Την ίδια ώρα, στην Κίνα...

Απονομή του Βραβείου Λέμκιν στον Yang Jisheng (Γιανγκ Τζισένγκ), συγγραφέα του βιβλίου Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine 1958-1962, και η σχετική διάλεξη του Guo Jian (University of Wisconsin-Whitewater), China’s Gulag Archipelago: Yang Jisheng’s Investigative Study of the Great Leap Forward Famine, 1958-1962. Αν είστε στη Νέα Υόρκη, πεταχτείτε! :)

The Institute for the Study of Genocide and the Cardozo School of Law Program in Holocaust, Genocide, and Human Rights at Yeshiva University invite the public to attend:

2013 Lemkin Award and Lecture:
Yang Jisheng, the author of Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine 1958-1962

Lecture: Guo Jian (University of Wisconsin-Whitewater)
China’s Gulag Archipelago: Yang Jisheng’s Investigative Study of the Great Leap Forward Famine, 1958-1962

Presentation and comments:

Joyce Apsel (New York University)
Sheri P. Rosenberg (Cardozo Law School)
Ernesto Verdeja (University of Notre Dame)

Location: Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law
55 Fifth Avenue, Third Floor Lounge, New York, NY
Time: Thursday, October 24; 6:00 PM-
Please RSVP to [email protected]
 
(China change)
Dr. Wang Bingzhang (王炳章) was among the first Chinese sent overseas by the Chinese government to study science and technology in late 1970s when Deng Xiaoping opened up China. He was the very first Chinese to obtain a PhD (in medicine) when he graduated from McGill University in Canada in 1982. Upon graduation, he announced that he would devote himself to a democratic movement to change China. He founded the first overseas democratic league, and worked with activists overseas as well as inside China in the pre-Internet era. In 2002, he was kidnapped in Vietnam by the Chinese government, and in 2003, he was sentenced to life in prison (New York Times‘ coverage). He has been kept in solitary confinement since. On June 27, the 11th anniversary of his kidnapping, his family launched a global campaign to free him. As part of the campaign, Dr. Wang Juntao (王军涛), a leader of Chinese democratic movement overseas and a leader of the 1989 democratic movement in Beijing, has staged a protest called “In Prison with Dr. Wang Bingzhang” to demand the release of Dr. Wang. On September 15, the International Democracy Day, a large demonstration will be held in front of the Chinese Consulate in New York. On October 7, a 7-day hunger strike will commence in front of the UN to demand investigation into Chinese government’s inhumane treatment of Dr. Wang.

Contact information:
Wang Mei, sister of Dr. Wang Bingzhang: 1-650-521-1774, Dr. Wang Juntao: 1-347-705-3789.
To learn more about Dr. Wang Bingzhang, visit wangbingzhang.org, website maintained by his youngest child Ti-Anna Wang (王天安).
 
(WSJ)
Peking University's Purge
Western partners of China's top university ignore its persecution of a political professor.


Chinese democracy advocate Xia Yeliang has suffered police interrogations, detentions, a period of house arrest, even harassment by as many as 50 silent phone calls in the middle of the night. Now the professor of economics at the country's most prestigious school, Peking University, may lose his job. This summer Prof. Xia learned that administrators planned a vote of the faculty to revoke his
tenure.

Meanwhile a growing list of Western universities have lined up joint degree programs, research centers and teaching exchanges at Peking University. Those institutions are keeping mum on Prof. Xia's case.

One exception is Wellesley College in Massachusetts, where last month more than 130 professors (40% of the faculty) criticized Peking University for targeting the professor "based solely on his political and philosophical views." In June, Wellesley formally partnered with Peking University, announcing plans for research collaboration and exchanges of faculty and students. The protesting Wellesley profs consider Prof. Xia a colleague and argue that his fair treatment should be a condition of continued cooperation.

In 2008 Prof. Xia was among the first signatories of Charter 08, the democracy manifesto for which his friend Liu Xiaobo, the Nobel Peace laureate, now sits in prison. In 2009 he called for the end of government censorship in an open letter to Communist Party propaganda chief Liu Yunshan, now one of seven Politburo Standing Committee members who call the shots in Beijing. And more recently he has used his microblog to criticize President Xi Jinping's campaign against constitutional government.

The good sense of the Wellesley faculty is particularly notable next to the silence of other schools with significant Peking University partnerships. They include the University of California, Penn State, the University of Chicago, the University of Pennsylvania, Columbia University, Cornell University, the University of Michigan, the University of Toronto, the London School of Economics, Seoul National University, Waseda University and the University of Tokyo.

Stanford University is an especially interesting case: It hosted Prof. Xia as a visiting fellow this summer and operates the Stanford Center at Peking University. Stanford's website brags that the research and teaching facility "breaks new ground in U.S.-Sino cooperation."

Stanford would break more ground if it joined with Wellesley in denouncing the treatment of their Chinese colleague.
 
(NYT)
Busting China’s Bloggers
Murong Xuecun

BEIJING — A frequent topic of conversation among my friends here has been: Who will be arrested next?

Some of us met recently for dinner and started a list of potential candidates. We included outspoken scholars, writers and lawyers who have discussed democracy and freedom, criticized the government and spoken out for the disadvantaged.

