pressure on Japan such that other countries will see the US as an unreliable ally. I am not convinced it will work but it does look to be a significant part of Beijing's strategy. And Prime Minister Abe is starting to look like a gift for Beijing.
Of course any unforeseen, exogenous events could render some or all of these non-operative...
Σχετικά με το σημείο 10, η γιαπωνέζικη Asahi Shimbun προ ημερών έγραφε:
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe appears to have badly misjudged Washington's reaction to his surprise Dec. 26 visit to Yasukuni Shrine.
In a rare public criticism, the U.S. government expressed disappointment at Abe's first visit as prime minister to the Tokyo shrine that memorializes Japanese war dead along with 14 Class-A war criminals. Both the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo and the U.S. State Department in Washington expressed their concerns over Abe's visit. (...)
One high-ranking Foreign Ministry official said: "It was shocking to see the United States use the terminology 'disappointed.' If disharmony should arise between Japan and the United States, China, South Korea and North Korea could be emboldened to take stronger measures against Japan." (...)
When former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited Yasukuni every year during his administration in the early 2000s, the United States refrained from making comment. (...)
A high-ranking Pentagon official said Dec. 27 that the statement about being disappointed said everything about Washington's position. The official added the visit would only increase friction between Japan and its neighbors at a time when it is vital for the United States that Japan have good relations with its neighbors.
1. 2014 is the Year of the Horse but it will also likely become known as the Year of the Grind as Beijing works through its many political, economic, environmental and social challenges;
2. Xi Jinping will continue to consolidate power. The apparent ongoing purge of Zhou Yongkang and his allies will result in Xi having more control over both the security services and the military than any leader in decades;
3. Xi's appointment to head the leading group for comprehensively deepening reform is positive for reform prospects. Some had expected Premier Li Keqiang to lead the group and now see this move as a diminution of Li, but given that the scope of the group is much broader than just the economy it makes more sense for the General Secretary to lead it. Only Xi may have the authority and the bureaucratic power to push through reforms that affect so many entrenched interests (though of course reform will also bring new opportunities to some). If Xi is successful in rebuilding Party discipline through the Mass Line Campaign and the corruption crackdown then there is a decent chance the reforms will succeed. But there is a reason some in Beijing say that Xi is the Party's last chance to make the changes needed to keep it in power;
4. The corruption crackdown will intensify and while it will not solve the root issues it will be more successful than most have predicted. Zhou Yongkang may be the first tiger to fall in 2014 but there will be others. There will be increasing pockets of resistance as cadres are squeezed but Xi appears to have the power base to continue the crackdown. And business prospects will not improve for luxury goods merchants;
5. The economy will continue to struggle, in large part due to the excessive buildup of corporate and government debt. The recent audit and the listing of "resolving risk associated with local government debt" as a key task in 2014 by the Central Economic Work Conference are signs of both how worried Beijing is and how serious it is taking the debt mess. There are no quick fixes though, moral hazard is a huge issue and while a debt crisis is unlikely (but never say never) Beijing's options are increasingly constrained and any overly aggressive efforts to rein in credit growth could dramatically slow the economy. GDP growth should come in around 7% (and there will be plenty of debate about how "healthy" or real" that growth is), the Shanghai Composite will end 2014 15% higher, the RMB will appreciate to between 5.8-5.9 to the US Dollar and first-tier and maybe second-tier city real estate markets will continue to see price appreciation, though at least one high profile real estate developer will be taken down as a scapegoat for the high housing prices;
6. The Party has made much progress towards its goal of seizing the commanding heights of the Internet and those efforts will continue, as will a continued shift in social media usage from Weibo to Wechat. The stepped up control of the Internet will continue part of the broader, ongoing ideological tightening;
7. Alibaba and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange will both make concessions by the second quarter that will allow the company to list on the HKSE. The IPO will be bigger than Facebook's even though Tencent's Wechat will increasingly be seen as serious threat and Laiwang, Alibaba's Wechat clone, will have little traction;
8. There will be more China pain for US technology companies in the wake of the Snowden revelations. Do not be surprised if Beijing bans military and security personnel and cadres above a certain rank from using Apple products;
9. There will be progress on cleaning up the environment though the problems are so huge that not much will change substantively in a year. But there will be more bureaucratic will and policy support as Beijing has come to realize that the environmental disaster is one of the core threats to the country. One of my predictions for 2013 was that the environmental issues would lead to "more protests as citizens become more aware of their rights and are emboldened to protect them." In fact there were fewer large scale ones than in 2012 as Beijing narrowed the public sphere.
10. Verbatim from last year's predictions: "China’s external environment is increasingly complex. Mr. Xi is likely to work hard on maintaining stable relations with the United States, while at the same time expanding China’s military capabilities and asserting its regional interests. China has unsettled its neighbors with its approach to the disputes over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea and the various islands in the South China Sea. Both issues look intractable, so a solution is unlikely in 2013. Expect a quickening arms race in Asia, increasingly nationalist rhetoric, continued tensions with Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines and growing risks of misunderstandings — and possible mishaps — as the various countries send more vessels into the disputed areas."
