# Ολοκληρωτικά



## Costas (Nov 21, 2013)

*Political Religion & the Khmer Rouge* 
Posted on Nov 21, 2013 in Southeast Asia (Dissertation Reviews)

A review of _Pol Pot’s Total Revolution: An Inquiry of Democratic Kampuchea as a Political Religion_, by Steven Michael DeBurger.

Pol Pot’s Total Revolution offers a fresh reading of Cambodia’s Democratic Kampuchea period. This dissertation consists of 12 chapters and an appendix. Chapter 1 opens with a gloss on the pre-revolutionary violence that served as the condition of possibility for the emergence of Democratic Kampuchea, and second, the subsequent genocidal violence of Pol Pot’s revolutionary regime. The author follows this opening discussion by helpfully warning the reader that his dissertation will not focus on the questions that traditionally occupy research on Democratic Kampuchea. Rather, the dissertation will focus on what he identifies as critical “aporia” in the literature, namely those “aspects of the regime of terror historians and political scientists have been unconcerned with, or chose not to explore” (p. 4). This opening chapter also introduces Eric Voegelin’s key concept of political religion, which will be deployed in the subsequent chapters’ analyses of Democratic Kampuchea’s violent replacement of Khmer Buddhism with the regime’s totalitarian ideology.

Chapter 2 focuses on the genre of the survivor memoir. The author draws on the harrowing survivor narratives of Haing S. Ngor’s _A Cambodian Odyssey_ (1987), Pin Yathay’s _Stay Alive, My Son_ (1987), U Sam Oeur’s _Crossing Three Wildernesse_s (2005), Loung Ung’s _First They Killed My Father_ (2000), Laurence Picq’s _Beyond the Horizon_ (1989), and Denise Affonco’s _To the End of Hell_ (2005), among others, to reconstruct life under Democratic Kampuchea, and more crucially, the political religion introduced by Angkar, the Khmer Rouge’s feared central organization. Khmer Buddhism, the spiritual life-world that was violently suppressed by the regime, is the subject of Chapter 3. After a brief discussion of the place of Khmer Buddhism in pre-revolutionary Cambodian society, the author turns to its near-destruction at the hands of the violently anti-clerical Khmer Rouge, and the regime’s strenuous efforts to indoctrinate Cambodians to embrace Angkar as a quasi-religious totem. This spiritual overthrow was accomplished in part by the mass killing of monks and the forced disrobing of the surviving members of the Khmer Buddhist monastic order. The author briefly discusses the Khmer Rouge’s parallel suppression of the Cham Muslim minority, and returns to survivor memoirs to flesh out the regime’s violent disruption of the traditional Cambodian life-world.

Following Chapter 3’s account of the overthrow of Khmer Buddhism in Democratic Kampuchea, Chapter 4 focuses on its replacement with the regime’s deployment of radical agrarian utopianism as a political religion, which while ostensibly secular, constituted “an authentic religious phenomenon which exhibited the trappings of many Khmer Theravada Buddhist religious experiences yet ultimately led to a construction of an entirely new spiritual identity” (p. 62). For example, the regime’s evacuation of Cambodia’s urban dwellers from cities to forests and collective farms short-circuited the traditional Khmer cultural binary of wild and civilization, and the author reads this forced migration as a means through which the regime undertook the spiritual transformation of its citizens into authentically Khmer revolutionary subjects. Eric Voegelin’s notion of political religion, from his _Die politischen Religionen_ (1938), is crucial to this analysis, and the author draws parallels with Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Bolshevik Russia, and Maoist China.

Chapter 5 turns to the spiritual and aesthetic dimension of Democratic Kampuchea. Drawing on the anthropological work of May Ebihara, the author first reconstructs the spiritual life-world of pre-revolutionary Cambodia, in particular its rich dimension of supernatural belief. Following this, the author reconstructs the violent aesthetic life-world of Democratic Kampuchea through a reading of the revolutionary slogans and songs recounted in survivor memoirs and other documents. The author concludes this chapter with an account of the everyday acts of resistance courageously undertaken by ordinary Cambodian believers against the Pol Pot regime’s totalitarian attempt to obliterate their spiritual life-world. Despite the immense danger, these believers continued their forbidden acts of worship in secret, and this helped Cambodia to rebuild its spiritual life-world after the fall of the Pol Pot regime in 1979.

From the macrocosm of Democratic Kampuchea, Chapter 6 turns to the microcosm of the notorious S-21 prison. The author opens with an extended discussion of Eric Voegelin’s account in his Hitler and the Germans (1999) of the existential tension which affects the subject living under a political religion, when the representation of reality constituted by ideology comes into conflict with reality itself. This notion of “second reality” allows Voegelin to critique the Nazi subject as living under a grossly deluded understanding of reality. The author draws on this Voegelinian concept to explicate S-21’s perpetrators – its executioners, torturers, guards, and administrators – as existing in a thought-space constituted by the paranoid fantasies of the Pol Pot regime. As the author notes, this second reality of S-21 eventually devoured many of its subjects: almost 600 of S-21’s employees ended up getting arrested and executed over the course of its existence. The chapter concludes with a discussion of Rithy Panh’s seminal documentary _S-21: The Khmer Rouge Killing Machine_, which memorably brought together a group of S-21’s surviving perpetrators and victims on the prison grounds. The author observes that these surviving perpetrators’ testimonials of their past actions and their chilling reenactments of their prison routines recreates for the viewer the second reality that came into existence with S-21.

Chapter 7 expands on the previous chapter’s discussion of S-21 with its focus on the prison’s notorious gallery of prisoner mugshots. After deploying aesthetic insights drawn from Gilles Deleuze’s _Francis Bacon_ (2002), Roland Barthes’s _Camera Lucida_ (1981), Elaine Scarry’s _The Body in Pain_ (1985), and Jill Bennett’s _Emphatic Vision_ (2005) to read the disturbing affect of these mugshots, the author extends his aesthetic analysis by offering a Foucauldian reading of the disciplinary regime instantiated by this photographic archive. Chapter 8 continues with the previous chapter’s aesthetic theme with Schillerian readings of first, Democratic Kampuchea’s kill squads, and second, S-21 survivor Vann Nath’s account of the revolutionary aesthetics of Pol Pot’s regime. The chapter concludes with a deployment of Jacques Rancière’s aesthetic philosophy to read the political theater of Democratic Kampuchea. Chapter 9 extends this Rancièrean theme with a discussion of the Pol Pot regime’s totalitarian aesthetics, which are read alongside those of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany.

Chapter 10 turns from the aesthetic theme of the previous three chapters with a reflection of the position of the peasant in the revolutionary teleology of Democratic Kampuchea. This is read in counterpoint to the Marxist and Maoist understandings of the revolutionary role of the peasant. Chapter 11 focuses on a key deviation of Pol Pot’s revolution from the Marxist and Maoist models: its Khmer ethnocentrism. This violent ethnic chauvinism, which was accompanied by genocidal purges of the Cham Muslim and Vietnamese minorities, brings the analysis back to the earlier discussions of Democratic Kampuchea qua political religion, by focusing on the regime’s ultra-nationalism as an aspect of the revolutionary state’s political religion.

In the conclusion of his dissertation, the author reflects on the applicability of the notion of political religion, in particular Eric Voegelin’s formulation of the concept, to analyze other regimes of terror, including the genocidal regimes of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. He observes that an understanding of Democratic Kampuchea would be incomplete without a consideration of the transcendental dimension of the regime’s ostensibly secular ideology, and he reiterates the importance of survivor memoirs as a source of insight into this dimension of affect. This concluding chapter is followed by an appendix: a study of Nuon Chea, Democratic Kampuchea’s Brother Number Two and one of the surviving defendants in the ongoing Khmer Rouge genocide trials.

With his deployment of Eric Voegelin’s notion of political religion, and with his focus on political aesthetics, Steven DeBurger fulfills in his dissertation his promise of offering a fresh reading of Democratic Kampuchea. Moving beyond the Pol Pot period, this conceptual toolkit offers the means of new readings of other periods in Cambodian history, including the present neoliberal period.

Alvin Cheng-Hin Lim
International and Comparative Politics
American University of Nigeria
[email protected]

Primary Sources

Democratic Kampuchea survivor memoirs, including:
Affonco, Denise. _To the End of Hell: One Woman’s Struggle to Survive Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge_. London: Reportage Press, 2007.
Bizot, François. _The Gate_. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003.
Charithy Him. _When Broken Glass Floats: Growing Up Under the Khmer Rouge_. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000.
Chileng Pa with Carol A. Mortland. _Escaping the Khmer Rouge: A Cambodian Memoir_. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2008.
Criddle, Joan D. & Teeda Butt Mam. _To Destroy You Is No Loss: The Odyssey of a Cambodian Family_. New York: Doubleday, 1987.
Dith, Pran & DePaul, Kim. (Eds.) _Children of Cambodia’s Killing Fields: Memoirs by Survivors_. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997.
Haing Ngor. _A Cambodian Odyssey_. New York: Warner Books, 1987.
Keo, Sam. _Out of the Dark: Into the Garden of Hope_. Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2001.
Lafreniere, Bree. _Music through the Dark: A Tale of Survival in Cambodia_. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2000.
Loung Ung. _First They Killed My Father: A Daughter of Cambodia Remembers_. New York: Harper Perennial, 2000.
Lunn, Richard. _Leaving Year Zero: Stories of Surviving Pol Pot’s Cambodia_. Crawley: University of Western Australia Press, 2004.
Ly Y. _Heaven Becomes Hell: A Survivor’s Story of Life Under the Khmer Rouge_. New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 2000.
Picq, Laurence. _Beyond the Horizon: Five Years with the Khmer Rouge_. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989.
Pin Yathay. _Stay Alive, My Son_. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987.
U Sam Oeur. _Crossing Three Wildernesses: A Memoir_. Minneapolis: Coffee House Press, 2005.
Vann Nath. _A Cambodian Prison Portrait: One Year in the Khmer Rouge’s S-21_. Bangkok: White Lotus, 1998.

Dissertation Information

University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. 2012. 279 pp. Primary Advisor: Manfred Henningsen.
Image: Detention and torture room, Security Prison 21 (S-21), Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Wikimedia Commons.


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## Zazula (Nov 21, 2013)

Αυτό δεν πάει εδώ: http://lexilogia.gr/forum/showthread.php?2396-Την-ίδια-ώρα-στην-Καμπότζη;


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## Costas (Nov 21, 2013)

Θενκς, Ζαζ. Αν και δεν θυμόμουν το νήμα που λινκάρισες, όχι, δεν νομίζω ότι έχει σχέση.


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## Zazula (Nov 21, 2013)

Costas said:


> Θενκς, Ζαζ. Αν και δεν θυμόμουν το νήμα που λινκάρισες, όχι, δεν νομίζω ότι έχει σχέση.


Υπέθεσα πάντως πως ίσως και να το 'χες ξεχάσει, οπότε με την ευκαιρία... :)


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## Costas (Dec 14, 2013)

Μια ερμηνεία για την εκτέλεση του συζύγου της θείας του Βορειοκορεάτη δικτάτορα, από το China Matters:

Friday, December 13, 2013
*Jong’s Execution Might Be Kim Jung Un’s High-Stakes Diplomatic Gambit*


Initial reports on the purge of Jong Song Thaek have understandably focused on his abrupt, brutal execution and the hysterical denunciation issued by the Korea Central News Agency.

Terms like “medieval” and “Games of Thrones” have been bandied about, along with expressions of amused contempt at the crude and barbaric character of the DPRK regime and its power and succession struggles.

I enjoy a bout of condescending sniggering as much as anyone, but perhaps attention should be paid to the risky geopolitical gambit that might underpin the move against Jang.

Jang was the architect of the DPRK’s nascent economic reform movement, which apparently relied to a significant extent on PRC models, PRC assistance and, we can assume, acceptance of the idea that a cost of reform was to allow Chinese companies unfair and resented advantages in exploiting economic opportunities in North Korean mines, factories, animal products, and electrical power (I wish to pause here to address the canard that the DPRK is dependent on the PRC for its energy. True, the DPRK has no petroleum resources to provide fuel for gas and diesel engines and is desperately reliant on imports; then again, so is South Korea. North Korea, thanks to its abundant hydropower, is a significant exporter of electricity to the PRC’s Northeast).

Anyway, Jang was Beijing’s guy in Pyongyang. His removal might mean that Kim Jong Un had it up to here with Uncle Jang’s bossiness, or his way of injecting PRC views and interests into the center of DPRK decision-making.

But it also might mean that Kim Jong Un decided to make a bold move to finally obtain direct U.S. engagement on security and economic talks.

Although it doesn’t seem to be discussed much in Western reporting, the DPRK has tried for decades—ever since its security and economic vulnerabilities were mercilessly exposed by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the loss of Russian aid in 1990-- to wean the United States from its wholehearted backing of South Korea, and its willingness to let the PRC act as DPRK’s impatient patron, so Washington would engage with Pyongyang directly as a significant chess piece in the Northeast Asian great game.

One element of this struggle has been the DPRK’s nuclear weapons gyrations. Given the U.S. preoccupation with hostile states possessing nuclear weapons, it was considered that developing and testing nuclear weapons was perhaps the best way to attract U.S. attention and negotiate concessions. Unfortunately, this exposed the DPRK to a fatal contradiction, given the absolute U.S. insistence on nuclear deproliferation: to exploit its leverage and gain something from negotiations, the only way was to get rid of its leverage.

US-DPRK diplomacy has been understandably ridiculous since then.

Now, with the Swiss-educated and Dennis Rodman-entertaining Kim Jong Un in power, the DPRK desire for direct, productive relations with the US is stronger than ever.

And Kim can look to two positive developments.