Some of my dinner companions nominated themselves for the list. We agreed that the social critic Xiao Shu (the pen name of Chen Min) and Guo Yushan, a friend of the blind lawyer Chen Guangcheng (now in the United States), should top the list. I’m right behind them.

Almost of all of us are active microbloggers. Some of us qualify as Big V, the widely used label for influential bloggers with millions of followers. (V stands for “verified account.”) It is our online activism that makes us prime targets of the government.

In August, the authorities launched the most severe round yet in their “campaign against cybercrime.” Ostensibly to curtail online “rumors,” they are rounding up and jailing outspoken netizens across the country. Judging from official media accounts and police reports, the number of arrests is in the hundreds, and many of us believe it may be in the thousands.

Charles Xue, a government critic and a Big V blogger with 12 million followers, who writes under the name Xue Manzi, was arrested as an early high-profile example. He was detained in August for allegedly hiring prostitutes, but the state-run news agency, Xinhua, made clear the true reason: “This has sounded a warning bell about the law to all Big V’s on the Internet.” The most infamous case was the arrest of a 16-year-old boy in Gansu Province. In early September, he posted two short messages commenting on the police’s handling of a mysterious death. His message included the phrase: “All officials shield one another.” He was arrested a few days later.

Meanwhile, the state media have published a steady flow of articles warning microbloggers to tone down their commentaries. An Aug. 24 editorial on Xinhua’s Web site said that popular bloggers who “poison the online environment” should be “dealt with like rats scurrying across the street that everyone wants to kill.”

It’s easy to see why the government feels threatened. The most popular microblogging service, Sina’s Weibo, has more than 500 million registered members and 54 million daily users, and has become the most important space for citizens to participate in public life — and expose government lies. Microbloggers dare to question the legitimacy of the one-party state. They expose corruption. They shame criminals.

And Big V bloggers don’t just express opinions; we act as information hubs. When we discuss issues online, people take notice. In 2010, I re-posted a news item about a protest against a forced eviction in Jiangxi Province in which three people resorted to self-immolation. The story was re-posted thousands of times and became one of the hottest news items of the year.

The vast state censorship apparatus works hard to keep us down. But posts race through Weibo so quickly that it’s difficult to control them with technology. Hence, the government is resorting to detainment.

The effect has been chilling. Since August, the Weibo community has collectively cooled down the political speech. The historian Zhang Lifan and others have dubbed the crackdown the “Internet anti-rightist campaign,” an echo of the anti-rightist campaign instigated by Mao in the late 1950s to crush dissent. Nearly 550,000 people were arrested or sent into exile. Just over a half-century later, the term “anti-rightist” still triggers fears that Chinese people have been trying to forget. And that is one of the government’s aims: to instil fear.

But these are different times. In 1957, Chinese intellectuals were on their own. They were defenseless and received no public support. In 2013, the Internet is like a giant public square where citizens can hear and support one another. Otherwise powerless people join together. When a courageous person steps forward, others follow.

I have been asked if I’m afraid. A couple of years ago, in the early days of my blogging, I was scared. Now I am not. I think my shift is representative of that of many popular bloggers, who have been emboldened by the freedom we’ve found online, as my friends have.

My friends and I channel our lingering anxiety into jokes about being on a government hit list. But of course this is a serious matter — and really all we can do is prepare for the inevitable.

For example, Xiao Han, a legal scholar in Beijing, has prepared a statement to be released in the event of his arrest, and sent a copy to his friends overseas. And he has preemptively decided on a courtroom strategy: If he is charged with disturbing public order or manufacturing rumors, he says he will counter-sue the government for its crimes and declare, “This is my court, too.”

The most I’ve done in preparation for arrest is to back up all my writing and give a copy to friends overseas.

As we contemplate the government’s next target, I keep my fear in check. I understand that for China to change, some people will have to pay a price. Wang Xiaoshan, a publisher who was among my friends at the dinner, put it best when he said: Start with me.

Murong Xuecun, the pen name of Hao Qun, is a novelist whose books include “Leave Me Alone: A Novel of Chengdu” and “Dancing Through Red Dust.” This article was translated by Jane Weizhen Pan and Martin Merz from the Chinese.
 
(South China Morning Post)
Peking University expels liberal economist Xia Yeliang

An elite Chinese university has decided to expel an outspoken economist who champions free speech and the rule of law, a move critics say underscores the Communist Party’s intolerance for discussion of democratic values that it believes threatens its legitimacy.

A 34-member faculty at Peking University’s School of Economics voted last week to dismiss Professor Xia Yeliang by a 30-3 vote, with one abstention, in a closed session from which he was excluded, Xia said on Friday after being notified of the decision. Calls to the university rang unanswered.

“I am angry inside, but I must face it with composure,” said Xia, who will remain employed by the university until his contract expires Jan. 31, more than 13 years after he started teaching there.

Rumours that Xia was facing expulsion had swirled in academic circles and on discussions on China’s popular microblogs for months, with many commentators saying such a move would be an assault on already limited academic freedoms in China.

Xia’s expulsion comes as China’s recently installed leadership has further tightened controls on public discourse, arresting popular bloggers for spreading so-called rumours and activists who have called for anti-corruption measures. Communist Party authorities reportedly issued a directive to some college campuses that certain topics are now barred from class discussions, including press freedom, judicial independence and civil society.