What I will add for 2014 is that there will be increasing recognition that Beijing has a well-crafted strategy, not ad-hoc and uncoordinated actions, that it believes it will demonize and isolate Japan in the region and force the US to choose between supporting an increasingly unpopular regional partner or applying pressure on Japan such that other countries will see the US as an unreliable ally. I am not convinced it will work but it does look to be a significant part of Beijing's strategy. And Prime Minister Abe is starting to look like a gift for Beijing.
Of course any unforeseen, exogenous events could render some or all of these non-operative...
Σχετικά με το σημείο 10, η γιαπωνέζικη Asahi Shimbun προ ημερών έγραφε:
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe appears to have badly misjudged Washington's reaction to his surprise Dec. 26 visit to Yasukuni Shrine.
In a rare public criticism, the U.S. government expressed disappointment at Abe's first visit as prime minister to the Tokyo shrine that memorializes Japanese war dead along with 14 Class-A war criminals. Both the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo and the U.S. State Department in Washington expressed their concerns over Abe's visit. (...)
One high-ranking Foreign Ministry official said: "It was shocking to see the United States use the terminology 'disappointed.' If disharmony should arise between Japan and the United States, China, South Korea and North Korea could be emboldened to take stronger measures against Japan." (...)
When former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited Yasukuni every year during his administration in the early 2000s, the United States refrained from making comment. (...)
A high-ranking Pentagon official said Dec. 27 that the statement about being disappointed said everything about Washington's position. The official added the visit would only increase friction between Japan and its neighbors at a time when it is vital for the United States that Japan have good relations with its neighbors.
Costas
¥
Πλησιάζει η κινεζική Πρωτοχρονιά, και...
Spring Festival Gala Performance by Chinese Rock Icon in Doubt
By LUO TIAN (ΝΥΤ)
An iconic Chinese rocker whose music is closely associated with the 1989 pro-democracy movement is unlikely to appear on this year’s Spring Festival gala on Chinese state television because of censorship concerns, his agent said.
The invitation extended to Cui Jian to perform on the China Central Television variety show, a staple of the Chinese holiday and one of the most watched programs in the world, had been seen as a breakthrough for the man known as the “Godfather of Rock” in China. Despite his fame, Mr. Cui has long been kept off state radio and television, mainly because of the political connotations of his work.
“In the end Mr. Cui Jian can’t participate in this performance,” his agent, You You, told The New York Times in an e-mail. Asked why, she replied, “Because we cannot change the song lyrics.”
Ms. You declined to elaborate on the censorship process but held out the possibility that Mr. Cui could perform if no cuts to his songs were required. “We are still waiting for the results of the censorship,” she said.
Mr. Cui is currently directing a film and declined an interview request.
News of the invitation to Mr. Cui earlier this month prompted questions about whether he might play “Nothing to My Name,” the 1986 ballad that became an anthem of student protesters in Tiananmen Square.
The CCTV New Year’s Gala is an hours-long annual special watched by hundreds of millions of Chinese on the eve of the country’s most important holiday. It is light entertainment, with comedy, music and dance performances. The content is tightly scripted, sometimes with overt political messages. In 2010, a singer from the Uighur ethnic minority performed a song titled, “The Party’s Policies are Good,” and was ridiculed online for the crude propaganda.
In recent years, public enthusiasm for the the show has declined, particularly among younger viewers who favor the Internet rather than state television for entertainment. A few regional broadcasters have also created rival shows, and some ordinary Chinese have even staged alternative holiday performances online.
The invitation to Mr. Cui was seen as a possible attempt to add some punch to the CCTV special and attract viewers whose interest may have waned.
Mr. Cui, who faced close official scrutiny and unwritten restrictions on large-scale performances in the 1990s, did not appear on a big stage before a mass audience in mainland China for 15 years. But over the last decade, cultural and security authorities have eased up on rock as popular tastes have diversified and the market for music festivals has grown. Mr. Cui, too, has become far less taboo for the censors, who have allowed him to perform in stadium concerts and state media to interview him.
CCTV has flirted with adding Mr. Cui to its holiday lineup before. In 2012, he recorded for a performance for an online version of the gala, but it was never shown.
The 1989 student movement and the bloody crackdown that ended it are among the most sensitive subjects for China’s ruling Communist Party. The themes of loneliness and alienation conveyed by Mr. Cui’s songs, including the 1987 hit “A Piece of Red Cloth,” which he performed in Tiananmen during the demonstrations, resonated with the protesters, though he has said in interviews that they were originally meant as love songs.
Little is known about the vetting and censorship of acts in the Spring Festival gala. But in 2012, Zhao Benshan, an actor who had appeared in 21 previous consecutive New Year’s shows, declined to perform and later described the censors as “unhappy” and “nervous.” In 2010, the Taiwanese magician Liu Qian complained the censorship process was “truly frightening.”
Spring Festival Gala Performance by Chinese Rock Icon in Doubt
By LUO TIAN (ΝΥΤ)
An iconic Chinese rocker whose music is closely associated with the 1989 pro-democracy movement is unlikely to appear on this year’s Spring Festival gala on Chinese state television because of censorship concerns, his agent said.
