actual occasion

[unique]

Υποψιάζομαι ότι πρόκειται για τεχνικό όρο.

Every actual occasion represents and feels a situation of the entire process, and its very existence is due to the contribution of the rest of the actual occasions; it is produced by the whole universe by way of integration of characters, which Whitehead calls the process of 'concrescence'. An actual occasion is called more precisely a 'prehensive occasion', for it has no existence independent of its prehensions.
Whitehead speaks of an 'ingressive' evolution of the actual occasions from possible forms of experience which are known as 'eternal objects'. The eternal objects 'ingress' into the formation of actual occasions. These eternal objects are not concrete existences but abstract possibilities of the evolution of the actual occasions. The universe of our experience is the result of the ingression of one of infinite sorts of eternal objects which have not all been actualised in this particular realm of spatio-temporal events. The manner of the selection of particular kinds of eternal objects for ingression is similar to that in which certain actual occasions contribute to the birth of the other actual occasions in varying ways of relation, which are known as the 'relevances' of these actual occasions to others. The actual occasions determine themselves by physical prehension of other actual occasions and by conceptual prehension of eternal objects. The eternal objects, therefore, are not different from the actual occasions, though distinct in nature, and even when not actualised form part of the process of the universe and influence everything by way of negative prehension. The laws of Nature are the relatively stable expressions or modes of its behaviour in relation to actual occasions that appear at a given time. As the universe evolves in time, its laws must change with its modified relation to its evolved parts.

 

[Irini]

Εξαιρετικά ενδιαφέρον ερώτημα. Είναι όντως όρος, αλλά όχι γενικός. Από όσα διάβασα, τον χρησιμοποίησε ο Γουάιτχεντ για να αντικαταστήσει ή να αποσαφηνίσει τον όρο "actual entity" ("πραγματική οντότητα" αν δεν κάνω λάθος). Το "περίσταση" ίσως να ήταν καλή μετάφραση ανάλογα με το register (για πιο λόγιο κοινό που θα δώσει ευρύτερο περιεχόμενο στην λέξη) αλλά όχι ίσως η καλύτερη. Ίσως ακόμα και το "στιγμή" να μας έκανε, αλλά δεν είμαι σίγουρη ότι κατανοώ με ακρίβεια την χρήση του όρου (άμα δεν διαβάσεις όλο το βιβλίο δεν γίνεται και μετά το Πανεπιστήμιο την έκοψα την Φιλοσοφία).

Δεν βρίσκω μετάφραση του συγκεκριμένου βιβλίου του ή του όρου.

In Process and Reality, rather than assuming substance as the basic metaphysical category, Whitehead introduces a new metaphysically primitive notion that he calls an actual occasion. On Whitehead's view, an actual occasion is not an enduring substance, but a process of becoming. As Donald Sherburne points out, “It is customary to compare an actual occasion with a Leibnizian monad, with the caveat that whereas a monad is windowless, an actual occasion is ‘all window.’ It is as though one were to take Aristotle's system of categories and ask what would result if the category of substance were displaced from its preeminence by the category of relation …” (Sherburne 1995, 852). As Whitehead himself puts it, his “philosophy of organism is the inversion of Kant's philosophy … For Kant, the world emerges from the subject; for the philosophy of organism, the subject emerges from the world” (quoted in Sherburne 1995, 852).

Πηγή

1.`Actual entity' is the central concept in Whitehead's system. This system is atomistic- i.e., like Democritus, Whitehead conceives of the world as composed of a vast number of microcosmic entities. But while Democritus is a materialist and views atoms as bits of stuff, Whitehead presents an organic philosophy- each of his atoms, termed `actual entities' or `actual occasions', is an organism that grows, matures and perishes. The whole of Process and Reality is concerned with the characteristics of, and the inter-relationships between, actual entities- their being and becoming. They are the final real things of which the world is made up. There is no going behind actual entities to find something more real. They differ among themselves - God is an actual entity, and so is the most trivial staff of existence ie far-off empty space. In the philosophy of organism, as developed by Whitehead, God's existence is not generically different of other actual entities, except that he is `primordial.'

Πηγή


Επίσης σελίδες 73-77 από το βιβλίο του εδώ (ελπίζω να μην τα έκανα θάλασσα με αυτόν τον σύνδεσμο)

 

[unique]

Το βρήκα ως "ενεργές περιστάσεις" ή "πραγματικές περιστάσεις' αλλά βέβαια αυτά τα δύο δεν συμπίπτουν...
Ίσως θα ήταν προτιμότερο το "πραγματικές περιστάσεις" γιατί ό όρος είναι συνώνυμος του "πραγματικές οντότητες".

 

[nickel]

Ψηφίζω κι εγώ τις «πραγματικές περιστάσεις» γιατί έχει μια αντιστρεψιμότητα μούρλια.