In August, East China University of Political Science and Law in Shanghai banned Zhang Xuezhong, also an outspoken professor, from teaching any course at the school.

Xia has been a vocal advocate for democracy in recent years. In 2008, he helped draft Charter 08, a bold call for sweeping changes to China’s one-party political system that landed its main champion, Liu Xiaobo, in prison.

Xia wrote an open letter in 2009 addressed to a senior Chinese leader criticising him for imposing tight controls on expression.

He said he was notified of his dismissal by school officials, who told him that the faculty committee – which had earlier approved of his academic performance – was not pleased with remarks he made against the university. Xia, however, has generally been critical of the government’s politics and its interference with the academic world.

Xia said the officials insisted that the dismissal was nonpolitical, although they also told him that the support he had received in the last several months did not do him any good.

Overseas, Xia has gained support among academia from Wellesley College in Massachusetts, the Committee of Concerned Scientists and, according to Xia, two foreign professors at the Shenzhen campus of Peking University.

A group of Wellesley professors had signed an open letter urging the school to reconsider an academic partnership with Peking University, in a high-profile case of US professors pushing a Chinese university to hold up the principle of academic freedom at a time when educational partnerships between the two countries are proliferating.

An open letter from the Committee of Concerned Scientists also urged Peking University’s president to consider the institution’s ambitions of making itself a “world-class seat of learning and research.”

“We therefore urge you to prevent a vote by your faculty that would punish Professor Xia, one of your respected academic colleagues, for his opinions, and deprive Peking University of his expertise,” the committee wrote in the July 31 letter.

But in September, China’s state-run nationalist newspaper Global Times criticised Xia for using social media to attack Peking University and urged the school not to yield to outside pressure.

“Only Peking University can decide whether it would keep Xia,” the Global Times editorial read. “After all, Peking University is a venue of teaching, not a place for political fighting.”
 
Current Rumor Crackdown in China a Tip of a Large Policy Iceberg
By Rogier Creemers (China Change)

(...)
This leads us to a third factor, the nature of the Party itself. The Party isn’t just there to attend to some of the arrangements underpinning Chinese society. Its program and its legitimacy rest on the delivery of a comprehensive modernization plan that improves everyone’s livelihoods. The CCP claims that only it has the means and the capacity to lead this process, and consequently claims a monopoly on political leadership. That puts it in a difficult position when it has to deal with social problems and tensions. If something goes wrong, the Party, in its own mind, must respond to alleviate the tension; it cannot stand aside and wash its hands of whichever hiccup occurs. Now, perhaps the Internet is not the most heartening lens into the workings of a society, as anyone who has ever read the comments posted to news websites or YouTube will know. However, to the Party, such online activity is an indication of profound disharmony, and must be replaced by “responsible, healthy and upward behavior.” Rather a huge and frustrating task, in my view.

Fourth, there is the current state of Chinese politics more generally. We still see the aftershocks of the leadership transition, which historically always have come together with political tensions and high-profile arrests, as well as the necessity to establish a new guiding ideology. Also, a lot of the low-hanging fruits for Chinese development have been picked, and its further trajectory will run into the law of decreasing marginal benefit. As always, it is attractive to deal with such anxieties by focusing on a superficial phenomenon, rather than have to face up to the fundamental structural weaknesses that generate those. It is much easier to say that everything that goes wrong in Chinese society is caused by a few louts spouting whatever on the Internet, than to admit that a number of fundamental ideas in CCP political thinking no longer are purpose-fit and may need to be abandoned. It is more comforting to reach back to slogans and methods from the past than to confront real and profound challenges thrown up in the present.
 
The Southern Street Movement
(China Change)

(...)
Up until the Southern Weekend Incident at the beginning of this year, according to Wang Aizhong, the Guangdong authorities had been relatively tolerant. When three or four people held up signs on the street, or in the park, the police would intervene but were by and large lenient. They seldom took the participants into custody, let alone criminally detained them. Even administrative detentions were used sparsely. At most the authorities would summon the participants “to drink tea”, or make a record of the event.
(...)
Since the Southern Weekend Incident at the beginning of this year, Mr. Wang told RFI , criminal detention has been directly applied to people who have participated in street demonstrations. In February, biologist and businessman Liu Yuandong (刘远东), an important player in the Southern Street Movement, was arrested. He has been held without a trial ever since, far beyond the legally prescribed time limit. Recent reports said Mr. Liu has been mistreated in jail.

In May, Huang Wenxun, Yuan Fengchu and a number of others, all of them regular participants in the Southern Street Movement, were detained in Chibi, Hubei. They were all beaten up by the police, and Huang Wenxun was tortured with electrical shocks. Other participants were also detained. After Shenzhen resident Yang Lin (杨林) had been missing for a month, his family received a notice of his arrest and learned that he had been accused of “inciting subversion of state power.”

The crackdown is clearly nationwide. Since April, China has detained close to 200 dissidents and activists, including Dr. Xu Zhiyong, billionaire investor Wang Gongquan (王功权) in its crackdown on the New Citizens Movement and the prominent Guangzhou-based dissident Guo Feixiong (郭飞雄).