The invitation extended to Cui Jian to perform on the China Central Television variety show, a staple of the Chinese holiday and one of the most watched programs in the world, had been seen as a breakthrough for the man known as the “Godfather of Rock” in China. Despite his fame, Mr. Cui has long been kept off state radio and television, mainly because of the political connotations of his work.
“In the end Mr. Cui Jian can’t participate in this performance,” his agent, You You, told The New York Times in an e-mail. Asked why, she replied, “Because we cannot change the song lyrics.”
Ms. You declined to elaborate on the censorship process but held out the possibility that Mr. Cui could perform if no cuts to his songs were required. “We are still waiting for the results of the censorship,” she said.
Mr. Cui is currently directing a film and declined an interview request.
News of the invitation to Mr. Cui earlier this month prompted questions about whether he might play “Nothing to My Name,” the 1986 ballad that became an anthem of student protesters in Tiananmen Square.
The CCTV New Year’s Gala is an hours-long annual special watched by hundreds of millions of Chinese on the eve of the country’s most important holiday. It is light entertainment, with comedy, music and dance performances. The content is tightly scripted, sometimes with overt political messages. In 2010, a singer from the Uighur ethnic minority performed a song titled, “The Party’s Policies are Good,” and was ridiculed online for the crude propaganda.
In recent years, public enthusiasm for the the show has declined, particularly among younger viewers who favor the Internet rather than state television for entertainment. A few regional broadcasters have also created rival shows, and some ordinary Chinese have even staged alternative holiday performances online.
The invitation to Mr. Cui was seen as a possible attempt to add some punch to the CCTV special and attract viewers whose interest may have waned.
Mr. Cui, who faced close official scrutiny and unwritten restrictions on large-scale performances in the 1990s, did not appear on a big stage before a mass audience in mainland China for 15 years. But over the last decade, cultural and security authorities have eased up on rock as popular tastes have diversified and the market for music festivals has grown. Mr. Cui, too, has become far less taboo for the censors, who have allowed him to perform in stadium concerts and state media to interview him.
CCTV has flirted with adding Mr. Cui to its holiday lineup before. In 2012, he recorded for a performance for an online version of the gala, but it was never shown.
The 1989 student movement and the bloody crackdown that ended it are among the most sensitive subjects for China’s ruling Communist Party. The themes of loneliness and alienation conveyed by Mr. Cui’s songs, including the 1987 hit “A Piece of Red Cloth,” which he performed in Tiananmen during the demonstrations, resonated with the protesters, though he has said in interviews that they were originally meant as love songs.
Little is known about the vetting and censorship of acts in the Spring Festival gala. But in 2012, Zhao Benshan, an actor who had appeared in 21 previous consecutive New Year’s shows, declined to perform and later described the censors as “unhappy” and “nervous.” In 2010, the Taiwanese magician Liu Qian complained the censorship process was “truly frightening.”
Costas
¥
Έχω ξαναποστάρει γι' αυτή τη δολοφονία, είναι πολύ γνωστή και υπάρχει και ντοκιμαντέρ στο youtube (πού στον κόρακα το 'χωσα; :s )
Bowed and Remorseful, Former Red Guard Recalls Teacher’s Death
By CHRIS BUCKLEY
(NYT)
Nearly half a century after Bian Zhongyun was beaten, kicked, tormented and left to die, bloody and alone, at the Beijing girls’ school where she was deputy principal, a daughter of the Communist Party elite has offered public penance — of a kind that instantly brought controversy — for her part in one of the most notorious killings of the Cultural Revolution.
Growing numbers of aging Red Guards have declared their contrition for violence perpetrated from 1966, when Mao Zedong urged students to turn against the school and party authorities he accused of stymieing his vision of a revolutionary society cleansed of ideological laxity.
But the apology from Song Binbin, reported
by The Beijing News on Monday, quickly drew attention and was featured on many Chinese news websites. Here was a daughter of a veteran revolutionary apologizing for what has been widely described as the first killing of a teacher in the decade-long Cultural Revolution.
Ms. Song’s father was Song Renqiong, a general who served as a senior official under Mao and later Deng Xiaoping.
Ms. Song herself won fame as a member of the first wave of Red Guards when she was photographed meeting Mao. But for years, many of them spent in the United States, she was muted about the death of Ms. Bian, a deputy principal at the elite Beijing Normal University Girls High School, where she was a student. The Cultural Revolution remains a sensitive, and heavily censored, chapter in China’s history. President Xi Jinping mentioned it only once and briefly in a speech last month celebrating the 120th anniversary of Mao’s birth.
On Sunday in Beijing, Ms. Song, who was born in 1949, told a gathering of former students and teachers from the school that she was sorry.
“Please allow me to express my everlasting solicitude and apologies to Principal Bian,” she said, according to The Beijing News. “I failed to properly protect the school leaders, and this has been a lifelong source of anguish and remorse.”
Tearfully, Ms. Song read out a statement about her “responsibility for Principal Bian’s terrible fate.” (Though Ms. Bian was actually a deputy principal, she served as the school’s leader.) The newspaper showed a photo of Ms. Song and other former students bowed before a bust of Ms. Bian.