First, Iran, an indication that the Obama administration will pursue diplomatic engagement with a nuclear power without insisting on complete deproliferation as a condition. New guy—Rohani—in Tehran, so open hand. Kim’s a new guy, too. Maybe he can get some of that open hand.

Second, Myanmar. It is safe to say that the United States told Myanmar and is telling the DPRK that it is not going to be suckered into providing security and economic assistance while its interlocutor snuggles comfortably in the bosom of the PRC. A clean break with China is, in other words, the price to be paid for nice words and things from the United States.

In the case of Myanmar, the government sacrificed the Myitsone Dam, a gigantic hydroelectric project funded by the PRC that threatened to orient the country’s power grid permanently toward China in the north and east (instead of west to Thailand, where we want it).

DPRK, instead of killing a dam, killed a guy: “Uncle Jang”.

Even so, a decisive and catastrophic break with the PRC is probably not going to happen. The PRC’s highest priority is probably the continued survival of the northern regime and avoiding a scenario in which the ROK occupies the peninsula, and becomes a world power on the scale of Japan with troops on China’s border. And if the DPRK can parlay a US tilt into economic growth, then the transition from basket case to Asian tiger will have knock-on economic benefits for the PRC that might compensate for the loss of its economic monopoly (thoughtfully created, as in the case of Myanmar, by a counterproductive US sanctions regime).

And, it should be remembered, immediately prior to the purge, the DPRK released American detainee Merrill Newman as a show of good will. And hapless evangelical Kenneth Bae is still in inventory to be released if US-North Korean discussions bear fruit.

It will be interesting to see how the U.S. government decides to play this.


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## Costas (Dec 14, 2013)

Το άρθρο της γιαπωνέζικης Asahi Shimbun για την εκτέλεση του συζύγου της θείας, με διάφορα μεζεδάκια:

Jang had been tried and executed, North Korea said, for “attempting to overthrow the state by all sorts of intrigues and despicable methods with a wild ambition to grab the supreme power of our party and state.” It called him a “traitor to the nation for all ages” and *“worse than a dog.”*
(...)
The unusually detailed announcement came only days after North Korea said it had *“eliminated”* Jang from all his posts.
(...)
The KCNA report called Jang a “despicable political careerist and trickster” and *“despicable human scum.”*
(...)
Jang was described earlier this week by state media as “abusing his power,” being “engrossed in irregularities and corruption,” and taking drugs and squandering money at casinos while undergoing medical treatment in a foreign country.

Κόντεψα να τον συμπαθήσω το θείο!...


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## rogne (Dec 24, 2013)

Στα όρια του τρολαρίσματος: _Ο Κιμ Γιονγκ Ιλ για την ελάχιστη σχέση μαρξισμού-λενινισμού και κιμιλσονγκισμού_


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## Costas (Dec 25, 2013)

Το παραπάνω κείμενο (οΘντκ) του Κιμ μού θυμίζει τον περίφημο ισχυρισμό ότι ο Μάο σινοποίησε τον μαρξισμό. Πάντως ακόμα και αυτός λέει "Παλιότερα, η επαναστατική ιδέα του ηγέτη αποκαλούταν σύγχρονος Μαρξισμός-Λενινισμός. Φυσικά, υπάρχει κάποια αλήθεια σε αυτό, όμως δεν είναι ένας σωστός ορισμός, καθώς δίνει έμφαση κυρίως στην κληρονομιά του από το μαρξισμό-λενινισμό. Πλέον κανείς δεν αναφέρεται με αυτό τον ορισμό στην επαναστατική σκέψη του ηγέτη. Ωστόσο, υπάρχει ακόμα η τάση να την ερμηνεύουμε στη βάση του Μαρξισμού-Λενινισμού. " Τέλος, όσον αφορά την πρόζα του ίδιου του ελληνικού λαοκρατικού σάιτ: τον αντιφασισμό ή τον αντικαπιταλισμό ή τον αντιιμπεριαλισμό τον κηρύττει κανείς, αλλά τον αντικομουνισμό μόνο τον "ξερνάει"...

Τέλος πάντων, για όσους έχουν γερό στομάχι ώστε να ασχολούνται με το καθεστώς αυτό, τα juche και τα songun του, υπάρχει το σάιτ Sino-NK, π.χ.:
It is this curious admixture of socialism, militarism, nationalism, and third-worldism (the belief in helping third-world based socialist struggles for national autonomy) that makes up the contemporary North Korean worldview—and very much has since the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s.
και επίσης [αυτό] το κείμενο.


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## Costas (Jan 3, 2014)

Για όσους δεν γνωρίζουν για το καθεστώς της Βόρειας Κορέας (όπως ο Χριστόδουλος δεν γνώριζε για τα βασανιστήρια της δικής μας χούντας γιατί...διάβαζε), υπάρχει στο YouTube το κανάλι North Korea Today, καθώς και στο νέτι το Korean Central Television. Ίσως έτσι διαλυθεί ο...γνόφος αγνωσίας.


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## Costas (Jan 3, 2014)

Καθώς η δολοφονία του Jang Song Thaek ενόχλησε βαθύτατα την Κίνα, οι αποτροπιαστικές λεπτομέρειες για τα ήθη και έθιμα του...αντιιμπεριαλιστικού βορειοκορεατικού καθεστώτος πρωτοδημοσιεύτηκαν, προτού κάνουν το γύρο του κόσμου, σε έντυπο που ελέγχεται πλήρως από την επίσημη ΛΔΚ, το wenweipo. Σύμφωνα λοιπόν με άρθρο τής 24 Δεκ. 13 της σιγκαπουρέζικης The Straits Times, η παραπάνω Χονγκ-Κονγκέζικη εφημερίδα περιέγραψε σε άρθρο της της 12 Δεκ. 2013 τον τρόπο εκτέλεσης του άντρα της θείας του Κιμ Τζονγκ Ουν, από 120 άφαγα από 3 μέρες σκυλιά, μαζί με άλλους 5 συνεργάτες του και παρουσία 300 αξιωματούχων και του ίδιου του Κιμ (τζεϊμςμποντική ταινία θυμίζει αυτό). Και σχολιάζει η The Straits Times:

Beijing's displeasure is expressed through the publication of a detailed account of Jang's brutal execution in Wen Wei Po, its official mouthpiece, in Hong Kong, on Dec 12.

According to the report, unlike previous executions of political prisoners which were carried out by firing squads with machine guns, Jang was stripped naked and thrown into a cage, along with his five closest aides. Then 120 hounds, starved for three days, were allowed to prey on them until they were completely eaten up. This is called "quan jue", or execution by dogs.

The report said the entire process lasted for an hour, with Mr Kim Jong Un, the supreme leader in North Korea, supervising it along with 300 senior officials.

The horrifying report vividly depicted the brutality of the young North Korean leader. The fact that it appeared in a Beijing-controlled newspaper showed that China no longer cares about its relations with the Kim regime.

Two days later, the Global Times, associated with the People's Daily, a Chinese Communist Party organ, followed up with a sternly worded editorial saying that the abrupt political change epitomised the backwardness of the North Korean political system. It warned the Chinese government not to coddle North Korea any longer, saying that the majority of Chinese were extremely disgusted with the Kim regime.

The incendiary story, plus the stern editorial, provided a measure of the extent of Beijing's loathing, which is quite understandable.
(...)
Recent developments have posed a number of issues for China.

First, China's own security is at risk. The erratic and ruthless behaviour of Mr Kim Jong Un suggests that China should not underrate the likelihood of a nuclear threat from Pyongyang.

The Internet version of the Global Times carried an article last Monday by Lieutenant-General Wang Hongguang, former deputy commander of Nanjing Greater Military Region, saying that the recent incident showed North Korea had become increasingly provocative and was getting out of (Chinese) control. He urged a complete reassessment of security threats originating from that direction.

Second, China's political and strategic influence on the Korean peninsula has been drastically reduced. China was widely considered to be able to rein in the unruly Kim regime, thus acting as a force for peace in the region. But it now appears China's influence over its neighbour is close to zero.

This is clear from the fact that Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi telephoned his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov for urgent consultation on Dec 13. This was followed by Ambassador Wu Dawei's trip to Moscow. Both moves suggest that Beijing realises it can no longer tame the Kim regime by itself.

Third, China had hoped to nurture a less belligerent neighbour by encouraging reform, open-door policies and economic development in North Korea. Jang had been working closely with China to bring about a Chinese-style transformation in his own country. With Jang brutally executed, the idea of a peaceful transformation seems unrealistic.


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## Marinos (Jan 3, 2014)

Μα συγγνώμη, πρέπει να είναι κανείς φιλικά διακείμενος προς τους Κιμ Ιλ Τάδε για να καταλάβει πόσο μούφα είναι αυτή η τζεϊμσμποντική φαντασία;

(Όχι: το λέει και η Washington Post).


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## Costas (Jan 3, 2014)

Όχι βέβαια, ο καθένας δυσκολεύεται να πιστέψει τέτοιες ιστορίες. Ωστόσο, όπως λέει το λινκ σου,

Ωστόσο, ο συντάκτης παραδέχεται ότι παρ' όλο που η ιστορία φαντάζει εξαιρετικά απίθανη, δεν υπάρχει τρόπος να διαψευστεί, ενώ ακόμα και αναλυτές που είναι ιδιαίτερα επιφυλακτικοί απέναντί της, δηλώνουν ότι δεν μπορούν και να την αποκλείσουν.
Αυτός είναι άλλωστε και ένας από τους λόγους που θα οδηγούσε τόσα πολλά μέσα ενημέρωσης να μεταδώσουν μια τέτοια ιστορία: Σχεδόν κάθε πληροφορία, όσο παράλογη και αν ακούγεται, θα μπορούσε να αποδειχθεί αληθινή, δεδομένων και των ελάχιστων πληροφοριών που έρχονται από τη χώρα.

Και αυτό είναι το φοβερό. Άλλωστε, ποτέ μην πεις ποτέ, αφού, όπως επισημάνθηκε νωρίτερα, εξίσου ασύλληπτες και απίστευτες ήταν οι μαζικής κλίμακας βαρβαρότητες των ναζί στον Β' ΠΠ. Επίσης θυμάμαι τη δεκαετία του '70 τις ιστορίες που κυκλοφορούσαν για τον Ιντί Αμίν Νταντά της Ουγκάντας, τα κομμένα κεφάλια στο ψυγείο του και άλλα τέτοια.


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## Costas (Jan 6, 2014)

Από το Dissertation Reviews, του/της Tae-Ho Kim:
A review of _The Furnace is Breathing: Work and the Everyday Life in North Korea, 1953-1961_, by Cheehyung Kim.


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## Costas (Jan 6, 2014)

Από το Dissertation Reviews, της Sarah Eunkyung Chee:

A review of _Gender, Justice and the Geopolitics of Undocumented North Korean Migration_, by Eunyoung Choi.


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## Marinos (Jan 7, 2014)

Ως σάτιρα από ένα κινέζικο μπλογκ ξεκίνησε, σύμφωνα με το Reuters, η πληροφορία που προκάλεσε τον διεθνή αποτροπιασμό, ότι ο ηγέτης της Βορείου Κορέας, Κιμ Γιονγκ-Oυν, έριξε τον θείο του, Τζανγκ Σονγκ Θαέκ, σε πεινασμένα σκυλιά.


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## LostVerse (Jan 7, 2014)

*120 Dogs: Chinese Satirist's Tweet Takes All English News Media For A Ride*

Το παραθέτω κυρίως για το παρακάτω ενδιαφέρον απόσπασμα:



> What do I take away from this? One, I'm reminded that language is always a barrier. Nowadays I think we imagine that global news organizations probably have multilingual experts from a wide variety of backgrounds covering all the bases. Maybe that's not the case. The ability of any one party to navigate fluidly across linguistic barriers will always be an advantage. Two, many Chinese news providers do sometimes play a little bit fast and loose with their sources when there is something that backs a viewpoint they support. Regardless of whether the tweet's content was true or false or whether the writer was aware of the source's reputation as a known satirist, Wen Wei Po saw it as something worth legitimizing. If Wen Wei Po is a government mouthpiece as some of the articles have said, then maybe that is telling. Or maybe not.


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## Costas (Jan 7, 2014)

Κι εγώ απομονώνω ακόμα περισσότερο:
_If Wen Wei Po is a government mouthpiece as some of the articles have said, then maybe that is telling. Or maybe not._ 

Στην Κίνα, με βάση τις καινούργιες οδηγίες για την καταστολή των κακόβουλων φημών στο ίντερνετ, εδώ και μερικούς μήνες αν δημοσιέψεις μια κακόβουλη (ή "κακόβουλη") φήμη που προωθηθεί πάνω από 500 φορές ή διαβαστεί πάνω από 5000 φορές, κινδυνεύεις ποινικά με έως 3 χρόνια φυλακή. Ο νόμος αυτός έχει ήδη οδηγήσει σε συλλήψεις, (αυτο)κλεισίματα μπλογκ κττ. Οπότε το ότι μια τέτοια φήμη αφέθηκε να δημοσιευτεί στη συγκεκριμένη εφημερίδα maybe is telling. Or maybe not. Αυτό έλεγε και το άρθρο της σιγκαπουρέζικης The Strait Times. Μια τυχόν ρήξη Κίνας-Β. Κορέας θα αποτελέσει μείζονα αλλαγή σκηνικού στην περιοχή.

Edit: Το κομμάτι της Wikipedia για τον χαρακτήρα της εφημερίδας είναι το εξής:
Wen Wei Po is a Hong Kong-based Chinese language newspaper, first established in Shanghai in January 1938, with the Hong Kong version launched on 9 September 1948.

The publishing of Wen Wei Po aims at supporting New China, that is the People's Republic of China and delivering the latest Mainland developments, especially over the last 20 years. A rare exception was in 1989 when the editorial board openly objected to the use of force in the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests. As a consequence the editorial board was replaced shortly thereafter.