Right now the situation is severe, but the Southern Street Movement participants have not backed down from their aspirations. Wang Aizhong said, “We must unwaveringly continue on with the street movement, influencing more people through our actions, and making the street movement bigger and bigger. Of course, facing the current suppression, we do our very best to avoid unnecessary losses. Our consensus is that we need to lie low for the time being, suspending our street activities for a while and focusing instead on developing strength. Our ultimate goal is to build a China that is democratic, constitutional, and that conforms to modern political civilization.”
 
Βαρυσήμαντο άρθρο του γνωστού κοινωνικού ανθρωπολόγου Marshall Sahlins, με θέμα:

China U.
Confucius Institutes censor political discussions and restrain the free exchange of ideas. Why, then, do American universities sponsor them?

(...)
The CI at Chicago presents the risible spectacle of Chinese Communists using Confucius’ name to channel Gary Becker’s über-capitalist ideology of rational choice.
The still-greater contradiction is that the Confucius Institute engaged the university’s cherished traditions of laissez-faire, both as a matter of academic freedom and as an economic philosophy, in a global project designed to increase the political influence of the People’s Republic of China.
(The Nation)
 
China’s Touchy Luxury Love Affair
By Roseann Lake
(The Diplomat)

BEIJING – On November 29, 2012, soon-to-be Chinese president Xi Jinping visited the National Museum of China and made a speech that was hailed as a coup in the State-sponsored “war against formalism and bureaucracy.” After touring the museum’s famed “Road to Renewal” exhibition, Xi spoke to the press casually and in a very informal setting, a move that earned him praise for abandoning the more stilted socialist jargon of his predecessor. The content of his speech, which has since become known as the “China Dream,” also won him accolades. Seemingly inspired by the exhibition, which houses historical elements dating back to the First Opium War and emphasizes China’s victimization by imperial forces, Xi offered up heaping spoons of nationalism while urging his comrades to unite in fostering “the great renewal of the Chinese nation.”

As he delivered these lines – dressed in a black windbreaker and dress shirt with the top few buttons undone – on the second floor of the same museum, 100 mannequins dressed in couture Christian Dior gowns, silently awaited their unveiling.

Slated to open at the National Museum of China on November 13 – just two weeks before Xi’s speech – “Esprit Dior,” was billed as an exhibition of Dior gowns, perfumes, accessories, photography and accompanying artwork by contemporary Chinese artists. In late November, various international media outlets reported that its opening had been delayed because the accompanying works by Chinese artists had not yet been completed. In early December, shortly after Xi’s speech, luxury conglomerate CEO Bernard Arnault of LVMH visited Beijing hoping to attend the opening of the exhibition, but the champagne flown in for the occasion remained in its bottles and the doors to the exhibition, closed.

A technician associated with the exhibition confirms that everything was vernissage ready by the time of Arnault’s visit, and that the only thing delaying a grand opening seemed to be mysterious resistance from the museum itself. On a regular basis, the technician, who prefers to remain anonymous due to the sensitive nature of the subject, tells The Diplomat that the exhibition would receive “visits.” These included various delegations from the museum, but also from the Chinese Vice-Minister of Culture, and two days later, from the Minister of Culture, himself. As a result of these “visits,” which lasted anywhere from an hour (the Vice-Minister of Culture was enraptured) to a few minutes (her superior, the Minister of Culture, was far less captivated), small changes were made to the exhibition.

The first was rather foreboding. At the entrance to the exhibition, which was the replica of the original Dior storefront on Avenue Montaigne in Paris, the name “Christian Dior,” which appeared etched into the stone of the storefront, was retouched, so that it was no longer visible. New insoles were also made for the 10 pairs of couture Dior shoes on display, masking their iconic Christian Dior label visible in the instep. The plaques which accompanied the items on display – indicating their year of creation and materials used to make them – were also edited so that “Christian Dior” was no longer visible on them. Videos of Dior fashion shows scheduled to play during the exhibition were frozen on frames with images where there was no detectable representation of the Dior label. Even the very name of the exhibition, which publications as mainstream as Vogue had been referring to for months as “Esprit Dior,” was changed to the rather cryptic, “La Beauté de l’Allure.”

Exactly why these changes were made is a subject neither the Museum nor Dior headquarters wish to comment on, but the mystery of why, on December 21, Dior staff in Beijing received a call from their superiors with instructions to pack everything up and repatriate it to France – before the Chinese public could get a glimpse of any of it – is a larger intrigue that has been delicately unraveling itself over the course of the last several months.

The day following Xi Jinping’s “China Dream” speech, his chief appointed corruption-buster, Wang Qishan, met with a committee of corruption fighting experts to stress the importance of cracking down on graft. The meeting marked the start of an anti-corruption campaign, which launched with a flurry of articles in Chinese media cheering the comeuppance of various party miscreants; the former district legislator who fathered 10 children with four different women, the prefecture chief who was revealed to own 23 homes, and the bureaucrat with $19 million in unexplained assets, among others. These types of strategically penned news stories have continued over the following months, with reports of corrupt officials embroiled in sex tape scandals and mistresses avenging and outing corrupt lovers, among the most popular.