“The Cultural Revolution was a massive calamity,” she said, according to a text of her statement published on “Consensus Net,” a Chinese website that specializes in intellectual and political discussions. She said:
<<How a country faces the future depends in large part on how it faces its past…
I hope that all those who did wrong in the Cultural Revolution and hurt teachers and classmates will face up to themselves, reflect on the Cultural Revolution, seek forgiveness and achieve reconciliation.>>
Ms. Song’s apology immediately prompted rival views on the Internet in China. Some welcomed her words, others called them belated and inadequate. Some said the Communist Party itself should apologize.
Yin Hongbiao, a scholar at Peking University who studies the Cultural Revolution, said in a telephone interview that Ms. Song had taken a valuable step in confronting her past and that rumors had overstated her role in Ms. Bian’s death.
But Cui Weiping, a retired professor of literature in Beijing who has written about China’s struggle to recall – or forget – its traumatic past, said Ms. Song lacked candor. Ms. Cui said:
<Given who she was, this wasn’t enough. She was an important figure among the Red Guards, and so the demands should be higher than for ordinary people. It’s meaningless to say you witnessed a murder and then say you don’t know who the killers were.>
Ms. Song’s declaration of remorse also appeared unlikely to satisfy Ms. Bian’s widower, Wang Jingyao, who for years has accused Ms. Song and others of disguising their part in the death of Ms. Bian on Aug. 5, 1966.
Ever since then, Mr. Wang, 93, has preserved his wife’s memory and sought an honest reckoning from the perpetrators. He took photos of her battered body soon after she died and has kept a shrine to her in his home. In a telephone interview on Monday, he said he had heard about Ms. Song’s apology but had not heard directly from her.
“She is a bad person, because of what she did,” he said. “She and the others were supported by Mao Zedong. Mao was the source of all evil. He did so much that was bad. And it’s not just an individual problem” of someone like Ms. Song, he added. “The entire Communist Party and Mao Zedong are also responsible.”
Mao launched his Cultural Revolution to purge the authorities of perceived ideological foes, but initially its most ardent young supporters were the sons and daughters of powerful party officials, who saw the campaign as a chance to display and hone their revolutionary credentials. Ms. Song was among that early wave of Red Guards, who soon fell from Mao’s grace and were often then attacked by other, even more radical groups.
She was among the band of students who formed the school’s first group of Red Guards — youths pledged to enforce Mao’s revolutionary will — who organized rallies to criticize and humiliate the school authorities and teachers accused of sabotaging the Cultural Revolution.
In a memoir published in 2012, Ms. Song said she and other Red Guard leaders at the school twice tried to stop students from assaulting Ms. Bian and other school staff who had been dragged to a school sports ground. Only later was Ms. Song told that Ms. Bian was close to death, Ms. Song wrote in “Remembrance,” a Chinese magazine devoted to Cultural Revolution memoirs that circulates by email. A senior party official told Ms. Song soon after the killing to keep quiet about it, she wrote.
But other accounts, often citing Ms. Bian’s widower, Mr. Wang, have indicated that Ms. Song played a bigger role in the death, by abetting or implicitly endorsing the attacks and conspicuously failing to help Ms. Bian afterward.
In the ensuing mayhem of the Cultural Revolution, many other deaths followed. In August and September 1966, nearly 1,800 people died in attacks instigated by Red Guards and other radicals across Beijing, according to party estimates published in 1980.
Two weeks after Ms. Bian died, Ms. Song was among the Red Guards taken up to meet Mao as he stood on top of Tiananmen — the “Gate of Heavenly Peace” overlooking the square, where throngs of adoring students had gathered. That encounter with Mao brought Ms. Song fame among her peers, and newspapers said that, at Mao’s suggestion, she took the name Yaowu, words indicating “Willing Fighter.” But in 1968, Ms. Song’s father fell from favor, and his family suffered.
After the Cultural Revolution, Ms. Song went to the United States to study and completed a doctorate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. She worked for the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection, Bloomberg News reported in a 2012 profile of the family. In 2003, she moved back to China, she said in her statement on Sunday.
The Beijing News asked Ms. Song how she would respond if people called her apology insincere. “If I wasn’t prepared for that, I would not have stood up to do it,” she said.
Didi Kirsten Tatlow contributed reporting.
Bowed and Remorseful, Former Red Guard Recalls Teacher’s Death
By CHRIS BUCKLEY
(NYT)
Nearly half a century after Bian Zhongyun was beaten, kicked, tormented and left to die, bloody and alone, at the Beijing girls’ school where she was deputy principal, a daughter of the Communist Party elite has offered public penance — of a kind that instantly brought controversy — for her part in one of the most notorious killings of the Cultural Revolution.
Growing numbers of aging Red Guards have declared their contrition for violence perpetrated from 1966, when Mao Zedong urged students to turn against the school and party authorities he accused of stymieing his vision of a revolutionary society cleansed of ideological laxity.
But the apology from Song Binbin, reported
by The Beijing News on Monday, quickly drew attention and was featured on many Chinese news websites. Here was a daughter of a veteran revolutionary apologizing for what has been widely described as the first killing of a teacher in the decade-long Cultural Revolution.
Ms. Song’s father was Song Renqiong, a general who served as a senior official under Mao and later Deng Xiaoping.