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## bernardina (Jan 7, 2014)




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## Costas (Jan 25, 2014)

Έχω στην NYT ετούτο τον τίτλο:
*Cuban Vendors, in Rare Move, Stage a Protest*
In a rare demonstration of dissent, dozens of Cuban artisans and vendors protested government inspectors in the...

αλλά εξάντλησα τον αριθμό άρθρων σε ελεύθερη πρόσβαση, οπότε, αν ενδιαφέρεται κανείς/-μιά, ας πατήσει το λινκ του τίτλου κι ας μας πει τι συνέβη.


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## bernardina (Jan 25, 2014)

MEXICO CITY — In a rare demonstration of public dissent, dozens of Cuban artisans and vendors protested in the city of Holguín this week, marching to local government offices and demanding the right to work without government harassment, witnesses said.

The march — which took place on Tuesday in a provincial capital just an hour or so from Fidel and Raúl Castro’s childhood home — was a surprising and spontaneous response to a crackdown earlier in the day at a local market, residents said. Inspectors enforcing rules prohibiting the self-employed from selling products that are either imported or possibly pilfered from government shops confiscated a variety of items from several sellers, prompting them and many others to take to the streets.

Some residents said in telephone interviews that the protest involved just a smattering of people who were lawbreakers with invalid complaints. Others, especially those who identified themselves as government opponents, said there were 100 to 150 protesters, whom they described as brave and justifiably angry.

“The government revoked their licenses and took away their resources, their work,” said one local dissident who declined to be named for fear of reprisals. He added that several protesters were beaten when confronted by the authorities, and that at least three people were detained and then released. “It’s one of the most important things to have happened in Cuba in 54 years,” he said. “It was a protest by workers; it wasn’t dissidents. We support them, but we didn’t do this.”

Analysts differed on the significance of the protest. Some noted that the group promoting the protest, with a YouTube video supposedly showing marchers shouting “We want to work,” is known for being militantly anti-Castro, and possibly infiltrated by Cuban security forces.


Video purporting to show street marches in Holguín uploaded by CID, the group promoting the protests. 
But even pro-government residents in Holguín — including a taxi driver and an employee at a hospital near the market — acknowledged that the protest occurred and was led by people licensed to work for themselves as part of Cuba’s limited effort to encourage private employment.

Ted Henken, a professor at Baruch College and president of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, said that any worker revolt in Cuba, however small, reflects frustration with Raúl Castro’s attempt to improve the nation’s communist economy through calculated, cautious economic openings. Though around 445,000 Cubans now legally work for themselves, according to government figures, growth among the self-employed has plateaued and complaints about stricter enforcement have been growing for months.

“It’s been so far fairly easy for the government to dismiss or defame most dissidents given their small number and total lack of exposure in the mass media,” Mr. Henken said. “It will be much harder to control and contain everyday citizens who are protesting not about the lack of political freedoms but over their rising frustration at the on-again-off-again pace of Raúl’s so-called economic reforms.”


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## Costas (Jan 25, 2014)

Μάλιστα... Ευχαριστώ, Βερναρδίνα! :)


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## Irini (Jan 26, 2014)

Costas said:


> Έχω στην NYT ετούτο τον τίτλο:
> *Cuban Vendors, in Rare Move, Stage a Protest*
> In a rare demonstration of dissent, dozens of Cuban artisans and vendors protested government inspectors in the...
> 
> αλλά εξάντλησα τον αριθμό άρθρων σε ελεύθερη πρόσβαση, οπότε, αν ενδιαφέρεται κανείς/-μιά, ας πατήσει το λινκ του τίτλου κι ας μας πει τι συνέβη.




Δες αν πιάνει και στην Ελλάδα το εξής: Αντιγράφεις τον τίτλο, τον γκουγκλίζεις και κάνεις κλικ στο σωστό αποτέλεσμα (αν ξεπεράσεις τα 10 την ημέρα μ' αυτόν τον τρόπο πρέπει να πας από λινκ σε άλλο σάιτ). Επίσης διαφορετικά προφίλ από τον ίδιο κομπιούτερ σου δίνουν ελεύθερη πρόσβαση εξ αρχής (το κάνω με το προφίλ του άντρα μου και μιας και έχω και λάπτοπ 4 φορές τα ελεύθερα άρθρα).


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## Costas (Jan 26, 2014)

Ευχαριστώ!


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## SBE (Jan 26, 2014)

Επίσης από σμαρτόφωνο αν κατεβάσεις το app τους, έχεις περισσότερα άρθρα προσβάσιμα.


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## bernardina (Jan 26, 2014)

Costas said:


> Μάλιστα... Ευχαριστώ, Βερναρδίνα! :)



Παρακαλώ, Κώστα. :)


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## nickel (Jan 26, 2014)

Δεν μου έχει τύχει περιορισμός, αλλά, αν το κοντέρ δεν βρίσκεται στον δικό τους σέρβερ αλλά σε κούκι του δικού σου υπολογιστή, αρκεί να σβήσεις το κούκι. Στον Firefox πας: 
Tools > Options > Privacy > Remove individual cookies
Δακτυλογραφείς nytimes και μπορείς να διαγράψεις όλα τα κούκις της εφημερίδας ή ένα-ένα μέχρι να βρεις ποιο κάνει τη ζημιά και να το πεις και σ' εμάς.
Στο μεταξύ, βρήκα και κάποιον που λέει πιο πολλά:

http://www.labnol.org/internet/nyt-paywall/18992/


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## Costas (Jan 26, 2014)

Χρήσιμες όλες αυτές οι καταθέσεις για όλους, αλλά προσωπικά με βολεύει που μου βάζουν χαλινάρι!


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## Costas (Jan 28, 2014)

Το κινεζικό πρακτορείο Sina αναμεταδίδει νοτιοκορεάτικο πρακτορείο:

*All relatives of Kim Jong-un's uncle executed too: report*
2014-01-26 03:39:44 GMT2014-01-26 11:39:44(Beijing Time) SINA.com

All relatives of the executed uncle of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, including children and the country's ambassadors to Cuba and Malaysia, have also been put to death at the leader's instruction, Seoul's Yonhap news agency quoted multiple sources as saying Sunday.

Jang Song-thaek, the once-powerful uncle, was executed last month on charges of attempting to overthrow the regime, including contemplating a military-backed coup. All direct relatives of Jang have also been executed, the sources said.

"Extensive executions have been carried out for relatives of Jang Song-thaek," one source said on condition of anonymity. "All relatives of Jang have been put to death, including even children."

The executed relatives include Jang's sister Jang Kye-sun, her husband and Ambassador to Cuba Jon Yong-jin, and Ambassador to Malaysia Jang Yong-chol, who is a nephew of Jang, as well as his two sons, the sources said.

All of them were recalled to Pyongyang in early December and executed, they said. The sons, daughters and even grandchildren of Jang's two brothers were all executed, they said.

It was unclear exactly when they were killed, but they are believed to have been put to death after Jang's death on Dec. 12.

"Some relatives were shot to death by pistol in front of other people if they resisted while being dragged out of their apartment homes," another source said.

Some relatives by marriage, including the wife of the ambassador to Malaysia, have been spared from executions and sent to remote villages along with their maiden families, according to the sources.

"The executions of Jang's relatives mean that no traces of him should be left," a source said. "The purge of the Jang Song-thaek people is under way on an extensive scale from relatives and low-level officials."

(Agencies)


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## Costas (Feb 12, 2014)

Cuba's Reward for the Dutiful: Gated Housing
By DAMIEN CAVE (ΝΥΤ)

A new housing development in Havana will have apartments for military and government families, a reward for loyalty and a sign of the island's hybrid economy.


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## Costas (Feb 17, 2014)

Το κείμενο της προφορικής ενημέρωσης της τριμελούς εξεταστικής επιτροπής για τα δικαιώματα του ανθρώπου του ΟΗΕ για την 24η σύνοδο του Συμβουλίου Δικαιωμάτων του Ανθρώπου του ίδιου οργανισμού. (6 σελίδες PDF)


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## Costas (Feb 18, 2014)

Νά και η σελίδα του ΟΗΕ με την Έκθεση της Διερευνητικής Επιτροπής για τα Δικαιώματα του Ανθρώπου στην ΛΔ Κορέας.


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## Costas (Feb 22, 2014)

China rejects U.N. criticism in North Korea report, no comment on veto (Reuters)


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## Costas (Mar 4, 2014)

Πρότυπο οικολογικής αποανάπτυξης η Βόρεια Κορέα: δεν φαίνεται στις νυχτερινές φωτογραφίες της γης από ψηλά. Φαντάζομαι θα έχει τους πιο όμορφους έναστρους ουρανούς. (in.gr)


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## bernardina (Mar 10, 2014)

Β. Κορέα: «Θρίαμβος» για τον Κιμ Γιονγκ Ουν που έπαιξε μόνος του και εξελέγη με 100%!

Αυτά είναι ποσοστά, ρε σεις! Όχι όπως εδώ, που το έχουμε κάνει αμέρρρικαν μπαρρ.

Ορίστε, το λέει καθαρά:

Ο Κιμ ήταν ο μοναδικός υποψήφιος στην περιφέρειά του, ενώ στις υπόλοιπες περιφέρειες υπήρχε πάλι μόνο ένα όνομα, της δικής του επιλογής.
Αν και τα αποτελέσματα για τους υπόλοιπους υποψηφίους δεν ανακοινώθηκαν, τα ΜΜΕ της χώρας έσπευσαν να κάνουν γνωστό πως ο Κιμ Γιονγκ Ουν επικράτησε στην περιφέρειά του, χωρίς να χάσει ούτε μία ψήφο.

Αρχοντιές...


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## nickel (Mar 10, 2014)

Είναι πρώτη φορά και δεν ξέρουν ότι το κόλπο είναι να ανακοινώνουν ποσοστά όπως 97-98%.


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## Palavra (Mar 10, 2014)

nickel said:


> Είναι πρώτη φορά και δεν ξέρουν ότι το κόλπο είναι να ανακοινώνουν ποσοστά όπως 97-98%.


...που τους δίνει και δυνατότητα να σφάξουν και κανέναν αντιφρονούντα...


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## SBE (Mar 10, 2014)

H αγάπη του λαού είναι τόσο απέραντη και καθολική που δεν διανοούμαστε εμείς οι κακοί να αντιλήφθούμε το μεγαλείο της. 
Έτσι είναι οι σωστές χώρες Μπέρνι, όχι σαν την Ελλάδα που έχει κάνει κόμμα κι η κουτσή Μαρία και που έιμαστε δέκα άνθρωποι κι έχουμε έντεκα γνώμες. Έκαστος.


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## Costas (Mar 25, 2014)

(China Digital Times)

2014 03 25

*Minitrue: Meat Soup in North Korea*

The following censorship instructions, issued to the media by government authorities, have been leaked and distributed online. 

State Council Information Office: All websites are asked to immediately delete the article “North Korean Defector Says Average Person Can Have Meat Soup Once a Month.” (March 19, 2014)

国信办：请各网站立即删除《脱北者透露朝鮮普通人1個月已能吃上1次肉湯》一文。

The article, which appeared this morning on the People’s Daily overseas Chinese-language website Haiwai Wang (海外網), opens with North Korean defector Park Ju-hui describing improvements to middle class life in his hometown of Hyesan since the famine of the 1990s. “Seven out of ten households have a color TV. The average person can have meat soup once a month… The quality of life has really improved” (10戶里有7戶裝了彩電，普通人一個月能吃上一次肉湯……生活質量有了很大提高).

The report is still available on Tencent [zh] as of this posting, but has already been removed from Haiwai Wang and NetEase.

Read the original article on CDT Chinese [zh].

Chinese journalists and bloggers often refer to these instructions as “Directives from the Ministry of Truth.”


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## Costas (Apr 16, 2014)

Οργή των Βορειοκορεατών για λονδρέζικο κομμωτήριο που χλευάζει την «κουπ» του Κιμ Γιονγκ Ουν
(Τα Νέα)

«Bad Hair Day? 15% off all gent cuts through the month of April»
(...)
«Τους είδα απ' εξω. Μπήκαν στο κομμωτήριο και με ρώτησαν γιατί το πόστερ είναι στη βιτρίνα και απαίτησαν να το κατεβάσω» διηγήθηκε ο νεαρός κομμωτής. 
(...)
«Τους απάντησα πως συχνά βάζω φωτογραφίες διασημοτήτων στη βιτρίνα, αλλά μου ανταπάντησαν: "Δεν είναι διασημότητα, είναι ο λατρεμένος μας ηγέτης". Απαίτησαν να μάθουν το όνομά μου και αρνήθηκα. "Εδώ δεν είναι Βόρεια Κορέα, εδώ είναι Αγγλία, βγείτε έξω!" τους απάντησα».


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## Costas (May 3, 2014)

Η Γκάρντιαν δημοσίεψε την καθημερινότητα στην Πιονγκγιάνγκ, από το βιβλίο North Korea. State of Paranoia, του Paul French.

6am The day starts early in Pyongyang, the city described by the North Korean government as the "capital of revolution". Breakfast is usually corn or maize porridge, possibly a boiled egg and sour yoghurt, with perhaps powdered milk for children.

Then it is time to get ready for work. North Korea has a large working population: approximately 59% of the total in 2010. A growing number of women work in white-collar office jobs; they make up around 90% of workers in light industry and 80% of the rural workforce. Many women are now the major wage-earner in the family – though still housewife, mother and cook as well as a worker, or perhaps a soldier.

Makeup is increasingly common in Pyongyang, though it is rarely worn until after college graduation. Chinese-made skin lotions, foundation, eyeliner and lipstick are available and permissible in the office. Many women suffer from blotchy skin caused by the deteriorating national diet, so are wearing more makeup. Long hair is common, but untied hair is frowned upon.