Rod Wye, an associate fellow at the London-based think-tank Chatham House, attributes the persistence of salacious news stories to the new regime’s attempt to distinguish itself from the former administration; and particularly, from some of the more egregious problems that have plagued it. “Anti-corruption is the headline they’ve chosen, because it goes down well with the people. It shows the party is self-policing and self-cleansing,” he says, though he warns that there may be more rotten eggs than the party is willing or able to eradicate.

To Wye, the entire anti-corruption movement smacks of the strategy used by the party when handling cases of social unrest. “The narrative is that it’s all the fault of the corrupt, inefficient local officials who have brought this bad state of affairs about,” he explains. “They like to make it seem that a deus ex machina from the center swoops in and waves his magic wand, the corrupt inefficient official is dealt with, and everyone lives happily ever after.” The danger with this approach is that it only deals with the problem in a very isolated, superficial way, and allows the central governing force to put a distance between itself and the mal-administrations of its system. The local administrations are turned into the scapegoats, and the central powers who discipline them are reinforced in their role as the ultimate source of power and salvation of the people.

But what might all of this have to do with a 67-year old French luxury label?

As one of the only museums in China to operate under the direct jurisdiction of the Chinese Ministry of Culture, the National Museum of China is one of the Party’s prime means of showcasing and shaping the narrative of history. While this may sound rudimentary in a country where State-controlled media confections the news on a daily basis, it’s more complicated than it sounds. The governing elite tasked with writing this narrative are often in disaccord on how they’d like it to be presented. A statue of Confucius, for instance, once stood prominently at the front of the museum, until one night when it was quietly relegated to a remote internal courtyard because certain members of the elite decided that China’s revival would not benefit from a reminder of the strictly hierarchical relationships enforced by Confucianism.

These types of internal tiffs and changes, Dior employees may be unsurprised to learn, have resulted in the museum spending more time closed, than open, in the 50-odd years of its existence. Built in 1959 as one of the Ten Great Buildings commissioned to celebrate the ten-year anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the museum occupies an honorary place overlooking Tiananmen Square (where, ironically, some of China’s most violent manifestations against government corruption have taken place). When it was first scheduled to open, Prime Minister Zhou Enlai is said to have visited and objected that it did not sufficiently emphasize the “red line,” or the spirit of the country’s supreme leader, Mao Zedong.

The museum officially opened in 1961, closed a few years later in 1966 with the onset of the Cultural Revolution, and didn’t open again until 1979. It continued to erratically open and close until 2001, when Beijing won the bid to host the 2008 Olympics. At this time, it was decided that China needed a world-class museum to spruce up its capital. In an attempt to make it the largest in the world, what were formerly known as the Museum of Chinese History and the Museum of the Chinese Revolution were combined in 2003 and renamed the National Museum of China. Then, in 2005, a German architectural firm was enlisted, and renovations were set to be completed in time for the Games in 2008, but the museum’s opening was postponed again to October 1, 2009, or the 60th anniversary of Communist Party rule. That deadline wasn’t met either, but in March 2011, after a decade of renovations worth $400 million, and more than 50 years of spotty operation, the National Museum of China once again opened its doors.

As noted by Kirk Denton, China historian and author of Exhibiting the Past: Historical Memory and the Politics of Museums in Postsocialist China, the museum reopened with a selection of three very telling marquee exhibitions. The first was the previously mentioned “Road to Renewal” exhibition, which Denton notes, plays to the glorious socialist legacy which the Party would like to keep fresh in the minds of its people. Next, there was the exhibition on the Chinese Enlightenment, which traced the Party’s origins to the May 4th Movement, highlighting a move towards anti-imperialism and an upsurge in Chinese nationalism. The third exhibition, opening just two months later in May of 2011, was “Louis Vuitton Voyages,” an spread of luxurious LV suitcases and travel accessories.

“It was very odd that a museum meant to represent China’s tradition, history and revolution reopen with an LV exhibition,” notes Denton, “though it is completely representative of the post-socialist consumerist society supported by the Party.”

And indeed, the Party’s relationship to luxury is deeper than it might like to admit.

Luxury brands began their foray into China in the early 1990s, with Louis Vuitton at the helm. Former Chairman and CEO of LV Yves Carcelle is largely credited with making LV the luxury retail giant that it has become, as a result of his foresight and determination to make LV the first major luxury house with a store in China. It is also no secret that the early days of the luxury industry in China were fueled by the purchases of Party officials; either in the form of lavish gifts to grease their “guanxi;” the system of backdoor favors and exchanges on which China runs, or in the form of lavish gifts to mistresses, in exchange for favors of another variety.

As might be expected, the “Louis Vuitton Voyages” exhibition was met with a fair degree of ire <http://www.china.org.cn/china/2011-06/01/content_22689523.htm>. Yet while Peking University professor Xia Xueluan won support for his critique that the exhibition was ill-suited to a state-level public museum – would should instead restrict itself to non-profit cultural promotion – the general response to the museum was positive. Lines for the exhibition extended for hours, and netizens rejoiced at their opportunity to see craftsmanship mixed with commercial success; something rarely reflected in the “made in China” label. On the heels of LV, the Italian luxury giant, Bvlgari hosted “125 Years of Italian Magnificence” at the National Museum of China that following September, and Chanel showcased more than 400 articles in “Culture Chanel,” at the National Art Museum in November of 2011.