Ms. Song herself won fame as a member of the first wave of Red Guards when she was photographed meeting Mao. But for years, many of them spent in the United States, she was muted about the death of Ms. Bian, a deputy principal at the elite Beijing Normal University Girls High School, where she was a student. The Cultural Revolution remains a sensitive, and heavily censored, chapter in China’s history. President Xi Jinping mentioned it only once and briefly in a speech last month celebrating the 120th anniversary of Mao’s birth.
On Sunday in Beijing, Ms. Song, who was born in 1949, told a gathering of former students and teachers from the school that she was sorry.
“Please allow me to express my everlasting solicitude and apologies to Principal Bian,” she said, according to The Beijing News. “I failed to properly protect the school leaders, and this has been a lifelong source of anguish and remorse.”
Tearfully, Ms. Song read out a statement about her “responsibility for Principal Bian’s terrible fate.” (Though Ms. Bian was actually a deputy principal, she served as the school’s leader.) The newspaper showed a photo of Ms. Song and other former students bowed before a bust of Ms. Bian.
“The Cultural Revolution was a massive calamity,” she said, according to a text of her statement published on “Consensus Net,” a Chinese website that specializes in intellectual and political discussions. She said:
<<How a country faces the future depends in large part on how it faces its past…
I hope that all those who did wrong in the Cultural Revolution and hurt teachers and classmates will face up to themselves, reflect on the Cultural Revolution, seek forgiveness and achieve reconciliation.>>
Ms. Song’s apology immediately prompted rival views on the Internet in China. Some welcomed her words, others called them belated and inadequate. Some said the Communist Party itself should apologize.
Yin Hongbiao, a scholar at Peking University who studies the Cultural Revolution, said in a telephone interview that Ms. Song had taken a valuable step in confronting her past and that rumors had overstated her role in Ms. Bian’s death.
But Cui Weiping, a retired professor of literature in Beijing who has written about China’s struggle to recall – or forget – its traumatic past, said Ms. Song lacked candor. Ms. Cui said:
<Given who she was, this wasn’t enough. She was an important figure among the Red Guards, and so the demands should be higher than for ordinary people. It’s meaningless to say you witnessed a murder and then say you don’t know who the killers were.>
Ms. Song’s declaration of remorse also appeared unlikely to satisfy Ms. Bian’s widower, Wang Jingyao, who for years has accused Ms. Song and others of disguising their part in the death of Ms. Bian on Aug. 5, 1966.
Ever since then, Mr. Wang, 93, has preserved his wife’s memory and sought an honest reckoning from the perpetrators. He took photos of her battered body soon after she died and has kept a shrine to her in his home. In a telephone interview on Monday, he said he had heard about Ms. Song’s apology but had not heard directly from her.
“She is a bad person, because of what she did,” he said. “She and the others were supported by Mao Zedong. Mao was the source of all evil. He did so much that was bad. And it’s not just an individual problem” of someone like Ms. Song, he added. “The entire Communist Party and Mao Zedong are also responsible.”
Mao launched his Cultural Revolution to purge the authorities of perceived ideological foes, but initially its most ardent young supporters were the sons and daughters of powerful party officials, who saw the campaign as a chance to display and hone their revolutionary credentials. Ms. Song was among that early wave of Red Guards, who soon fell from Mao’s grace and were often then attacked by other, even more radical groups.
She was among the band of students who formed the school’s first group of Red Guards — youths pledged to enforce Mao’s revolutionary will — who organized rallies to criticize and humiliate the school authorities and teachers accused of sabotaging the Cultural Revolution.
In a memoir published in 2012, Ms. Song said she and other Red Guard leaders at the school twice tried to stop students from assaulting Ms. Bian and other school staff who had been dragged to a school sports ground. Only later was Ms. Song told that Ms. Bian was close to death, Ms. Song wrote in “Remembrance,” a Chinese magazine devoted to Cultural Revolution memoirs that circulates by email. A senior party official told Ms. Song soon after the killing to keep quiet about it, she wrote.
But other accounts, often citing Ms. Bian’s widower, Mr. Wang, have indicated that Ms. Song played a bigger role in the death, by abetting or implicitly endorsing the attacks and conspicuously failing to help Ms. Bian afterward.
In the ensuing mayhem of the Cultural Revolution, many other deaths followed. In August and September 1966, nearly 1,800 people died in attacks instigated by Red Guards and other radicals across Beijing, according to party estimates published in 1980.
Two weeks after Ms. Bian died, Ms. Song was among the Red Guards taken up to meet Mao as he stood on top of Tiananmen — the “Gate of Heavenly Peace” overlooking the square, where throngs of adoring students had gathered. That encounter with Mao brought Ms. Song fame among her peers, and newspapers said that, at Mao’s suggestion, she took the name Yaowu, words indicating “Willing Fighter.” But in 1968, Ms. Song’s father fell from favor, and his family suffered.
After the Cultural Revolution, Ms. Song went to the United States to study and completed a doctorate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. She worked for the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection, Bloomberg News reported in a 2012 profile of the family. In 2003, she moved back to China, she said in her statement on Sunday.
The Beijing News asked Ms. Song how she would respond if people called her apology insincere. “If I wasn’t prepared for that, I would not have stood up to do it,” she said.