Men's hairstyles could not be described as radical. In the 1980s, when Kim Jong-il first came to public prominence, his trademark crewcut, known as a "speed battle cut", became popular, while the more bouffant style favoured by Kim Il-sung, and then Kim Jong-il, in their later years, is also popular. Kim Jong-un's trademark short-back-and-sides does not appear to have inspired much imitation so far. Hairdressers and barbers are run by the local Convenience Services Management Committee; at many, customers can wash their hair themselves.

Fashion is not really an applicable term in North Korea, as the Apparel Research Centre under the Clothing Industry Department of the National Light Industry Committee designs most clothing. However, things have loosened up somewhat, with bright colours now permitted as being in accordance with a "socialist lifestyle". Pyongyang offers some access to foreign styles. A Japanese watch denotes someone in an influential position; a foreign luxury watch indicates a very senior position. The increasing appearance of Adidas, Disney and other brands (usually fake) indicates that access to goods smuggled from China is growing. Jeans have at times been fashionable, though risky – occasionally they have been banned as "decadent", along with long hair on men, which can lead to arrest and a forced haircut.

One daily ritual of all North Koreans is making sure they have their Kim Il-sung badge attached to their lapel. The badges have been in circulation since the late 1960s, when the Mansudae Art Studio started producing them for party cadres. Desirable ones can change hands on the black market for several hundred NKW. In a city where people rarely carry cash, jewellery or credit cards, Kim badges are one of the most prized targets of Pyongyang's pickpockets.

Most streets are boulevards of utilitarian high-rise blocks. Those who live on higher floors may have to set out for work or school a little earlier than those lower down. Due to chronic power cuts, many elevators work only intermittently, if at all. Many buildings are between 20 and 40 storeys tall – there are stories of old people who have never been able to leave. Even in the better blocks elevators can be sporadic and so people just don't take the chance. Families make great efforts to relocate older relatives on lower floors, but this is difficult and a bribe is sometimes required. With food shortages now constant, many older people share their meagre rations with their grandchildren, weakening themselves further and making the prospect of climbing stairs even more daunting.

Some people do drive to work, but congestion is not a major problem. Despite the relative lack of cars, police enforce traffic regulations strictly and issue tickets. Fines can be equivalent to two weeks' salary. Most cars belong to state organisations, but are often used as if they were privately owned. All vehicles entering Pyongyang must be clean; owners of dirty cars may be fined. Those travelling out of Pyongyang require a travel certificate. There are few driving regulations; however, on hills ascending vehicles have the right of way, and trucks cannot pass passenger cars under any circumstances. Drunk-driving is punished with hard labour. Smoking while driving is banned on the grounds that a smoking driver cannot smell a problem with the car.

Those who have a bicycle usually own a Sea Gull, unless they are privileged and own an imported second-hand Japanese bicycle. But even a Sea Gull costs several months' wages and requires saving.

7.30am For many North Koreans the day starts with a 30-minute reading session and exercises before work begins. The reading includes receiving instructions and studying the daily editorial in the party papers. This is followed by directives on daily tasks and official announcements.

For children, the school day starts with exercises to a medley of populist songs before a session of marching on the spot and saluting the image of the leader. The curriculum is based Kim Il-sung's 1977 Thesis on Socialist Education, emphasising the political role of education in developing revolutionary spirit. All children study Kim Il-sung's life closely. Learning to read means learning to read about Kim Il-sung; music class involves singing patriotic songs. Rote learning and memorising political tracts is integral and can bring good marks, which help in getting into university – although social rank is a more reliable determinant of college admission. After graduation, the state decides where graduates will work.

8am Work begins. Pyongyang is the centre of the country's white-collar workforce, though a Pyongyang office would appear remarkably sparse to most outsiders. Banks, industrial enterprises and businesses operate almost wholly without computers, photocopiers and modern office technology. Payrolls and accounting are done by hand.

12pm Factories, offices and workplaces break for lunch for an hour. Many workers bring a packed lunch, or, if they live close by, go home to eat. Larger workplaces have a canteen serving cheap lunches, such as corn soup, corn cake and porridge. The policy of eating in work canteens, combined with the lack of food shops and restaurants, means that Pyongyang remains strangely empty during the working day with no busy lunchtime period, as seen in other cities around the world.

Shopping is an as-and-when activity. If a shop has stock, then returning later is not an option as it will be sold out. According to defectors, North Koreans want "five chests and seven appliances". The chests are a quilt chest, wardrobe, bookshelf, cupboard and shoe closet, while the appliances comprise a TV, refrigerator, washing machine, electric fan, sewing machine, tape recorder and camera. Most ordinary people only have a couple of appliances, usually a television and a sewing machine.

Food shopping is equally problematic. Staples such as soy sauce, soybean paste, salt and oil, as well as toothpaste, soap, underwear and shoes, sell out fast. The range of food items available is highly restricted. White cabbage, cucumber and tomato are the most common; meat is rare, and eggs increasingly so. Fruit is largely confined to apples and pears. The main staple of the North Korean diet is rice, though bread is sometimes available, accompanied by a form of butter that is often rancid. Corn, maize and mushrooms also appear sometimes.

5pm Work ends, but most people are required to remain in the office or factory for the daily Community Session and Learning Session. At the Community Sessions there is a discussion of the day's work, an evaluation of progress and an anticipation of the next day. The Learning Session is more overtly political and can include a Political Ideology Learning Session to disseminate party policy. Self-criticism is still popular, as are so-called "colleague criticising sessions". Criticisms can range from being late for work to wasting national resources. All criticism is based on the Ten Principles for Firmly Establishing the Party's Unique Thought System.. Solidarity, Learning and Community Sessions are held by the Agricultural Working People's Union, the Women's Union and the Children's League. In December longer meetings are held to take stock of the year. Spontaneous demonstrations or marches often require attendance.

8pm Most people are already home. In winter they take off their street clothes and don layers of underwear and shirts to retain body heat. Apartments are draughty, forcing residents to cover the windows with plastic sheeting. Apartment buildings are largely heated by hot water, houses by charcoal briquettes. If the electricity supply is suspended, however, no heat is available. Most residents stay in their winter clothes all day, even sleeping in them. People who manage to obtain chicken or duck feathers use them to make quilts.

Every day people liaise with their neighbours about the electricity situation. A large proportion of Pyongyang operates an "alternative suspension of electricity supply" system, meaning that when buildings on one side of the street are blacked out, the other side of the street gets power. When the alternation time arrives there is a mad rush of children as they head for their friends' apartments across the road.

Social communication is problematic. Most telephone calls are made through operators. This is a prime occupation for women (all of them are women), and a way to gain access to rumour and information before other, ordinary, workers. Phones are only installed for high-ranking officials, and are thus technically official rather than private.

Smoking is a cheap pleasure. As shortages have grown, many people roll their own. It can also be an act of resistance, as the best rolling paper is considered to be the Workers' Party daily paper. Formal entertainment options are limited in Pyongyang. The city has around eight cinemas, although many shut early due to lack of power. The Yongdae Funfair remains closed, as do many theatres. Normal fare at the cinema is heavily propagandist, such as Sea of Blood, The Fate of a Self-Defence Corps Man, Flames Spreading Over the Land or the recent hit Beyond Joy and Sorrow, which included the first on-screen kiss seen in North Korea. The usual plots describe South Korean or US perfidy and end with a victory for the KPA.

Holidays are rare, despite a long list of anniversaries and commemorative occasions. Four or five days' annual holiday appears to be the norm around Kim Jong-il's birthday, the anniversary of the DPRK's founding and Kim Il-sung's birthday, when children are given biscuits and confectionery by their parents. Sunday is "walking day", with public transport schedules curtailed. Live music is often performed by Art Propaganda Troupes singing popular ballads (pansori) espousing revolutionary sentiments. Home entertainment consists largely of television.

Citizens must report purchases of radios and TVs. The authorities have been known to make inspections to ensure sets are tuned to official programming. Possession of foreign books, magazines and newspapers is forbidden. However, some news of the outside world filters through via illegal short-wave radios.

10pm Most people are in bed. The scarcity of cars, the early nights, the absence of entertainment venues, and the electricity shortages, mean that by midnight Pyongyang is effectively a ghost city, and remains so until 6am the next day.


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## Costas (May 19, 2014)

Κατέρρευσε πολυκατοικία
Πρώτη φορά συγγνώμη για δυστύχημα ζήτησαν οι αρχές της Β.Κορέας
(in.gr)
Πιονγκγιάνγκ, Βόρεια Κορέα
Σε μία ασυνήθιστη κίνηση για τα δεδομένα της χώρας προχώρησαν οι αρχές της Βορείου Κορέας, ζητώντας για πρώτη φορά συγγνώμη για δυστύχημα που συνέβη σε μια υπό κατασκευή πολυκατοικία στην Πιονγιάνγκ, η οποία κατέρρευσε.

Τα επίσημα μέσα ενημέρωσης της Βορείου Κορέας έκαναν λόγο για ένα «απίστευτο» δυστύχημα που άφησε πίσω του αδιευκρίνιστο αριθμό θυμάτων.

Οι αρχές της Πιονγκγιάνγκ εκφράζουν «τη βαθιά θλίψη και τη συγγνώμη τους», ήταν η πρώτη επίσημη ανακοίνωση για το δυστύχημα που σημειώθηκε στην περιοχή Πιονγκτσόν της πρωτεύουσας της Βορείου Κορέας την Τρίτη.

«Η κατασκευή ενός συγκροτήματος κατοικιών δεν έγινε σωστά και οι αξιωματούχοι που την επέβλεψαν και την έλεγξαν με ανεύθυνο τρόπο» σημείωνε η ανακοίνωση του κρατικού πρακτορείου ειδήσεων KCNA.

Σύμφωνα με την ίδια πηγή, από την κατάρρευση της πολυκατοικίας υπάρχουν θύματα, όμως το πρακτορείο δεν έδωσε πληροφορίες για τον αριθμό των νεκρών ή των τραυματιών ούτε για τα αίτια της κατάρρευσης. Επεσήμανε εξάλλου ότι η επιχείρηση των σωστικών συνεργείων ολοκληρώθηκε.

Το KCNA μετέδωσε τη δημόσια συγγνώμη υψηλόβαθμων αξιωματούχων της χώρας, ένα σπάνιο γεγονός στη Βόρεια Κορέα, μεταξύ αυτών και ο υπουργός Ασφάλειας του Λαού Τσόε Που-Ιλ, ο οποίος παραδέχτηκε ότι απέτυχε να επιβλέψει επαρκώς το έργο της κατασκευής «προκαλώντας ένα απίστευτο δυστύχημα».

Αξιωματούχος από το υπουργείο Ένωσης της Νοτίου Κορέας επιβεβαίωσε ότι ένα 23ώροφο κτίριο κατέρρευσε στην Πιονγκγιάνγκ την Τρίτη, αν και δεν διευκρίνισε από πού έχει λάβει τις πληροφορίες αυτές.

Ο αξιωματούχος, που ζήτησε να μην κατονομαστεί, σημείωσε ότι το κτίριο φέρεται να διέθετε διαμερίσματα για 92 νοικοκυριά ή οικογένειες και πρόσθεσε ότι είναι συνηθισμένο φαινόμενο στη Βόρειο Κορέα οι ένοικοι να μετακομίζουν στα νέα κτίρια προτού αυτά ολοκληρωθούν.

«Οι νεκροί πρέπει να είναι εκατοντάδες, αν υποθέσουμε ότι κάθε οικογένεια έχει κατά μέσο όρο τέσσερα μέλη» υπογράμμισε.

Ο ηγέτης της Βόρειας Κορέας Κιμ Γιονγκ-Ουν «έμεινε ξύπνιος όλη τη νύχτα εξαιτίας της θλίψης» μόλις ενημερώθηκε για το συμβάν, δήλωσε υψηλόβαθμος αξιωματούχος της χώρας στο KCNA.

Στην Πιονγκγιάνγκ ζουν περίπου 2,5 εκατομμύρια κάτοικοι, μεγάλο μέρος των οποίων ανήκουν στις ανώτερες τάξεις του πολιτικού και στρατιωτικού κύκλου.

Newsroom ΔΟΛ, με πληροφορίες από ΑΠΕ/Reuters/Γαλλικό


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## Costas (Jun 8, 2014)

*Lukashenka threatens modern serfdom for farm workers* (Transitions Online)

In an attempt to boost agriculture, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka ordered what Interfax calls a “military approach” to this year’s harvest, The Moscow Times reports.

“Everyone needs to be on a war footing, especially for the harvest of crops,” Lukashenka said 27 May and called for “iron discipline” to keep agriculture from suffering the fate of the dairy industry, which he said lost $700 million in 2013, according to the newspaper.

Lukashenka also announced a second plank in his farm support policy.

“Yesterday, a decree was put on my table concerning – we are speaking bluntly – serfdom,” he said 27 May, according to the Financial Times’ Beyondbrics blog.

He plans to introduce legislation to prevent workers from quitting jobs on farms and moving to cities, the blog writes, citing gazeta.ru.

At the same meeting he said, “You cannot quit,” apparently aiming his remark at farm workers, the opposition website Charter ’97 reports. “Start working so that people cannot say: you press on us, but you don’t work properly. ... Don’t expect unlimited freedom anymore.”

Such a law would violate a 1957 international convention against forced labor, Beyondbrics notes. However, the Eastern European country already has a precedent in a 2012 decree banning workers in the timber industry from quitting their jobs.

Agriculture employs almost 10 percent of the Belarusian labor force, according to The Moscow Times.


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## Costas (Jul 22, 2014)

N.Korea Slams 'Spineless' China
(The Chosun Ilbo)
North Korea's relations with its sole ally and benefactor China are going rapidly downhill. In an unprecedented move on Monday, North Korea attacked Beijing as "spineless" after cracking down on the usage of the yuan within its borders and reducing exchanges of personnel between the two sides.