Dior’s experience at the Museum, however, was less fortunate. Before it could open, the luxury label had to scotch an exhibition that had been several months and millions in the making. All 100 gowns and accompanying elements were sent back to France, denying the Chinese public of an exhibition which otherwise promised to be both exquisite and edifying. Prior to its original opening date, a Dior team had spent over a month inside the National Museum of China, custom-building a set tgar included a sprawling atelier where an artisan leather-worker, flown in from France, would be cutting and stitching together Dior bags. A brodeuse would also be on site, hand-embroidering gowns as visitors made their way through the exhibition, which was designed to educate visitors about the artistry and artisanship that define the luxury of the label. Several elements featured in the exhibition were also historical, including a perfume coffret that had belonged to Grace Kelly, and was on special loan from the Principality of Monaco. Accompanying artworks by Chinese artists were also plentiful, among them, Zhang Huan’s stunningly realistic oversized portrait of Dior, made from the ashes of a Chinese temple.

Though considerable time, money, and opportunity to increase brand awareness was lost, as of September 13, 2013, the Dior exhibition is now back in China. Nearly one year later, it enjoyed a much warmer reception at the privately owned Museum of Contemporary Art (MoCA) in Shanghai, which has previously hosted other luxury giants such as Chanel, Ferragamo and Van Cleef & Arpels. “We’re getting over 1,200 visitors per day, and the weekends are crazy,” explains the MoCA Marketing Manager, who preferred not to be mentioned by name. The 1,800-square-meter exhibition space contains a similarly spectacular display of couture and art intended for the National Museum of China, but with none of the imposed subtlety or label masking. Advertisements for the exhibition, which has been restored to its original name, “Esprit Dior,” abound in People’s Park, and even the museum café has paid its homage to haute couture, allowing diners to eat in a garden of topiaries shaped like Dior handbags and J’adore perfume bottles.

With the exhibition at MoCA, Dior has recovered a tremendous opportunity to connect with the Chinese market, which already appears geared in its favor. Dior currently has more than 40 stores on the Mainland, and according to reports by Bain Capital, in 2012, it surpassed Burberry as the second most popular brand of womenswear, after Chanel. As the top five luxury brands are reported to account for 50 percent of luxury goods sales in China, in a luxury market worth an estimated 115 billion RMB ($18.9 billion), this is a significant accomplishment. Though Dior’s rise may have more to do with the increased buying power of young Chinese women than the purchases of profligate party officials, Bain reports that 35 percent of luxury purchases made in China are still for gifting purposes.

“The bottom line is, luxury brands in China are not going to go away,” says Radha Chada, a leading marketing and consumer insights expert, and co-author of The Cult of the Luxury Brand: Inside Asia’s Love Affair with Luxury. “They’re now so much a part of Chinese culture, they’ve become the very ecosystem that guanxi puts into place.” She suspects the Dior debacle at the National Museum was just a matter of extremely unfortunate timing; evidence of the far-reaching ramifications of sudden changes in the Chinese political climate, a testament to how meticulously orchestrated these changes can be, and a shallow, temporary attempt at feigning thrift.

“The Party’s strong link to luxury will persist until there’s a more proper legal system that enforces transparency, accountability and justice in China,” says Chada. “Until then, if you’re in trouble, you reach out to your internal relations, and in order to be able to count on them when needed, you must nurture them.”

Roseann Lake is a Beijing-based journalist.
 
SimCity σ' Ανατολή και Δύση σε συνδυασμό με αναγκαστικό συνοικισμό with Chinese characteristics. (NYT)

Leaving the Land (Articles in this series are looking at how China’s government-driven effort to push the population to towns and cities is reshaping a nation that for millenniums has been defined by its rural life.)
New China Cities: Shoddy Homes, Broken Hope

SimCity σ' Ανατολή και Δύση:
As China pushes ahead with government-led urbanization, a program expected to be endorsed at a Communist Party Central Committee meeting that began Saturday, many worry that the scores of new housing developments here may face the same plight as postwar housing projects in Western countries. Meant to solve one problem, they may be creating a new set of troubles that could plague Chinese cities for generations.
(...)
Και τα Chinese characteristics:
But many others did not want to leave their land. By 2008, the government’s offer had met limited success, with only half the population choosing to move. Already, though, government propaganda was extolling Huaming as a success, and officials planned to feature it at the world’s fair in two years’ time.
“They said if we didn’t move, it would affect the World Expo,” said Jia Qiufu, 69, a former resident of Guanzhuang Village. “They said it had to happen by 2009 because the Expo was the next year.”
The local government used intense pressure to force farmers out of their villages. It tore up roads and cut electricity and water. Even so, thousands stayed on. As a final measure, the schoolhouses — one in each village — were demolished. With no utilities and no way to educate their children, most farmers capitulated and moved to town.