Didi Kirsten Tatlow contributed reporting.
Costas
¥
New Citizens Movement's συνέχεια (μα όχι τέλος)
Chinese Activists Test New Leader and Are Crushed
By ANDREW JACOBS and CHRIS BUCKLEYJAN. 15, 2014
(ΝΥΤ)
BEIJING — The 20 or so activists gathered at an isolated guesthouse on the outskirts of the capital, leaving their cellphones behind to avoid detection by the police. China’s first leadership change in a decade was fast approaching, and the group saw an opening for a movement to fight injustice and official corruption.
That day, in May 2012, they began work on a plan to expand the New Citizens Movement, an ambitious campaign for transparency and fairness that would eventually draw as many as 5,000 supporters, inspire street protests across the country and provide the first major test to help gauge the new leadership’s tolerance for grass-roots political activism.
They were heartened when China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, came to power that November, vowing to stamp out corruption, promote judicial fairness and respect the Constitution, goals tantalizingly close to their own.
Now, 14 months later, their ideals have collided with a harsh reality.
About 20 people associated with the group have been detained. Three members have been tried and await judgment. And the rights lawyer who organized the guesthouse meeting, Xu Zhiyong, was indicted last month for “gathering a crowd to disrupt public order” and faces almost certain conviction.
The crushing of the New Citizens Movement is just one stark example of the new leadership’s refusal to countenance any stirrings of opposition.
Since Mr. Xi assumed control, the Communist Party has used the state news media to denounce perceived ideological threats, sought to rid the Internet of politically unwelcome rumors and opinion, and tried to silence rights lawyers and muckraking journalists. Wen Yunchao, a Chinese rights activist studying at Columbia University, estimates that 160 activists have been arrested over the past year, not counting the Tibetans and Uighurs detained on separatism-related charges.
These events have largely flown under the radar, drawing little notice at home or abroad and only muted international protest. But taken together, they amount to a sweeping crackdown that experts say is broader and more concerted than other recent assaults on dissent.
“The new leadership has been much more systematic and strategic about how it cracks down,” said Maya Wang, a researcher in Hong Kong for Human Rights Watch, noting simultaneous efforts to rein in traditional news media and online commentary and stamp out even the smallest street rallies. “The government is basically sending a signal in dealing with these people that it has the upper hand.”
Mr. Xu, 40, is hardly a radical firebrand. As a young lawyer, he earned a national reputation for forging social change on the edges of the system. In 2003, he won a seat as an independent candidate on a district People’s Congress, a council stacked with party-appointed officials. Photogenic and articulate, he was celebrated by the domestic news media and appeared on the cover of the Chinese edition of Esquire magazine.
He emerged as a dogged legal activist during a popular backlash against the practice of forcibly relocating people without proper residence permits. In 2003, after the fatal police beating of a young designer in the southern city of Guangzhou, Mr. Xu and two other legal scholars publicized a petition to the government demanding an end to the system. To their surprise, Wen Jiabao, then prime minister, abolished it months after assuming office in 2003.
That case and others crystallized into an approach to activism combining litigation and government appeals on specific cases with public lobbying in the media and the rapidly expanding Internet. Mr. Xu and his colleagues took up the cases of death-row prisoners, parents of children poisoned by adulterated milk powder and a woman raped by officials. The movement came to be called “rights defense,” or weiquan in Chinese.
“You could think of the weiquan rights defense movement as an unintended consequence of legal reforms and the spread of the Internet,” said Eva Pils, an associate law professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. “They allowed the genie to come out of the bottle.”
But the movement soon drew official hostility. The police, courts and the party-run body that oversees lawyers prevented them from taking sensitive cases, refused to allow their suits to move forward or revoked their law licenses. In 2009, the government shut Mr. Xu’s advocacy and research organization, the Open Constitution Initiative, and arrested him on tax evasion charges. After a public uproar, he was released on bail and the matter was dropped.
Rather than subdue the movement, the pressure convinced many activists to shift away from the increasingly fruitless battles in party-run courts and toward broader and more public campaigning for political change.
Chinese citizens were increasingly aware of their legal rights, and willing to challenge the government to assert them. The Internet, especially social media, magnified public awareness of abuses.
Mr. Xu and other activists decided it was time to advance their ambitions through a more cohesive effort. In 2012, they created the New Citizens Movement and issued a manifesto, urging supporters to adopt its ideals and symbol — a distinctive blue and white logo declaring “Citizen” — and to form groups that would meet regularly.
“This is a political movement whereby this ancient nation bids ultimate farewell to autocracy and completes the civilized transition to constitutional government,” Mr. Xu wrote that May.
The new leader’s promises about corruption and fairness were not the only signs that bolstered the movement’s resolve. Mr. Xi also downgraded the post of domestic security chief, suggesting to some that the police would have to pay more heed to legal restraints.
The party’s initially mild response to a protest over censorship at the Southern Weekend newspaper in early 2013 also fed expectations that the government would tolerate more concerted activism, said Chen Min, a former editor at the paper.
“The impression left with some people was that there would be more space for street-level, organized rights defense, even if there would always be risks and setbacks,” said Mr. Chen, who is better known by the pen name Xiao Shu.