The move comes after months of a de-facto oil embargo from China that has left the all-important North Korean army high and dry and forced officers to cycle to work.

*◆ Outburst*

"Some spineless countries are blindly following the stinking bottom of the U.S., also struggling to embrace (South Korean President) Park Geun-hye, who came to a pathetic state of being," the North's powerful National Defense Commission said in an outburst of vitriol unusual even by its own somewhat eccentric standards.

The North defended its latest missile tests as measures to strengthen its "self-defense capability."

The comments appear squarely aimed at Beijing, which joined the UN Security Council in denouncing Pyongyang's short-range missile launch last week and whose president, Xi Jinping, took the rare step of visiting South Korea before North Korea shortly after he came to power.

A day before Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Seoul late last month, the North also accused Beijing of warming up to the U.S. and South Korea.

*◆ Crackdown on Yuan*

China halted shipments of oil to North Korea for five months so far this year, and bilateral trade has declined markedly. North Korea's special economic zones, which had seen huge amounts of trade and investment from China are ailing.

According to sources in the Rajin-Sonbong economic zones, security forces recently launched a massive crackdown on usage of the Chinese currency.

State security agents cracked down on Chinese money changers who refused to accept North Korean won and only traded in yuan and U.S. dollars, the source said.

"Security agents said China is the sworn enemy," the source added.

Violent scuffles broke out during the crackdown, resulting in one security agent getting stabbed to death by a money changer, who in turn was shot and killed by other agents.

Increasing tensions in the zones, a symbol of business ties between the two allies, prompted Chinese ambassador to North Korea, Liu Hongcai, to visit the region and plead for calm.

The number of North Koreans visiting China fell 7.3 percent in the first half of this year to 91,800 people. North Korea apparently recalled all workers dispatched to China to earn valuable foreign currency.

Park Hyung-joong at the Korean Institute of National Unification said North Korea's latest outburst was an official response to China's protest against the North's missile launch and Xi's trip to Seoul.

"Due to the North Korean nuclear program, relations are unlikely to improve any time soon," he said.

Meanwhile, North Korea is cozying up to Russia. State-run media on Saturday called for strengthened relations between Moscow and Pyongyang, marking the 14th anniversary of a summit between former North Korean leader Kim Jong-il and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

But on July 11, which marks the anniversary of a friendship treaty between Beijing and Pyongyang, the regime issued no official statement.

In May, Russia wrote off US$10 billion in loans to North Korea and a senior Russian diplomat visited Pyongyang. Trade between Russia and North Korea rose 37.3 percent last year to $104 million.


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## nickel (Jul 22, 2014)

Costas said:


> In May, Russia wrote off US$10 billion in loans to North Korea


Να οι γεωπολιτικές διαφορές.


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## Costas (Jul 24, 2014)

N.Korea Furious About Kim Jong-un Dance Video
(The Chosun Ilbo)
North Korea has asked China to stop the spread of a video clip lampooning leader Kim Jong-un. According to a source in China on Tuesday, the North feels the clip, which shows Kim dancing and Kung-Fu fighting, "seriously compromises Kim's dignity and authority." Beijng was unable to oblige.

The viral video is a Chinese-language techno track that features various dance and fight scenes in which Kim's head has been magicked on the body of a participant.

Στο σάιτ μπορείτε να δείτε το βιντεοκλίπ, ή και εδώ απευθείας.


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## Costas (Aug 29, 2014)

HORRORS OF NORTH KOREA: Defector carried knife for suicide to avoid arrest

Editor’s note: This story originally appeared in The Asahi Shimbun Digital website and part of a series of articles titled "HORRORS OF NORTH KOREA."

***

AJW ran a series of articles in March under the general title “Horrors of North Korea” that described the harsh conditions in the country and the problems facing defectors in South Korea, Japan and Canada.

But those articles, based on interviews of 60 North Korean defectors by The Asahi Shimbun and The Dong-A Ilbo of South Korea, touched on just part of what each defector went through.

As a complement to the original “Horrors of North Korea” series, AJW will run an occasional series featuring detailed versions of the interviews with the individuals.

The first installment is an interview with a man in his 60s who defected from North Korea in winter 2001 and entered Japan in October 2002.

Excerpts of the interview follow:

* * *
Question: Why did you go to North Korea in the first place?

Answer: I left Japan by ship in August 1972. My father was a Korean national living in Japan, and my mother was a Tokyoite born in the Asakusa district.

Shortly before I went to North Korea, I caused a slight incident that led to my arrest. I was imprisoned for a year and nine months. Thereafter, I was to be deported either to South Korea or North Korea.

I remembered a newspaper article about a French journalist who said that North Korea was a wonderful nation. While I had my doubts over whether that was true, I thought it would be better than South Korea, so I chose to be deported to North Korea, even though I had no relatives living there.

The ship entered the port of Chongjin in the northern part of the nation. I later worked at a paper manufacturing plant in Hyesan, also in the northern part, before moving to Kilju (North Hamgyong province) and Pyongsong (in the northern outskirts of Pyongyang).

Q: What led to your decision to defect?

A: I went to North Korea with my younger sister and younger brother. I began to think specifically about fleeing the nation 25 years after I went there. My sister developed psychological problems and entered a hospital where she died of starvation. This happened at a hospital.

In the late 1980s, salaries gradually stopped being paid, and the ration system also ended. Everyone somehow survived by taking on jobs outside of normal channels and buying food on the black market. However, in my neighborhood, some people continued to work diligently at their companies. They ended up dying of starvation.

A countless number of men died of starvation. Even if the family had money earned by the wife, the husband would not eat so his wife and children would have food, and the men died. All the men who starved to death left behind notes saying “Long live the Workers’ Party.” They wrote those notes even if they did not truly believe it. They died while leaving behind such notes on purpose because they did not want their families to face danger if they were confronted by the authorities and told, “(He) died of starvation because he was lazy in violation of the teachings of the Workers’ Party.”

All those who died were originally born in North Korea. Those who went there from Japan or those who had some smarts did business by selling rice and daily necessities. There was no distribution network to speak of in North Korea. That meant a little effort could lead to business profits.

I made a living by selling sugar, cigarettes and beer. The 50-kilogram bag of sugar had “CCCP” written on it, meaning it came from the Soviet Union. I went to a confectionary factory in North Korea and purchased the sugar. I would sell the sugar on my way back home. By the time I returned to Hyesan, my truck was empty.

At that time, there was nothing in the way of products. My sister’s death served as a catalyst because I thought: “This nation is heading straight for ruin. I have to find some way to escape.”

Fleeing North Korea, buying Chinese nationality

Q: But didn’t fleeing North Korea mean putting your life on the line?

A: For the next five years, I thoroughly studied what measures I should use to leave North Korea and who I should depend on to ensure that I would certainly leave. I felt that if I used illegal means, I would only face problems once I returned to Japan, so I thought I would obtain citizenship in China so I could “legally” return. I gave money to various people and faced many difficulties in making all the arrangements.

I fled North Korea in the winter of 2001 along with my younger brother. We went from Pyongsong back to Hyesan and crossed over into China. While the river was about 20 meters wide, it had frozen over because it was winter. We were able to walk across the river. At that time, I paid a North Korean who cooperated 2,000 won. I believe the average monthly pay in North Korea at that time was 100 won. I had money because of my business ventures in North Korea.

Once in China, I obtained a visa at the Japanese Consulate in Liaoning province. By that time, I had become a “Chinese.” That was because I acquired a Chinese identity for 40,000 yuan (about 600,000 yen at the time) from a woman whom I came to know. She worked at the local Communist Party committee in Jilin province.

In China, it was common to sell the family register of individuals who had died. I used that to become a Chinese resident and obtained the visa needed to come to Japan. I landed at Narita Airport on a flight from Lushun in October 2002.

Q: Did you ever feel danger to yourself?

A: When I was in China, I always carried a knife in my bag. That would allow me to commit suicide at any time should I be found by the police or agents of North Korea’s secret police.

Still remember seven-digit ID number

Q: Could you tell us in detail about life in North Korea?

A: The ship I used to enter North Korea had many people living in Japan who were making the trip to North Korea as well. When we reached the port at Chongjin, local children welcomed us by singing, “How good of you to return home.”

However, those children gave off a strange smell. I learned later that in washing their clothes they used sardine oil instead of detergent. That was the reason for the raw smell.

I remember how disappointed I was at that time after realizing what reality in North Korea was like. As we were taken by car from the port to the guesthouse where those from Japan stayed, I saw ox-driven carts from the car window. Another individual who was on the same ship looked at that and said: “What is that? It looks like some picture from a picture scroll.”

But that was the reality of North Korea.

Q: Did you become a member of the Workers’ Party?

A: I became one eight years after going to North Korea. I passed the test after memorizing the principles of the party. It is said that those from Japan normally take between 10 and 12 years to become a party member, so I think I achieved the goal rather quickly.

The party membership card came in a small notebook, and it contained my photo as well as such details as my address, place of birth, the name of the jurisdiction that registered me as a member and the seven-digit membership number.

I still remember that membership number. I kept the notebook in a leather case and always possessed it. There were occasional surprise checks, and if one did not have the notebook, it was taken away. I always had it with me, but I threw it away somewhere when I fled North Korea. If I had kept it, I would have been made right away.

Watching 'Rambo,' 'Titanic' was risking death

Q: Did you have opportunities to come in contact with foreign things?

A: I never came across foreign publications. However, I did watch “Rambo” and “Titanic” on video. To be honest, there were some government officials in North Korea who bought videos during foreign trips and then sold them in North Korea.

I acquired such videos through an acquaintance. Of course, we would be arrested if we were found to be watching such videos. We always watched late at night. We turned off all the lights in the apartment and covered the TV set with a blanket so no light would leak out. We also used headphones.

Even using such measures, there was one instance when I was caught by the secret police. Before raiding a place, they would turn off all power in the apartment building. In that way, it becomes impossible to eject the video, so we could not make any excuses. When I was arrested, I paid a bribe to get off the hook. If I had been sent to a political prison, that would have meant an end to my existence as a “human.” It would have meant receiving the same treatment as a cow or pig.

Kim family richer than petroleum barons

Q: What led to the corruption in North Korea?

A: After the ration system ended, government officials became busy accumulating wealth. I believe the reason bribery became worse was related to the end of the ration system. Be that as it may, I used bribes to continue with my business so I was able to lead a better life than others.

The reason North Korea does not develop is because of the ideology that Kim Il Sung’s teachings are absolute.

No one working in a company thinks about developing new technology. The boiler that was used at the paper manufacturing plant where I worked was old and falling apart. But we had to continue using it by replacing parts. No one thought about purchasing a new boiler or developing new equipment. That was because doing so would have led to creativity, which was considered a dangerous ideology. Such a nation cannot possibly develop economically.

Gold can still be mined in North Korea. However, it all ends up going to Kim Jong Un. That is not all. Rare earth metals are also being mined. For such reasons, that nation will not easily collapse. Although farmers do not have enough rice to eat, Kim Jong Un likely leads a life of luxury that is better than petroleum barons in the Middle East.

In order to destroy North Korea, its assets must first of all be frozen.

Discrimination causes suffering for defectors

Q: Were you able to contact family members left behind in North Korea after you defected?

A: I divorced my wife before I defected because I thought she would be placed in danger if I did not do so. I also did not have special feelings for her by then. However, I did want to meet with my two children. After I defected, I met my children on two occasions. I was able to meet with them by going to the Yalu river where I defected over. I gave my son a mobile phone which I used to contact him. I did not send money to my family.

In February or March 2006, my new wife whom I married in China cooperated, and I was able to have my son and daughter, my ex-wife, my son’s wife and children defect from North Korea. They all came through the same Yalu river. About six months later, they all arrived in Japan. They now have South Korean passports and live separately from me.

Q: Are you satisfied with your life in Japan?

A: That is a difficult question. Of course, my life is better than remaining in North Korea, which is only headed toward ruin. However, life is not easy in Japan, and there is discrimination.

I do not feel like returning to a North Korea that is headed toward ruin. However, most of the defectors who are in South Korea likely feel they want to return to North Korea.

The reason is that in South Korean society, there exists harsh discrimination toward defectors that is at a level unimaginable in Japan.

I have heard that defectors have been shocked because they always thought they would be welcomed if they went to South Korea because they were of the same ethnic race. There is a strong mood in South Korea that considers defectors to be a source of trouble.

That is the large difference between Japan and South Korea.

I can understand if defectors who come to Japan suffer discrimination. But I cannot forgive being discriminated by the same Korean people. I think defectors who went to South Korea now feel that they should have defected to Japan.

However, North Korea is rife with anti-Japanese sentiment, with the spreading of such propaganda as “Japan is barbaric. They easily kill people. The Japanese empire is the enemy.”

Anyone living in such an environment would never think about coming to Japan.

Future of the Korean Peninsula

Q: Do you think it will be difficult for the two Koreas to unify?

A: South Korea will have to become more tolerant. In their hearts, North Koreans do not hold bad feelings toward South Korea. I feel the peoples of the two nations can become friends if the nations are unified.

However, what would happen if South Korean society discriminated against North Koreans as it does now. It would not be possible to overcome the gap between the two peoples.

I feel the situation will move forward if South Korean society is able to accept North Koreans by appointing outstanding North Koreans to appropriate positions after unification.

The other point will be if North Koreans can also change. The political system will not change unless the people change. Although it may take time, my sense is that North Korea will change in about 40 years’ time.

What the Japanese government should do until then is to use nongovernmental organizations and religious groups to hand over money to those who are thinking of defecting. Giving each person about $500 would be sufficient. Even if they failed to defect and kept the money, what would be the problem?

If rumors spread that defectors would receive money, in a few years there would be a flood of defectors as though a dam had been breached.