Κάτι γλωσσικό· αγνοούσα την ύπαρξη του επιθέτου Potemkin:
Two greenhouses seemed to be functioning; local residents said they were used to make gifts of produce to visiting leaders as Potemkin-like proof of the still-vibrant agricultural sector.
Oxford Dictionaries:
adjective
informal

having a false or deceptive appearance, especially one presented for the purpose of propaganda: it is a Potemkin party; there is little behind the impressive parliamentary group seen on television

Origin:
1930s: from Grigori Aleksandrovich Potyomkin (often transliterated Potemkin), a favourite of Empress Catherine II of Russia, who reputedly gave the order for sham villages to be built for the empress's tour of the Crimea in 1787
 
"Η οδός του Γιν μου λέει: αφήνω να μπει όποιον θέλω / έχω δικαίωμα να φλερτάρω αλλά δεν μπορείτε να με παρενοχλείτε." Για δεύτερη φορά, οι Μονόλογοι του Αιδοίου στην Κίνα. (Le Figaro)
 
Φοιτητές ντύθηκαν αστυνομικοί από τις αρχές, έναντι ποσού μεγαλύτερου από αυτό που βγάζουν μοιράζοντας π.χ. προσπέκτους, ώστε η αστυνομική δύναμη να φαντάζει μεγαλύτερη στη διάρκεια αναγκαστικής κατεδάφισης σπιτιών. Επίσης, η Φόξκον ανάγκασε άλλους φοιτητές που παρακολουθούσαν σεμινάριο στο εργοστάσιό της να κατασκευάζουν κονσόλες, απειλώντας τους ότι αν δυστροπούσαν δεν θα τους έδινε τα μόρια που έχουν ανάγκη για να πάρουν το πτυχίο τους. (Le Figaro)
 
Αυτό κι αν είναι πονοκέφαλος!

Exclusive: Supporters of China's disgraced Bo Xilai set up political party
By Benjamin Kang Lim and Ben Blanchard

(Reuters) - Supporters of China's disgraced senior politician Bo Xilai, who has been jailed for corruption, have set up a political party, two separate sources said, in a direct challenge to the ruling Communist Party's de facto ban on new political groups.
The Zhi Xian Party, literally "the constitution is the supreme authority" party, was formed on November 6, three days before the opening on Saturday of a key conclave of top Communist Party leaders to discuss much-needed economic reforms, the sources said.
It named Bo as "chairman for life", Wang Zheng, one of the party's founders and an associate professor of international trade at the Beijing Institute of Economics and Management, told Reuters by telephone.

"This is not illegal under Chinese law. It is legal and reasonable," Wang said.

A second source, who asked not to be identified but who has direct knowledge of the party's founding, confirmed the news. Calls to the Communist Party's propaganda department seeking comment went unanswered.

The Communist Party has not allowed any opposition parties to be established since it came to power following the 1949 revolution, so history suggests it will not look kindly on this new party, even more so because its titular head is a former member of its top ranks.
Activists have been jailed in the past for setting up political parties, although parties have never before coalesced around fallen top political figures.
Asked if she was worried she would be arrested, Wang said: "We are not afraid. I don't think we will be arrested." The new party announced its establishment by sending letters to the Communist Party, China's eight other political parties, parliament and the top advisory body to parliament, Wang said, adding that no ceremony was held.
It also sent a letter to Bo on Friday via the warden of his prison informing him that he would be their "chairman for life", she said. It was not immediately clear if Bo would agree.
The party was set up because it "fully agrees with Mr Bo Xilai's common prosperity" policy, according to a party document seen by Reuters, a reference to Bo's leftist egalitarian policies that won him so many supporters.
Asked if party members included Communists, government officials or People's Liberation Army officers, Wang said she could not discuss the matter to protect them because it was politically "sensitive".

HISTORY LESSON

China's constitution guarantees freedom of association, along with freedom of speech and assembly, but all are banned in practice. The constitution does not explicitly allow or ban the establishment of political parties. Wang said school authorities asked her not to go ahead with her plans to form the party, but added that she was not doing anything illegal. She said she had not been approached by the government. The school could not be reached for comment on a weekend.
Bo, once a rising star in China's leadership circles who had cultivated a following through his populist, quasi-Maoist policies, was jailed for life in September on charges of corruption and abuse of power after a dramatic fall from grace that shook the Communist Party ahead of a once-in-a-decade generational leadership change.
Many of his supporters viewed his fall and the trial as a political plot against him, rather than the consequence of any wrongdoing, and the Communist Party remains worried about his influence.
A Communist Party document circulated this month urged officials to toe the line and learn from Bo's mistakes, sources said. They were told to fully conform with the party's decision to expel and prosecute Bo.
Senior party leaders had pushed for Bo to get a long sentence, fearing he could stage a political comeback one day if not dealt with harshly.
China's Communist rulers have held an iron grip on power since the 1949 revolution, though they allow the existence of eight government-sanctioned non-Communist parties, which were founded pre-1949. Technically, their role is to advise rather than serve as a functioning opposition, ostensibly to give a veneer of democracy. The Communist Party views the founding of opposition parties as subversion.
One of China's most prominent dissidents, Xu Wenli, was sentenced to 13 years in prison in 1998 for helping to organize an opposition party, the China Democracy Party. Xu and other activists set up the party that year, but the government took a dim view and by 2000 Beijing had effectively crushed the nascent movement and locked up its founders and members. Xu was forced into exile in the United States in December 2002.

Bo is imprisoned at the Qincheng penitentiary, just north of Beijing, where fallen members of the elite are incarcerated. He was expelled from the Communist Party last year ahead of his trial.