Supporters also saw an advantage in the movement’s lack of clearly defined leadership, which they feared would provoke a government ban. Meetings were informal, often over dinners at restaurants.
Mr. Xu “believed in the power of the people to make a change,” said Guo Yushan, a reform-minded scholar. “He thought he would succeed, and that once he stepped out, others would follow him.”
In early 2013, supporters organized public demonstrations on the streets of Chinese cities. Some wore T-shirts and pins with the movement insignia and its slogan “Freedom, Justice, Love.” They posted pictures of their rallies online.
As awareness of the group spread, it began drawing grass-roots activists like Liu Ping, a former steel mill worker from China’s southeast Jiangxi Province.
Ms. Liu and two others remain jailed as they await sentencing for illegal assembly and other charges, but in a telephone interview, her daughter, Liao Minyue, said Ms. Liu’s activism was initially spurred by unpaid wages and the beating of a relative. “Over time, she became interested in other people’s problems, she became more involved and more aware, and she saw the New Citizens Movement as way of realizing her ideals,” Ms. Liao said.
The Communist Party has partly endorsed some of the changes demanded by rights advocates, like ending re-education through labor, a form of imprisonment without trial. But behind the scenes, Mr. Chen and others said, the gatherings fed leaders’ fears that the growing clamor for reform could crystallize into a threat to the party’s authority.
During secretive meetings last spring, security and propaganda officials concluded that they had to take a tough line, Mr. Chen said. In April, the leadership approved an internal directive identifying seven ideological threats, including rights defense activists and civil society advocates.
The detentions appear to have effectively stymied the movement. In addition to a core of longtime activists, the authorities in October arrested Wang Gongquan, a wealthy venture capitalist who supported the group.
In their indictment, prosecutors described Mr. Xu as the “ringleader” of several of the 2013 protests. On Monday, as he sat in a Beijing jail, his wife gave birth to a daughter.
“This time, I think Xu is going to prison, and not for a short time,” said Mr. Guo, the scholar. “Xi needs to put on a big show. He feels confident right now. He needs to show people who’s boss.”
Andrew Jacobs reported from Beijing, and Chris Buckley from Hong Kong.
Chinese Activists Test New Leader and Are Crushed
By ANDREW JACOBS and CHRIS BUCKLEYJAN. 15, 2014
(ΝΥΤ)
BEIJING — The 20 or so activists gathered at an isolated guesthouse on the outskirts of the capital, leaving their cellphones behind to avoid detection by the police. China’s first leadership change in a decade was fast approaching, and the group saw an opening for a movement to fight injustice and official corruption.
That day, in May 2012, they began work on a plan to expand the New Citizens Movement, an ambitious campaign for transparency and fairness that would eventually draw as many as 5,000 supporters, inspire street protests across the country and provide the first major test to help gauge the new leadership’s tolerance for grass-roots political activism.
They were heartened when China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, came to power that November, vowing to stamp out corruption, promote judicial fairness and respect the Constitution, goals tantalizingly close to their own.
Now, 14 months later, their ideals have collided with a harsh reality.
About 20 people associated with the group have been detained. Three members have been tried and await judgment. And the rights lawyer who organized the guesthouse meeting, Xu Zhiyong, was indicted last month for “gathering a crowd to disrupt public order” and faces almost certain conviction.
The crushing of the New Citizens Movement is just one stark example of the new leadership’s refusal to countenance any stirrings of opposition.
Since Mr. Xi assumed control, the Communist Party has used the state news media to denounce perceived ideological threats, sought to rid the Internet of politically unwelcome rumors and opinion, and tried to silence rights lawyers and muckraking journalists. Wen Yunchao, a Chinese rights activist studying at Columbia University, estimates that 160 activists have been arrested over the past year, not counting the Tibetans and Uighurs detained on separatism-related charges.
These events have largely flown under the radar, drawing little notice at home or abroad and only muted international protest. But taken together, they amount to a sweeping crackdown that experts say is broader and more concerted than other recent assaults on dissent.
“The new leadership has been much more systematic and strategic about how it cracks down,” said Maya Wang, a researcher in Hong Kong for Human Rights Watch, noting simultaneous efforts to rein in traditional news media and online commentary and stamp out even the smallest street rallies. “The government is basically sending a signal in dealing with these people that it has the upper hand.”
Mr. Xu, 40, is hardly a radical firebrand. As a young lawyer, he earned a national reputation for forging social change on the edges of the system. In 2003, he won a seat as an independent candidate on a district People’s Congress, a council stacked with party-appointed officials. Photogenic and articulate, he was celebrated by the domestic news media and appeared on the cover of the Chinese edition of Esquire magazine.
He emerged as a dogged legal activist during a popular backlash against the practice of forcibly relocating people without proper residence permits. In 2003, after the fatal police beating of a young designer in the southern city of Guangzhou, Mr. Xu and two other legal scholars publicized a petition to the government demanding an end to the system. To their surprise, Wen Jiabao, then prime minister, abolished it months after assuming office in 2003.