Another possibility would be distributing DVDs about the reality of North Korea in Chinese territory that borders North Korea. Those who are given the DVDs would take them back to North Korea and pass around that information. That might lead to an even earlier collapse of North Korea.


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## Costas (Sep 25, 2014)

Romania Starts Trial of Former Gulag Boss
(Balkan Insight)
Alexandru Visinescu, the former commander of a notorious Communist-era labour camp, is facing charges of crimes against humanity in court.
Marian Chiriac, Bucharest

A Bucharest court on Wednesday started the trial of Alexandru Visinescu, a former prison commander accused of aggravated murder in the deaths of at least 12 political prisoners under the Communist regime.

This is the first trial of a head of a Communist-era lockup in Romania.

Prosecutors say Visinescu, who is now 89, was involved in beating detainees, depriving them of medical treatment and exposing them to cold. Many political prisoners, including a former diplomat and a party leader, died as a result.

Between 1956 and 1963, Visinescu ran the notorious Ramnicu Sarat prison where Romania’s pre-communist leaders and intellectual elite were incarcerated.

More than 50 years have passed since the prisoners’ deaths, but under Romanian law, there is no time limit on prosecuting serious crimes.

The widow of one detainee, General Ion Eremia, who died in 2003, asked the court for 100,000 euro in moral and financial damages. Eremia was sentenced to 14 years in prison for writing a satirical novel about the Soviet leader Stalin.

Valentin Cristea, the last survivor of the Ramnicu Sarat prison, says the trial it is important, but has comes late in the day. “It is an event I could not bear to watch … It won't recognize anything, won't remember anything," Cristea told local media.

But civic activists hope that Visinescu’s trial will be the first of many, with prosecutors looking at 35 other former Communist officials.

Two other former Communist-era jail bosses, Ioan Ficior and Florian Cormos, are also accused of causing deaths and torturing political prisoners. They both deny wrongdoing.

The last Romanian to be convicted of genocide was the former Communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu who was hurriedly tried and executed in 1989.

After decades of denial, Romania has finally started to try to punish Communist-era crimes. In April, the Romanian Institute for Investigating the Crimes of Communism, IICCMER, published a list of 35 people allegedly involved in detaining and torturing dissidents during Communist times.

Chilling details have emerged about the torments that guards inflicted on political prisoners in the gulags.

Reports have said that around 120,000 of a total of 617,000 political prisoners died in the gulags. Most were politicians, priests, writers and diplomats but some were also peasants.

The investigating committee is currently concentrating on political crimes from the early 1950s until 1964, when a general amnesty was declared.


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## Costas (Dec 18, 2014)

Στο Διεθνές Ποινικό Δικαστήριο για εγκλήματα κατά της ανθρωπότητας παραπέμπει τη Βόρεια Κορέα ο ΟΗΕ (δηλ. η ΓΣ του)


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## Costas (Dec 24, 2014)

Millions suffer as Uzbekistan deploys system of forced labour in the 2014 Uzbek cotton harvest
(Anti-Slavery.org)
14 November 2014

17 people lost their lives and millions, including children, were forced to pick cotton in the 2014 Uzbek cotton harvest in one of the largest state-sponsored systems of forced labour in the world, said the Cotton Campaign in its annual Uzbekistan cotton harvest review.

According to the report the government of Uzbekistan once again used systematic, mass forced labour to harvest cotton in 2014. In addition to coercing as many as four million people across the country to pick cotton, this forced labour system resulted in institutionalized harassment, extortion, and needless deaths.

Millions of Uzbek citizens were required to work in the cotton fields by local officials upon instructions from the very top of Uzbekistan’s hyper-centralised government. Continuing a trend started in 2012, the government reduced the number of children forced to pick cotton by increasing the forced labour burden on adults. The government did not, however, eliminate child labour.

Among the most tragic findings of the report was that some people have paid the ultimate price as a direct result of the government’s practices. In one case, a 3-year-old and a 5-year-old died in a house fire after being left alone while their mother, who could not afford to buy herself out of the harvest, went to pick cotton.

The report documents the forced mobilisation of 13-15 year old children in the Kashkadarya, Jizzakh, and Samarkand regions, especially toward the end the harvest. Despite decrees from the central government reminding local officials of the national law prohibiting child labour, when faced with the decision of whether to fulfil their central government-imposed cotton quotas or follow the law against child labour, officials sent children to the fields, knowing failure to deliver their quota would risk their jobs.

People who could not or did not want to harvest cotton had to pay for replacement workers and the government extorted mandatory payments from business to support the harvest. Parents in some schools and kindergartens were explicitly forced to pick cotton in place of their children. The government imposed harvest quotas on public institutions such as schools, hospitals, and local administrations, and required them to send up to send 30-60% of staff to the fields, a major increase over last year, seriously undermining the provision of key public services, such as health care and education.

The report is the result of evidence gathered by the network of monitors in Uzbekistan deployed by the Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights, a Cotton Campaign member.

“Cotton in Uzbekistan is produced by massive human rights violations, including forced labour, said Umida Niyazova, director of the Uzbek-German Forum. “Reducing the number of children in the fields by forcing even more adults to work against their will is not sufficient. The government needs to dismantle the forced labour system.”

Uzbekistan is the fifth largest cotton producer in the world, producing raw cotton mainly for export. The government controls every aspect of production and imposes mandatory production quotas on farmers and harvesting quotas on pickers. All cotton must be sold to the government at government-established prices..

“Teachers, doctors and nurses are needed in their communities more than in cotton fields,” said The American Federation of Labour and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFT or AFL-CIO).

“They have obligations to their students and patients as trusted professionals, and the state has an obligation to allow them to do their jobs, rather than forcing them into fields to harvest cotton. We are also very concerned about the costs these workers face to fund their participation in the cotton harvest, as well as consistent reports of deplorable working conditions and accommodations.”

With technical assistance from the International Labour Organization (ILO), the government of Uzbekistan conducted its own monitoring of efforts to eliminate the use of children under age 18 in the harvest, and the ILO praised the government’s monitoring. A number of the conclusions of that monitoring, however, were clearly contradicted by documentary evidence and eyewitness accounts collected by the Uzbek German Forum’s monitors. Again this year the authorities harassed and detained independent civil society activists and media attempting to report on the harvest.

“It’s clear from this report that Uzbekistan continues to have a serious problem with forced labor, said Nate Herman, from American Apparel and Footwear Association (AAFA).

“For this reason, many of our members have pledged not to purchase or use Uzbek cotton. We would encourage any company linked with Uzbekistan to follow that lead and look carefully into their supply chains.”

The Cotton Coalition calls on the United States government and European Union to urge the government of Uzbekistan to end its forced labour system, starting by granting the ILO unfettered access to survey forced labour and initiating agriculture sector reforms.

With the UK Government’s continues policy to promote the trade with Uzbekistan, including the latest meeting of the Uzbek-British Trade and Industry Council held in Tashkent on 7 November, the continues use of forced labour in Uzbekistan’s cotton industry puts into question the seriousness of UK government’s commitment to be a world leader in eradicating slavery.

Klara Skrivankova, Europe Programme and Advocacy Coordinator at Anti-Slavery International, said:

‘Once again the Uzbek Government forced its own citizens to pick cotton that only a narrow political elite benefits from. Let’s make it clear: it is slavery, and it is not acceptable by any standards.’

‘European governments should do more to stop these abuses. The British Government waves the flag of an anti-slavery leader, yet it continues to promote trading opportunities for British businesses in Uzbekistan. Maybe it would be taken more seriously if it stood up against a system that is based on forced labour.

‘A lot of Uzbek cotton, via China and Bangladesh, ends up on the shelves of European retailers, so businesses should also do much more to ensure that Uzbek cotton doesn’t get into their supply chains.


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## Costas (Jan 5, 2015)

(in.gr)
Την Ελλάδα θα επισκεφθεί αυτή την εβδομάδα ο γιος του προέδρου της Κούβας Ραούλ Κάστρο και ανιψιός του Φιντέλ, Αλεχάντρο Κάστρο Εσπίν, για να παραβρεθεί στο Φεστιβάλ Κουβανικού Κινηματογράφου, που διοργανώνει στην Αθήνα η New Star, σε συνεργασία με την πρεσβεία της Κούβας (8 - 14 Ιανουαρίου) για την επέτειο των 56 χρόνων της κουβανικής επανάστασης, αλλά και για να παρουσιάσει την ελληνική έκδοση του βιβλίου του «Το τίμημα της ισχύος - Η αυτοκρατορία του τρόμου», την ερχόμενη Δευτέρα, 12/1 στο Αλκυονίς New star art cinema.

Ο Αλεχάντρο Κάστρο Εσπίν είναι μηχανικός και ερευνητής σε θέματα εθνικής ασφάλειας και άμυνας.

Κατά τη διάρκεια της παραμονής του στην Ελλάδα, θα συναντηθεί με εκπροσώπους της τοπικής αυτοδιοίκησης, με τον Μίκη Θεοδωράκη, θα δώσει διάλεξη σε μεταπτυχιακούς φοιτητές στο Πάντειο Πανεπιστήμιο (13/1), ενώ θα επισκεφθεί ιστορικούς χώρους και μουσεία, μεταξύ των οποίων η γέφυρα του Γοργοπόταμου, το πρώην ΕΑΤ- ΕΣΑ, το Μουσείο Μακρονήσου, το Μουσείο Θερμοπυλών, το Χάνι της Γραβιάς κ.ά.

Το πρόγραμμά του περιλαμβάνει επίσης επισκέψεις σε Ηράκλειο, Άργος, Ναύπλιο, Λαμία, Επίδαυρο.

Την Παρασκευή 9 Ιανουαρίου θα διεξαχθεί στο Studio εκδήλωση διεθνιστικής αλληλεγγύης, παρουσία του Αλεχάντρο Κάστρο, ενώ στη συνέχεια θα προβληθεί η ταινία Kangamba (2008), με θέμα τη διεθνιστική αλληλεγγύη της Κούβας στην Αγκόλα, στην οποία συμμετείχε εθελοντικά και ο ίδιος.

Το Φεστιβάλ Κουβανικού Κινηματογράφου θα διεξαχθεί στον κινηματογράφο Studio, θα προβληθούν 26 ταινίες και ντοκιμαντέρ. Διοργανώνεται σε συνεργασία με το Ινστιτούτο Τέχνης και Κινηματογραφικής Βιομηχανίας της Κούβας (ICAIC).

Εκλογές θα κάνετε; Πάνε 55 χρόνια που κυβερνάτε, νισάφι! Εδώ έχουμε εκλογές κάθε τέσσερα δυο χρόνια...


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## Costas (Jan 14, 2015)

North Koreans Walk Across Frozen Border River to Murder Chinese
(Bloomberg)
The violence reflects a growing desperation among soldiers, including border guards, since Kim Jong Un took over as supreme leader in Pyongyang three years ago. As well as seeking food, they are entering China to steal money.


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## Costas (Jan 19, 2015)

Σχετικό με μια ανάρτηση στο νήμα Σοβιετικά (προτού ανοίξω το παρόν νήμα):

Prominent North Korean Defector Recants Parts of His Story of Captivity
(CHOE SANG-HUN / NYT)

SEOUL, South Korea — He was the poster boy for human rights atrocities in North Korea; a soft-spoken survivor of the North’s cruel gulags who eventually met such dignitaries as John Kerry in his campaign to focus attention on the North’s abuses. His harrowing tales of life in a prison camp — including being forced to watch his mother and brother being executed — stunned even those steeped in defectors’ stories and made him a star witness for an unprecedented United Nations’ investigation of abuses by the North’s rulers.

Now, that survivor, Shin Dong-hyuk, is retracting central facts of his life story, memorialized in a 2012 book, “Escape from Camp 14,” by a former Washington Post reporter that has been published in 27 languages.

Mr. Shin, who gives his age as 32, now says that the key fact that set him apart from other defectors — that he and his family had been incarcerated at a prison that no one expected to leave alive — was only partly true, and that he actually served most of his time in the less brutal Camp 18. He also said that the torture he endured as a teenager, instead happened years later and was meted out for very different reasons.

Mr. Shin’s confession has raised fears among other prison camp survivors and South Korean human rights activists that it could stall an already difficult campaign by the United States and other nations to get the Security Council to push for an investigation at the International Criminal Court. Other camp survivors also testified before the United Nations investigators, recounting being tortured and starved, but activists worry that Mr. Shin’s recanting will help China and other North Korea supporters fight against opening a court case.

In a twist, Mr. Shin’s story began to unravel because of his fame — and his success in helping push for the United Nations inquiry. Increasingly angry over the push for accountability at the United Nations, North Korea posted a nearly 10-minute video in October, called “Lie and Truth,” exposing what it called Mr. Shin’s many lies. The video was laced with propaganda for the brutal police state, but it also included an interview with his father, who was recognized by another defector, a woman who had served time at Camp 18.

She and other defectors then began to talk quietly with a handful of South Korean reporters about their suspicions that Mr. Shin and his family had never served time at the harsher camp in what is known as a “total-control zone.” As questions mounted, Mr. Shin came under increasing pressure to defend his story.

On Friday, he confessed to the author of “Escape from Camp 14,” Blaine Harden, and confirmed his retractions Sunday in a phone interview with The New York Times.

“I am sorry to a lot of people,” Mr. Shin said by telephone from the United States, where he recently married a Korean-American woman. “I knew I could hide it no longer, but I dithered because friends feared the damage my coming out might do to the movement for North Korean human rights.”

A post on his Facebook page urged his supporters to fight on to expose North Korea’s treatment of its people.

“For my family, for the suffering political prisoners, for the suffering North Korean people, each of you still have a voice and an ability to fight for us and against this evil regime,” the post says, adding that he may no longer be able to carry on his own campaign.