(Editing by Neil Fullick)
 
(ΝΥΤ)
Reporter for Reuters Won’t Receive China Visa
By ANDREW JACOBS

The websites for Bloomberg News and The New York Times have been blocked in China for more than a year following the publication of investigative articles by both news organizations that detailed the wealth accumulated by relatives of top Chinese leaders. Since then, employees for both Bloomberg and The Times have been awaiting residency visas that would allow them to report from China.

Such tactics appear to have had an impact. On Saturday, The Times detailed a decision late last month by Bloomberg to withhold publication of an investigative report, more than a year in the works, that explored hidden financial ties between one of China’s wealthiest men and the families of senior Chinese leaders. Company employees said the editor in chief, Matthew Winkler, defended the decision by comparing it to the self-censorship by foreign news bureaus that sought to remain working inside Nazi Germany.

Mr. Winkler and a senior editor denied that the articles had been killed and said they would eventually be published.

The Chinese government’s rejection of Mr. Mooney’s visa request will certainly add to the anxieties of foreign reporters in China, many of whom complain of cyberattacks, police interference and intimidation, especially during the annual visa renewal process, currently underway, which sometimes involves interviews with Foreign Ministry officials or public security personnel.

In a statement, the Foreign Correspondents Club of China said, “Such delays and lack of transparency merely add to the impression that the visa process is being used by the authorities to intimidate journalists and media organizations.”

Last year, Al Jazeera English shut its Beijing bureau after the authorities refused to renew press credentials and the visa of its China correspondent, Melissa Chan. Although they did not explain the reasons behind Ms. Chan’s expulsion, the first from China in 14 years, it was widely seen as retaliation for her hard-hitting coverage of Chinese society.

An American currently based in San Francisco, Ms. Chan said the Chinese government’s recent efforts to bully some of the largest foreign news organizations would have an insidious trickle-down effect on smaller media outlets, especially those from Southeast Asia and Africa that cannot afford to lose what may be their sole correspondent in China. “It’s got to have a chilling effect that leads to some level of self-censorship,” she said in a phone interview on Saturday.

Mr. Mooney said he suspected that the government’s decision to deny him a visa was punishment for his persistent coverage of human rights abuses in China. In April, after submitting his visa application to the Chinese Consulate in San Francisco, he was summoned for an interview, where he was questioned about previous articles and asked to explain his position on delicate issues like Tibet. The interview ended with a barely veiled threat. “They said, ‘If we give you a visa, we hope you’ll be more balanced with your coverage,’ ” he said he was told.
 
Σημαντικές αποφάσεις από την 3η Ολομέλεια της 18ης ΚΕ του ΚΚΚ, που τερμάτισε τις εργασίες της την εβδομάδα που μας πέρασε. Πέρα από τα οικονομικά, υπήρξαν και ανακοινώσεις για την πολιτική του ενός παιδιού (για να εξαιρεθεί ένα ζευγάρι από τον περιορισμό θα αρκεί τώρα ένας από τους δύο γονείς να είναι μοναχοπαίδι, ενώ ως τώρα έπρεπε να είναι και οι δύο) και για τα στρατόπεδα αναμόρφωσης μέσω της εργασίας, όπου μπορεί να εγκλειστεί κάποιος χωρίς δίκη, απλά με απόφαση της αστυνομίας:

The party leaders also confirmed an announcement made earlier this year, and then abruptly retracted, that they intend to abolish re-education through labor, which since the 1950s has empowered police authorities to imprison people without any real judicial review. Experts and officials have debated whether to adjust or abolish the system of camps since the 1980s. Now abolition is closer.

“Abolish the system of re-education through labor,” said the decision, which proposed expanding community corrections to partly replace the system.

“This is a significant step forward,” said Nicholas Bequelin, a senior researcher who specializes in China with Human Rights Watch, an advocacy organization based in New York.

“It doesn’t mean that China is going to be kinder to dissent and to its critics,” Mr. Bequelin said. “But it’s an important step to do away with a system that not only profoundly violated human rights, but was also standing in the way of any further legal reform.”

Re-education through labor was introduced under Mao Zedong to lock away those considered political opponents, and it expanded into a system of incarceration holding more than 100,000 people, many of them working in prison factories and on farms. Sentences are determined by the police, and defendants have scant chance to appeal imprisonment that can last up to four years.

The document gives no date for bringing labor re-education to an end, or for introducing the changes to family planning policy. And there is the possibility that the government will delay or dilute the changes, or introduce similar restrictions under another name, Mr. Bequelin said. The decision also leaves in place labor camps that are part of the general penal system for those convicted in court.


Και επίσης:

Under Mr. Xi, the government has pursued a broad crackdown on political dissent, critical opinion and rumors on the Internet, and perceived ideological threats. But the decision promised fairer and more predictable treatment from the police and the courts, hinting at support for long-discussed measures intended to make judges more independent of the local officials in their jurisdictions.

“Improve the transparency and public credibility of the judiciary,” Mr. Xi said in his statement. But he also promised more stringent controls on the Internet: “Ensuring order, national security and social stability in the dissemination of information on the Internet has become a real and pressing problem facing us.”
(NYT)
 
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