That case and others crystallized into an approach to activism combining litigation and government appeals on specific cases with public lobbying in the media and the rapidly expanding Internet. Mr. Xu and his colleagues took up the cases of death-row prisoners, parents of children poisoned by adulterated milk powder and a woman raped by officials. The movement came to be called “rights defense,” or weiquan in Chinese.
“You could think of the weiquan rights defense movement as an unintended consequence of legal reforms and the spread of the Internet,” said Eva Pils, an associate law professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. “They allowed the genie to come out of the bottle.”
But the movement soon drew official hostility. The police, courts and the party-run body that oversees lawyers prevented them from taking sensitive cases, refused to allow their suits to move forward or revoked their law licenses. In 2009, the government shut Mr. Xu’s advocacy and research organization, the Open Constitution Initiative, and arrested him on tax evasion charges. After a public uproar, he was released on bail and the matter was dropped.
Rather than subdue the movement, the pressure convinced many activists to shift away from the increasingly fruitless battles in party-run courts and toward broader and more public campaigning for political change.
Chinese citizens were increasingly aware of their legal rights, and willing to challenge the government to assert them. The Internet, especially social media, magnified public awareness of abuses.
Mr. Xu and other activists decided it was time to advance their ambitions through a more cohesive effort. In 2012, they created the New Citizens Movement and issued a manifesto, urging supporters to adopt its ideals and symbol — a distinctive blue and white logo declaring “Citizen” — and to form groups that would meet regularly.
“This is a political movement whereby this ancient nation bids ultimate farewell to autocracy and completes the civilized transition to constitutional government,” Mr. Xu wrote that May.
The new leader’s promises about corruption and fairness were not the only signs that bolstered the movement’s resolve. Mr. Xi also downgraded the post of domestic security chief, suggesting to some that the police would have to pay more heed to legal restraints.
The party’s initially mild response to a protest over censorship at the Southern Weekend newspaper in early 2013 also fed expectations that the government would tolerate more concerted activism, said Chen Min, a former editor at the paper.
“The impression left with some people was that there would be more space for street-level, organized rights defense, even if there would always be risks and setbacks,” said Mr. Chen, who is better known by the pen name Xiao Shu.
Supporters also saw an advantage in the movement’s lack of clearly defined leadership, which they feared would provoke a government ban. Meetings were informal, often over dinners at restaurants.
Mr. Xu “believed in the power of the people to make a change,” said Guo Yushan, a reform-minded scholar. “He thought he would succeed, and that once he stepped out, others would follow him.”
In early 2013, supporters organized public demonstrations on the streets of Chinese cities. Some wore T-shirts and pins with the movement insignia and its slogan “Freedom, Justice, Love.” They posted pictures of their rallies online.
As awareness of the group spread, it began drawing grass-roots activists like Liu Ping, a former steel mill worker from China’s southeast Jiangxi Province.
Ms. Liu and two others remain jailed as they await sentencing for illegal assembly and other charges, but in a telephone interview, her daughter, Liao Minyue, said Ms. Liu’s activism was initially spurred by unpaid wages and the beating of a relative. “Over time, she became interested in other people’s problems, she became more involved and more aware, and she saw the New Citizens Movement as way of realizing her ideals,” Ms. Liao said.
The Communist Party has partly endorsed some of the changes demanded by rights advocates, like ending re-education through labor, a form of imprisonment without trial. But behind the scenes, Mr. Chen and others said, the gatherings fed leaders’ fears that the growing clamor for reform could crystallize into a threat to the party’s authority.
During secretive meetings last spring, security and propaganda officials concluded that they had to take a tough line, Mr. Chen said. In April, the leadership approved an internal directive identifying seven ideological threats, including rights defense activists and civil society advocates.
The detentions appear to have effectively stymied the movement. In addition to a core of longtime activists, the authorities in October arrested Wang Gongquan, a wealthy venture capitalist who supported the group.
In their indictment, prosecutors described Mr. Xu as the “ringleader” of several of the 2013 protests. On Monday, as he sat in a Beijing jail, his wife gave birth to a daughter.
“This time, I think Xu is going to prison, and not for a short time,” said Mr. Guo, the scholar. “Xi needs to put on a big show. He feels confident right now. He needs to show people who’s boss.”
Andrew Jacobs reported from Beijing, and Chris Buckley from Hong Kong.
Red Guards Apologize For Cultural Revolution
Former Red Guard students apologize for their actions during the Cultural Revolution campaign, when teachers were insulted, tortured, and even killed by their students.
http://www.ntd.tv/en/China Forbidde...cultural-revolution.html#sthash.6Wzt6OV8.dpuf
Το ντοκιμαντέρ δεν το βρήκα στο youtube, οπότε:
Though I am Gone, also known as: Wo Sui Si Qu | Though I Was Dead
directed by Hu Jie, 70 minutes
Δεν προβάλλεται στην Ελλάδα, αλλά ίσως μπορέσεις να παρακάμψεις την απαγόρευση με κάποιο anonymizer.
Though I Am Gone (Wo Sui Si Qu) 2006 (Amazon, ενοικίαση προς 5 δολάρια)
Κώστα, γράψε λάθος, το βρήκα και μάλιστα με αγγλικούς υπότιτλους, ψάχνοντας κινέζικα :): 我雖死去