It is difficult to overestimate the influence Mr. Shin has had in the long effort to bring international attention to rights abuses in the North. Activists have long contended that the United States and others mainly ignored the abuses and focused instead on the external threat posed by the North’s growing nuclear arsenal.

In December 2012, Mr. Shin, together with another gulag survivor, took part in a meeting with then-United Nations human rights chief Navi Pillay in her Geneva office, according to Rupert Colville, who had served as her spokesman. Ms. Pillay cited the survivors’ accounts the next month when she publicly urged stronger international action against North Korea and the creation of an international inquiry into human rights conditions.

After the commission issued its scathing report, Mr. Shin appeared with Mr. Kerry at an unusual event on the sidelines of the General Assembly in which Mr. Kerry, too, added his voice to efforts to draw attention to human rights in North Korea.

Brad Adams, Asia director for Human Rights Watch, said Sunday that Mr. Shin’s change of heart did not diminish the findings of the yearlong United Nations inquiry, which relied on the testimony of 80 witnesses and more than 240 confidential interviews with victims and other witnesses who would not speak publicly for fear of reprisals.

“The commission report is air tight with or without Shin,” Mr. Adams said.

In a phone interview, Michael Kirby, the Australian judge who led the United Nations investigation, noted that the “commission deals with very serious abuses of human rights that go back over 70 years.”

In his revised account, Mr. Shin stuck to many of the key details he gave to the United Nations Commission of Inquiry.

Mr. Shin’s story, which he repeated many times in recent years, was remarkable. He said he was born and grew up at Camp 14 — a sprawling cluster of villages in mountains north of the North Korean capital, Pyongyang, surviving hunger and torture until he miraculously escaped in 2005, at 22, by crawling over the body of a dead friend electrocuted by a fence surrounding the camp.

He was the first North Korean who claimed to have escaped from a prison camp in the North. More than a dozen other camp survivors have escaped to South Korea, but all had been freed after serving terms in prisons that are used for re-education as well as punishment.

Among his more gruesome tales, Mr. Shin had said sadistic prison guards dangled him over a fire when they suspected him of plotting to escape with his family and chopped off a finger tip when he dropped a sewing machine. He now says the guards actually hurt him because he had escaped from Camp 18 and been caught.

The Washington Post first reported Mr. Shin’s revisions.

On Sunday, Mr. Harden declined to be interviewed, but in a statement he provided to The Times he said that Mr. Shin said he had not realized that changing the details of his story for the book would be a problem.

“I didn’t want to tell exactly what happened in order not to relive these painful moments,” the statement quoted Mr. Shin as saying.

It is difficult to verify the accounts of North Korean defectors because the country is so isolated. In an email Sunday, Mr. Harden said he had stressed in his book that Mr. Shin could be an unreliable narrator of his life.

When asked if copies of the book would be pulled from stores, a spokeswoman for Penguin Books, said that “we are working with the author on an accurate understanding of the facts.”

Mr. Shin’s latest account has raised its own questions. He now says he escaped Camp 18 twice, in 1999 and 2001, was caught both times, and eventually handed to the infamous Camp 14.

“He is still lying,” said a North Korean defector who said he was in Camp 18, speaking on condition of anonymity because he has family in the North. “You just cannot escape a North Korean prison camp twice, as he said he did, and is still alive and manages to escape a third time, this time from the total-control zone.”

During a phone interview Sunday, Mr. Shin cited “great mental stress” while declining to explain how he escaped so many times from heavily guarded camps.

Another former inmate, Chung Kwang-il, said he could not understand why Mr. Shin lied.

“Without saying he was from Camp 14, he had remarkable stories to tell, a good witness to North Korean human rights abuse,” he said. “I guess he somehow thought he needed a more dramatic story to attract attention.”
Correction: January 19, 2015

_Because of a transcription error, an earlier version of this article included a quotation by a former inmate of North Korean prison camps that referred incorrectly to the camp where Shin Dong-hyuk originally said he served most of his time, but then recanted. It was the more brutal Camp 14, not Camp 18._

Reporting was contributed by Nick Cumming-Bruce from Geneva, Alexandra Alter and Somini Sengupta from New York, and Michelle Innis from Sydney, Australia.


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## Costas (Mar 13, 2015)

jibaro, το παράνομο...φιλέτο

Επιστροφή στη «νέα» Κούβα
Πηγή: The Associated Press
(Καθημερινή)
_Η Anita Snow, δημοσιογράφος στο Associated Press και πρώην ανταποκρίτρια στην Κούβα επί σειρά ετών, επιστρέφει στη χώρα μετά από έξι χρόνια και διηγείται τη σημερινή εμπειρία της. Τι έχει μεσολαβήσει; Η κοινή ανακοίνωση για τη βελτίωση των σχέσεων Κούβας και ΗΠΑ και η επακόλουθη χαλάρωση των εκατέρωθεν περιορισμών που γέννησαν... ελπίδες.
_
Περνώντας από το τελωνείο με μια βαλίτσα αξίας 60 δολαρίων, γεμάτη με ρούχα και ηλεκτρονικά για φίλους, το στομάχι μου σφίχτηκε όταν με πλησίασε μια γυναίκα με πράσινη στολή. Εχοντας υπάρξει ανταποκρίτρια στη χώρα για πολλά έτη και επιστρέφοντας μετά από έξι χρόνια, νόμιζα ότι ήξερα τι επρόκειτο να ακολουθήσει: θα μου έψαχναν τη βαλίτσα οι στρατιώτες, θα με κατσάδιαζαν, μπορεί να μου έβαζαν και κάποιο πρόστιμο. Αντ’ αυτού, μου έδωσαν απλώς το πάσο. «Πέρασε, αγάπη μου», μου χαμογέλασε η ένστολη γυναίκα δείχνοντάς μου την έξοδο. «Πήγαινε δεξιά επάνω».

Αυτή ήταν η πρώτη ένδειξη της πιο χαλαρής και ελπιδοφόρας ατμόσφαιρας που βρήκα στη διάρκεια της πρόσφατης σύντομης επίσκεψής μου στην Αβάνα, μια αίσθηση που δεν υπήρχε το διάστημα της δεκαετούς θητείας μου εδώ από το 1999 έως το 2009, οπότε κυριαρχούσαν το άγχος και η απομόνωση. Οι μεταρρυθμίσεις που γίνονται υπό την προεδρία του Ραούλ Κάστρο φαίνεται πως μετατρέπουν την Κούβα σταδιακά σε μια νέα χώρα. Οπουδήποτε κι αν πήγα στην Αβάνα, υπήρχαν υψηλές προσδοκίες για ακόμη περισσότερες αλλαγές, ενώ μετά την κοινή ανακοίνωση της 17ης Δεκεμβρίου, οπότε Κούβα και ΗΠΑ δήλωσαν ότι θα έχουν στο εξής καλύτερες σχέσεις, οι Κουβανοί ελπίζουν να αυξηθούν οι αφίξεις Αμερικανών τουριστών στη χώρα τους.

Οταν ζούσα εδώ ως Αμερικανίδα δημοσιογράφος, ήμουν υπό στενή παρακολούθηση, ενώ ειδικά τα πρώτα χρόνια επικρατούσε έντονη καχυποψία προς το πρόσωπό μου. Δεν θα ξεχάσω όταν ένας ένστολος πράκτορας απαίτησε να μπει στο διαμέρισμά μου στην Παλιά Αβάνα για να βεβαιωθεί ότι δεν διέθετα την επικίνδυνη συσκευή που λέγεται φαξ. Συγχρόνως, παρόλο που οι δρόμοι της πόλης είχαν λίγη κίνηση και περιορισμένη εμπορική δραστηριότητα, σε κάθε γωνία υπήρχαν μέλη της Εθνικής Επαναστατικής Πολιτοφυλακής, τα οποία ασφαλώς δεν χαμογελούσαν.

Ως ξένη με πρόσβαση στο δολάριο, οι συνθήκες ζωής μου ήταν καλύτερες από ό,τι του μέσου Κουβανού. Κανείς όμως δεν μπορούσε να γλιτώσει από όλες τις δυσκολίες που εξακολουθούσαν να υπάρχουν μετά την «ειδική περίοδο» της δεκαετίας του ’90 - περίοδο οικονομικής λιτότητας μετά την απώλεια των σοβιετικών επιδοτήσεων.

Τα «μπλακ άουτ» διαρκούσαν ώρες, προκαλώντας αϋπνίες και πνιγηρές καλοκαιρινές νύχτες χωρίς κλιματισμό, αλλά και κάνοντας αδύνατο το μπάνιο στα κτίρια όπου ο ηλεκτρισμός ήταν απαραίτητος για να φτάσει το νερό στα διαμερίσματα ή καταστρέφοντας όλα τα τρόφιμα στα ψυγεία. Επίσης, υπήρχαν ελλείψεις σε βασικά αγαθά, όπως στο χαρτί υγείας και στα αυγά.

Επιστρέφοντας όμως σήμερα στην Αβάνα, δεν είδα ούτε τις ιερόδουλες (jineteras) που συναντούσες στην παραλιακή Malecοn και στις εισόδους ξενοδοχείων ή ντόπιους να ζητούν λεφτά ή οτιδήποτε άλλο, ούτε όμως και τόση αστυνομία σε κάθε γωνιά του δρόμου.

Τα κτίρια της πρωτεύουσας, ορισμένα εκ των οποίων μετρούν περισσότερους από δύο αιώνες ζωής, παραμένουν παραμελημένα, «ζητώντας» ένα χέρι βάψιμο, και σε ορισμένες περιπτώσεις οι προσόψεις καταρρέουν. Επικίνδυνες «συστάδες» μπλεγμένων ηλεκτρικών και τηλεφωνικών καλωδίων εξακολουθούν να διαπερνούν στενά δρομάκια με λακκούβες. Αλλά την ίδια στιγμή τα τουριστικά λεωφορεία παρκάρουν στο ανατολικό άκρο της Malecοn και οι τουρίστες κατακλύζουν τις πλατείες αποικιακής αρχιτεκτονικής της Αβάνας, ενώ σε αντίθεση με το παρελθόν πλέον οι δρόμοι είναι φωταγωγημένοι.

Η πλειονότητα των κατοίκων εξακολουθούν να εργάζονται για την κυβέρνηση, κερδίζοντας περί τα 20 δολάρια το μήνα -περίπου το ίδιο ποσό έπαιρναν και έξι χρόνια πριν-, και όλοι λαμβάνουν επιδοτήσεις για φαγητό, στέγαση, υπηρεσίες κοινής ωφέλειας και μετακίνηση. Ορισμένοι προσπαθούν να επιβιώσουν κάνοντας και δεύτερη δουλειά ή ζουν «στα... άκρα» ενισχύοντας το βασικό τους εισόδημα με την πώληση αγαθών που κλέβουν από τους χώρους εργασίας τους ή προϊόντων από αυτά που τους αναλογούν κάθε μήνα για φαγητό.

Κουβανοί με δικές τους επιχειρήσεις υποστηρίζουν ότι οι μεταρρυθμίσεις που γίνονται είναι ό,τι πρέπει για να αρχίσουν να ανακάμπτουν. Ο Jean Barrionuebo, για παράδειγμα, που δούλευε παράνομα ως ταξιτζής για έξι χρόνια, προτού καταφέρει να πάρει άδεια τα τελευταία δύο, μου είπε ότι στη συνεχή προσπάθειά του να αποφύγει τα πρόστιμα είχε γίνει αντιπαραγωγικός. «Εμείς οι Κουβανοί θα ήμασταν τρελοί αν δεν θέλαμε να σταματήσει αυτή η σύγκρουση με τις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες», λέει ο ίδιος, ενώ οδηγεί ένα ρωσικής προέλευσης Moskvitch Sedan, το οποίο αγόρασε αφού πούλησε το διαμέρισμα που κληρονόμησε από τους γονείς του. «Αυτή η σύγκρουση διήρκεσε 56 χρόνια και οι Κουβανοί ήταν αυτοί που πλήρωσαν το κόστος».

Η βελτίωση των σχέσεων μεταξύ Κούβας και ΗΠΑ έφερε στο προσκήνιο το ζήτημα των ανθρωπίνων δικαιωμάτων τόσο για τους Αμερικανούς αξιωματούχους όσο και για τους ακτιβιστές, αλλά οι περισσότεροι Κουβανοί με τους οποίους μίλησα φάνηκε να τους απασχολεί πολύ περισσότερο το θέμα των χρημάτων και της συντήρησης των οικογενειών τους. Και οι περισσότεροι παλιοί φίλοι και γνωστοί που συνάντησα μου φάνηκε να περνούν καλύτερα -ή τουλάχιστον όχι χειρότερα- από ό,τι πριν.

Οι οικονομικές αλλαγές που είδα είναι όλες αποτέλεσμα των μεταρρυθμίσεων στις οποίες προχώρησε ο Ραούλ Κάστρο μετά την ανάληψη της προεδρίας από τον άρρωστο αδερφό του Φιντέλ στις αρχές του 2008. Το πρώτο πράγμα που έκανε ήταν να δώσει τέλος στο «τουριστικό απαρτχάιντ» που εμπόδιζε τους Κουβανούς να μένουν σε ξενοδοχεία που προορίζονταν για τους ξένους. Στη συνέχεια άρθηκαν οι απαγορεύσεις σχετικά με την πώληση ιδιωτικών κατοικιών και αυτοκινήτων και χορηγήθηκαν άδειες για ιδιωτικά ταξί. Επίσης η κυβέρνηση κατάργησε τη «λευκή κάρτα» που απαιτούνταν για δεκαετίες να βγάζουν οι Κουβανοί ακόμη και για να πάνε διακοπές - επιτρέποντας επιτέλους την ελεύθερη έξοδο από τη χώρα.

Η έμπορος επίπλων Elia Rodriguez παρατηρεί ότι οι Κουβανοί έχουν αρχίσει να ενδιαφέρονται περισσότερο για τον εξοπλισμό των χώρων τους. «Ολοι θέλουν να έχουν ωραία σπίτια», λέει η ίδια υποδεχόμενη συγχρόνως μια ομάδα πελατών. Επίσης, συνειδητοποίησε ότι έχουν τρία ολόκληρα χρόνια να περάσουν για έλεγχο επιθεωρητές, που στο παρελθόν «ξεσκόνιζαν» κάθε μήνα περίπου τα βιβλία της επιχείρησης.

Οι πρώτες ιδιωτικές επιχειρήσεις που επιτράπηκαν από την κυβέρνηση τη δεκαετία του ’90 ήταν μεταξύ άλλων οικογενειακά εστιατόρια, τα λεγόμενα paladars. Ευρισκόμενα μέσα στα σπίτια, σαν καλά κρυμμένα μυστικά, διέθεταν αυστηρά μέχρι 12 καρέκλες και απαγορευόταν διά νόμου να πωλούν σκληρά ποτά και «ακριβά» εδέσματα, όπως γαρίδες, αστακό και μοσχαρίσιο κρέας. Σε ένα από αυτά συνήθιζα να πηγαίνω με τους φίλους μου και να παραγγέλνουμε ένα «jibaro», όπως ήταν η κωδική ονομασία του παράνομου φιλέτου.

Σήμερα λειτουργούν στην Αβάνα εκατοντάδες εστιατόρια από ιδιώτες που σερβίρουν οποιοδήποτε φαγητό ή ποτό θέλουν, αρκεί να μπορούν να αποδείξουν ότι το έχουν προμηθευτεί νόμιμα. Μπορούν ακόμη να εξυπηρετούν απεριόριστο αριθμό πελατών και να διαφημίζονται.
Στις αρχές της δεκαετίας του ’90 λειτούργησαν επίσης οι πρώτες αγορές αγροτικών προϊόντων, τις τιμές των οποίων όριζαν οι ίδιοι οι προμηθευτές, με βασική προϋπόθεση να εξασφαλίζεται ότι οι άνθρωποι εν μέσω οικονομικής κρίσης θα μπορούσαν να τα αγοράσουν.

Πηγαίνοντας ξανά σήμερα στην αγορά της 19ης Οδού, βρήκα λιγότερους προμηθευτές, αλλά μεγαλύτερη ποικιλία: μπρόκολα και κουνουπίδια, γλυκοπατάτες, λάχανα, μελιτζάνες και ξερά φασόλια. Την ίδια στιγμή όμως που τα προϊόντα είναι φθηνά για τους ξένους, εξακολουθούν να είναι ακριβά για τους περισσότερους Κουβανούς, οι οποίοι διαλέγουν προσεκτικά μονάχα τα απολύτως απαραίτητα, όπως λίγα κρεμμύδια και σπιτική σάλτσα τομάτας. Σε κάθε περίπτωση, πάντως, δεν είναι λίγες οι επιχειρήσεις που έχουν ανοίξει στον ίδιο δρόμο: ένας πάγκος με χυμούς, μια μικρή πιτσαρία, ένα κατάστημα που πουλάει δερμάτινα πορτοφόλια και ρουστίκ μεταλλικές κούπες για καφέ. Επίσης καινούργιοι είναι ο επιδιορθωτής ρολογιών, ο υδραυλικός και ο κλειδαράς.

Μέσα στη σκεπαστή αγορά, ο Leonardo Santos, 51 ετών, πουλάει κομματάκια καρύδας για 35 σεντς, ακριβώς κάτω από ένα μπλε πλακάτ που έγραφε «Το όνομά μου είναι Σάντος» στα Αγγλικά, απευθυνόμενο στους Αμερικανούς τουρίστες που περνούν από εκεί. 

Ο Radames Betancourt, στα 81 του σήμερα, συνέχισε να κάνει μικρά χαμαλίκια έναντι φιλοδωρήματος. Ο ίδιος, μόλις με αναγνώρισε, μου χαμογέλασε και το πρόσωπό του φωτίστηκε, ενώ δεν παρέλειψε να μου πει πόσο ενθουσιασμένος είναι με την προοπτική της βελτίωσης των σχέσεων Κούβας και ΗΠΑ, και των ολοένα και περισσότερων Αμερικανών που θα καταφτάσουν στο νησί του: «Αφήστε τους να έρθουν. Τόσα χρόνια τούς περιμένουμε».


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## nickel (May 13, 2015)

Συνεχίζεται η βρομερή δυτική προπαγάνδα εναντίον του ηγέτη της Βόρειας Κορέας:

North Korea's Defence Minister Hyon Yong-chol has been executed for showing disloyalty to leader Kim Jong-un, South Korea's spy agency has told parliament.
MPs were told Mr Hyon was killed on 30 April by anti-aircraft fire in front of an audience of hundreds, the Yonhap news agency reports.
It said Mr Hyon had fallen asleep during an event attended by Kim Jong-un and had not carried out instructions.
The news comes weeks after the reported execution of 15 senior officials. [...]
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-32716749


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## Costas (May 13, 2015)

Άλλη μια είδηση που είναι "φως φανάρι" πως είναι μούφα...


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## Marinos (May 13, 2015)

Mr Hyon was killed on 30 April by anti-aircraft fire in front of an audience of hundreds

Εγώ είμαι σίγουρος ότι το συγκεκριμένο είναι μούφα (αν κατάλαβα καλά τη σπόντα). Κάτι μάθαμε από τόσα σκυλιά.


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## Costas (May 13, 2015)

Το σκεπτικό μου είναι το εξής: όσο τραβηγμένη κι αν είναι μια είδηση, λόγω της ακόμα πιο τραβηγμένης φύσης του καθεστώτος καμία δεν μπορεί να αποκλειστεί με βεβαιότητα με βάση το τι είναι "εύλογο". Κάτι μάθαμε από τόσα φουρνισμένα πτώματα, από τόσους τόνους μαλλιά και χρυσά δόντια.


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## SBE (May 14, 2015)

Αυτές οι εκτελέσεις μου θυμίζουν λίγο ταινίες Τζέημς Μποντ, που αντί να τον καθαρίσει ο κακός τον ήρωα με μια σφαίρα στο κεφάλι, να είναι βέβαιο το αποτέλεσμα, τον δένει σ' ένα τραπέζι και βάζει το λέιζερ που θα τον κόψει/ ράψει (να μην έχουμε αίματα) να έρθει από την άλλη άκρη του δωματίου με ρυθμό χελώνας. Και φεύγει και τον αφήνει μόνο του, επίσης.


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## nickel (May 14, 2015)

Αλλάζει γνώμη η Σεούλ σχετικά με την εκτέλεση με αντιαεροπορικά πυρά του υπουργού Άμυνας της Βορείου Κορέας επειδή αποκοιμήθηκε.
Οι υπηρεσίες πληροφοριών της χώρας λένε τώρα ότι ο Χιόν Γιονγκ Τσολ απομακρύνθηκε από τη θέση του, αλλά δεν είναι σίγουρο ότι εκτελέστηκε.
Την Πέμπτη, η υπηρεσία πληροφοριών της Νοτίου Κορέας δήλωσε ότι δεν έχει καταφέρει να επιβεβαιώσει εάν ο υπουργός Άμυνας της χώρας όντως εκτελέστηκε.
Η είδηση είχε δει το φως της δημοσιότητας στη διάρκεια συνεδρίασης κοινοβουλευτικής επιτροπής την Τετάρτη, όπου η υπηρεσία πληροφοριών άφησε να εννοηθεί ότι ίσως είχε εκτελεστεί με αντιαεροπορικά πυρά.
Ωστόσο, την Πέμπτη η νοτιοκορεατική υπηρεσία NIS ανέφερε ότι η εκτέλεση δεν έχει επιβεβαιωθεί. Η είδηση είχε προλάβει να κάνει τον γύρο του κόσμου.
«Ο Χιόν έχει καρατομηθεί» ανέφερε εκπρόσωπος του NIS στο Γαλλικό Πρακτορείο Ειδήσεων. «Και υπάρχουν πληροφορίες ότι μπορεί να εκτελέστηκε, αλλά αυτό δεν έχει ακόμα επιβεβαιωθεί» τόνισε.
http://news.in.gr/world/article/?aid=1231407804

Καρατομήθηκε; Δηλαδή πώς καρατομήθηκε; 
Η χρήση ρήματος με κυριολεκτική και μεταφορική σημασία σε θέση μπαλώματος;;;

Όσο για τη διατύπωσή μου στο #54, δεν ήταν για να ειρωνευτώ μέλος του φόρουμ, αλλά για να δείξω τη θέση μου απέναντι σ' αυτή τη διελκυστίνδα προπαγάνδας. Από τη στιγμή που ένας κοκοβιός σαν τον Κιμ Γιονγκ Ουν έχει τη δύναμη που έχει πάνω σ' έναν λαό, η απέχθειά μου προς το καθεστώς του βρίσκεται ήδη στο 100%. Το τι κάνει αποκεί και πέρα είναι 50 αποχρώσεις της 100% απέχθειας.


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## nickel (May 21, 2015)

*Επιστροφή στους «αγρούς του θανάτου»
*Νατάσα Μπαστέα | Τα Νέα 20/05/2015 |

Τα κρανία είναι τοποθετημένα στη σειρά πίσω από το τζάμι. Κεριά καίνε στα σκαλιά αυτού του μαυσωλείου. Απ' έξω, σε μια περιοχή όπου είχαν βρεθεί πολλοί μαζικοί τάφοι, μπορεί κάποιος να εντοπίσει ακόμη κομμάτια από ανθρώπινα οστά, κυρίως μετά την εποχή των μουσώνων. Οι τουρίστες φωτογραφίζονται δίπλα από μια μεγάλη ταμπέλα που δείχνει πως χιλιάδες άνθρωποι οδηγήθηκαν κάποτε στον θάνατο σε αυτό το μέρος όπου χτυπούσαν τα κεφάλια των παιδιών πάνω σε αυτό που ονομαζόταν «δέντρο του θανάτου».

Πριν από 40 χρόνια ξεκινούσε η φρίκη για τους χιλιάδες που κατέληξαν σε αυτό το στρατόπεδο εξόντωσης στο Τσουνγκ Εκ, στα περίχωρα της Πνομ Πεν στην Καμπότζη. Στις 17 Απριλίου 1975, οι Ερυθροί Χμερ κατέλαβαν την πρωτεύουσα και άρχισαν να διώχνουν τους κατοίκους των μεγάλων πόλεων σε μια εκστρατεία υποδούλωσης και μαζικών δολοφονιών που κόστισε τη ζωή σε τουλάχιστον δύο εκατομμύρια ανθρώπους - το 1/4 του πληθυσμού της Καμπότζης. Τώρα σε αυτό τον «αγρό του θανάτου», οι επιζώντες από τον τετράχρονο τρόμο βρέθηκαν δίπλα σε μοναχούς με πορτοκαλί ρούχα για να αποδώσουν φόρο τιμής στους νεκρούς.

Ανάμεσά τους η Τίρι Σενγκ, οι γονείς της οποίας δολοφονήθηκαν από τους Ερυθρούς Χμερ. Πιστεύει ότι κάτι λείπει. «Αυτό δεν είναι ένα μέρος ελπίδας» λέει καθώς το πλήθος διαλύεται. «Είναι ένα μέρος που μιλά για το παρελθόν αλλά χρειάζεται να κάνουμε κάτι περισσότερο. Δεν υπάρχει λύτρωση στον τρόπο που θυμόμαστε». Είναι μια υπενθύμιση της ανοιχτής πληγής που άφησαν τα χρόνια των Χμερ στην Καμπότζη, η οποία παραμένει μια από τις πιο φτωχές χώρες στην ευρύτερη περιοχή.

Ποτέ δεν έγινε προσπάθεια συμφιλίωσης ή αποδοχής της αλήθειας, όπως έγινε για παράδειγμα στη Νότια Αφρική ώστε να αντιμετωπισθεί το απαρτχάιντ. Ούτε υπήρξε πλήρης πολιτική αλλαγή. Ο Χουν Σεν που βρίσκεται στην πρωθυπουργία επί 30 χρόνια είναι ένα πρώην διοικητής των Ερυθρών Χμερ που αυτομόλησε. Οι δίκες των υπευθύνων για τις σφαγές έχουν αρχίσει εδώ και εννέα χρόνια από ένα ειδικό δικαστήριο που μέχρι στιγμής έχει εκδώσει μόνο τρεις καταδικαστικές αποφάσεις διοικητών που είχαν διατάξει μαζικές δολοφονίες - σε ισόβια κάθειρξη.

Η Σενγκ έχει απογοητευθεί από τη δικαιοσύνη, καθώς λέει πως οι επιζήσαντες δεν έχουν συμπεριληφθεί στη διαδικασία. Και θεωρεί πως δεν μπορεί το δικαστήριο να δέχεται ότι ο κατηγορούμενος «μπορεί να παραμείνει σιωπηλός» όπως σε μια οποιαδήποτε άλλη δίκη. «Δεν θέλω αυτοί οι μπάσταρδοι να παραμείνουν σιωπηλοί, λυπάμαι» λέει οργισμένη. Πριν από δέκα χρόνια έγραψε ένα βιβλίο με μαρτυρίες για τις σφαγές με τίτλο «Κόρη των αγρών του θανάτου». Οι μαρτυρίες προέρχονται κυρίως από ξένους που ζούσαν στην Καμπότζη. Οι ντόπιοι δυσκολεύονταν να μιλήσουν. Ακόμη και τώρα δεν μιλούν. Κι έτσι όσοι χάθηκαν στους «αγρούς του θανάτου» ακόμη δεν έχουν βρει λύτρωση.


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